China's Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure connectivity and other projects are presented in much of the discourse as a grand strategy to trap developing nations in debt, to exert asymmetric power and construct a new world economic order. The asymmetric relationship between China and Myanmar might therefore be expected to generate a range of political risks for stakeholders. Myanmar itself presents a "perfect storm" of problems, with dysfunctional governance, civil conflict, under-development and growing economic dependence on China. The Kyaukphyu port project and associated Special Economic Zone in Myanmar's troubled Rakhine state is investigated as a case study of risks on the Belt and Road. While worst case fears China might seize military control of the port appear unlikely, at least in current conditions, empirical observation indicates the complexity on the ground generates an array of other risks - as well as opportunities, should conditions allow. Further, despite challenges and constrained capacity, Myanmar governments have demonstrated agency, including by re-negotiating control and costs of the Kyaukphyu project. The case underlines that conditions are more complicated than simply China's asymmetric power. A sceptical approach is taken to normative discourses in order to build inductive understanding of how stakeholders and local experts perceive dynamics underway. A political risk approach is deployed to develop a framework to identify, analyse and assess risks for actors in relation to the Kyaukphyu project. The research findings are presented on an interim basis, given current constraints on field interviews due to the current crisis.
In the last several decades, and especially since the Chinese launching of the Belt and Road (BRI) initiative in 2013, the Chinese presence in Central Asia has intensified. Russia and Chinese leaders deny that there is any conflict of interests between them, while the standard narrative has been that the two states adhere to a functional division of tasks in which China concentrates on economic activity while Russia acts as the security guarantor for the region. This article argues that the professed equanimity between the Russian and Chinese leaderships masks the emergence of widening cracks in their relationship with regard to Central Asia. The convenient narrative of a functional division of tasks between the two states is called into question by China's increasingly active presence in the military and security sector in the region, but China's influence is growing throughout the Central Asian economic, political, and social order. China's movement into Central Asia challenges Russia's claim to act as an equal partner of China, as well as its pretensions to regional hegemony. This development reflects the widening disparity between the two states with respect to their power capabilities but it also exposes the interactions between Russia and China in Central Asia as the most vulnerable aspect of their relationship. In Central Asia, a defensive Russia encounters an ascendant China.
This article is a sub-section of a comparative analysis of depictions of violence in Jakarta's Museum of the Indonesian Communist Party's Treachery, Ho Chi Minh City's War Remnants Museum, and Phnom Penh's Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. In comparing these public history sites, I analyze how memories of mass violence were central to state formation in both Suharto's anti-Communist New Order (1966-1998), the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (1976-present), and Cambodia since the collapse of Democratic Kampuchea (1979-present). While this comparison points out specific distinctions about the role of the military, the nature of revolution, and conceptions of gender, it argues for a central similarity in the use of a mythology of victimization in building these post-conflict nation-states. This article focuses on my gendered analysis of the use of images of women and children in each museum. Depending on context and political purpose, these museums cast women as tragic victim, revolutionary heroine, or threat to the social order. My analysis of gender places stereotypical images of violence against women (the trope of women and children as the ultimate victims) in conversation with dark fantasies of women as perpetrators of savage violence and heroic images of women liberated by participation in violence.
International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
/
v.21
no.7
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pp.331-340
/
2021
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a rapidly growing physical network that depends on objects, vehicles, sensors, and smart devices. IoT has recently become an important research topic as it autonomously acquires, integrates, communicates, and shares data directly across each other. The centralized architecture of IoT makes it complex to concurrently access control them and presents a new set of technological limitations when trying to manage them globally. This paper proposes a new decentralized access control architecture to manage IoT devices using blockchain, that proposes a solution to concurrency management problems and enhances resource locking to reduce the transaction conflict and avoids deadlock problems. In addition, the proposed algorithm improves performance using a fully distributed access control system for IoT based on blockchain technology. Finally, a performance comparison is provided between the proposed solution and the existing access management solutions in IoT. Deadlock detection is evaluated with the latency of requesting in order to examine various configurations of our solution for increasing scalability. The main goal of the proposed solution is concurrency problem avoidance in decentralized access control management for IoT devices.
In the midst of accelerating wars around the world, unmanned robot technology that can guarantee the safety of human life is emerging. ERP-42 is a modular platform that can be used according to the application. In the field of defense, it can be used for transporting supplies, reconnaissance and surveillance, and medical evacuation in conflict areas. Due to the nature of the military environment, atypical environments are predominant, and in such environments, the platform's path followability is an important part of mission performance. This paper focuses on reducing the minimum turning radius in terms of improving path followability. The minimum turning radius of the existing 2WS/2WD in-wheel platform was reduced by increasing the torque of the independent driving in-wheel motor on the rear wheel to generate oversteer. To determine the degree of oversteer, two GPS were attached to the center of the front and rear wheelbases and measured. A closed-loop speed control method was used to maintain a constant rotational speed of each wheel despite changes in load or torque.
Sang-Keun Cho;Ji-Min Lee;Eui-Chul Shin;Myung-Sook Hong;Jun-Chul Song;Sang-Hyuk Park
International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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v.11
no.2
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pp.196-201
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2023
The future is complex and unpredictable. In particular, it is unlikely to occur, but once it occurs, no one knows how it will affect our society if X-event, which has a tremendous impact, is created. This study was conducted only in the climate field to offset the ripple effect of this X-event, and was conducted through in-depth interviews with experts from the Korea Army Research Center for Future & Innovation and the Army College. As a result, it was possible to explore what factors would trigger X-event from their discourse and what X-event would be newly created by spreading them to other fields. Starting with this study, if we accumulate the discourse of experts in various fields such as population, science and technology, as well as climate, and other fields other than the Army, we can predict X-event and offset the threats that may arise.
In modern international law, the absence of legal definition regarding drone(Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) has made legal scholars work on an typical analogy between aircraft codified in the international document and drone. The wording of the Convention on International Civil Aviation is limited to two categories of aircraft, such as civil aircraft and state aircraft, whereas military aircraft is not legally defined. As such it is, the current practices of the State regarding the drone flight over foreign territory have proven a hypothese that drone is being deemed as military aircraft. Principal usage of drone lies in reconnaissance and surveillance mission as well as so-called targeted killing, which is prohibited if the killing is treacherous. Claimed war against terrorism, however, is providing a legal rationale that targeted killing is not treacherous, and that the targeted person is not civilian but combatant. In such context, armed attack of drone is deemed legal and justified. Consequently, such attack is legal in the general context of the war. The rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon system used, and there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflict so long as they are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war. Drones may present interesting new challenges because of their sophistication and the technological advantage they convey to their operators.
Former ministers of national defense and foreign affairs, intellectuals such as former and incumbent professors, and various NGO groups are demanding the South Korean government to stop promoting independence in operational control which is currently held by the United States Armed Forces in Korea commander. Although the Korea should exercise operational control independently in the future, orientation on the direction which should be taken under consideration in promoting this transfer should be assumed. First of all, South Korea must sufficiently examine the criticisms and dissenting opinions, and reflect them in promoting independence in operational control. From now on, the South Korean government should reflect the opinions of experts in operational control, and must promote the transfer with national consensus. Unilateral enforcement of the transfer may cause serious errors and aggravate conflicts Second, ROKA's exercise of independence in operational control should take place only after gaining restraint on North Korea's attack against the South, and the issues on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction(WMD) has been resolved, and a peace regime has been reached. Furthermore, exercise of independence in wartime operational control should be promoted only if there is a guarantee that international trust and the military collaboration will be restored to a level beyond the present state. Third, the USFK and the Korean-US alliance is providing South Korea with national security, not to mention tremendous diplomatical, and economical benefits However, if the alliance between the two countries become weakened due to the exercise of the independence in operational control, we might suffer a great deal of loss. Even though reasonable justification and external independence may be gained through promoting independence in operational control, it should be promoted in a longitudinal manner because national security problems and conflicts may be intensified, and there is no actual profit in doing so. Fourth, if the Korean-US alliance becomes weakened and therefore the United States decides to discuss eastern-asia strategies, North Korea deterrence strategies, and Japanese rearmament issues with other neighboring countries, South Korea may become diplomatically isolated and a subordinate to surrounding countries, destroying the independence we have now instead of restoring it Therefore searching for means to reinforce international trust and collaboration between South Korea and the United States, and leaving ROKA’s independence in operational control as a long term objective would be a more realistic method.
Declaration of Air Defense and Identification Zones started with the United States in 1950, which was followed by declaration of KADIZ by the Republic of Korea in 1951. Initial ADIZ were solely linked with air defense missions, but their roles have changed as nations around the globe manifested a tendency to expand their influence over maritime resources and rights. In particular, China declared ADIZ over the East China Sea in October 2013 and forced all passing aircraft to submit flight plan to ATC or military authority, saying failure of submission will be followed by armed engagement. China announced it would declare another zone over the South China Sea despite the ongoing conflict in the area, clearly showing ADIZ's direct connection with territorial claim and EEZ and that it serves as a zone within which a nation can execute its rights. The expanded KADIZ, which was expanded in Dec 15, 2013 in response to Chinese actions, overlaps with the Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea and the Japanese ADIZ. The overlapping zone is an airspace over waters where not only the Republic of Korea but also of China and Japan argue to be covering their continental shelf and EEZ. Military conventions were signed to prevent contingencies among the neighboring nations while conducting identifications in KADIZ, including the overlapping zone. If such military conventions and practice of air defense identification continue to be respected among states, it is under the process of turning into a regional customary law, although ADIZ is not yet recognized by international law or customary law. Moreover, identification within ADIZ is carried out by military authorities of states, and misguided customary procedures may cause serious negative consequences for national security since it may negatively impact neighboring countries in marking the maritime border, which calls for formulation of operation rules that account for other state activities and military talks among regional stake holders. Legal frameworks need to be in place to guarantee freedom of flights over international seas which UN Maritime Law protects, and laws regarding military aircraft operation need to be supplemented to not make it a requirement to submit flight plan if the aircraft does not invade sovereign airspace. Organizational instructions that require approval of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrance and exit of ADIZ for military aircraft need to be amended to change the authority to Minister of National Defense or be promoted to a law to be applicable for commercial aircraft. Moreover, in regards to operation and management of ADIZ, transfer of authority should be prohibited to account for its evolution into a regional customary law in South East Asia. In particular, since ADIZ is set over EEZ, military conventions that yield authority related to national security should never be condoned. Among Korea, China, Japan and Russia, there are military conventions that discuss operation and management of ADIZ in place or under negotiation, meaning that ADIZ is becoming a regional customary law in North East Asia region.
The late $19^{th}$ and early $20^{th}$ centuries of Korea were the times when the Confucianism (牲理學) ideology was shaken heavily under the influences of modernism and capitalism by Western and Japanese military and political-economic forces. Under such circumstances, alteration of clothing was much influenced by ideologies than changes in social structure or technological advance. In this study, an ideology was defined as "the force which drives people into a particular social order". Ideologies were postulated as an ongoing process of socialization with dialectic features rather than being a static state. Comparative analyses on conflict structures and different clothing patterns symbolizing the ideologies of the Ruling (支配) and the Opposition (對抗) were conducted. Investigating dresses as representations of ideologies is to reconsider the notion of dichotomous confrontation between the conservatives (守舊派) and the progressives (開化派) and a recognition of Koreans' passively accepting modernity during the Japanese occupation. This may also have contributed to enlightening Koreans about modernization. Here are the results. First, the theoretical review found that ideologies were represented by not only symbols of discourse, but also dresses, and that dresses embodied both physical and conceptual systems presenting differences between ideologies and their natures, Second, during the late 19th century Korea, conflict between conservatives' Hanbok (韓服) and progressives' Western suits (洋服) was found. Moderate progressives showed their identity by "Colored Clothing" (深色衣), and radical progressives by black suits with short hair (黑衣斷髮) or by western suits (洋服). The ultimate goal of both parties was a "Modern Nation". With these efforts, pale jade green coats and traditional hats symbolizing the nobleman class was eliminated within 30 years from 1880 to 1910, and then simple robes and short hair emerged. However, the powerful Japanese army had taken over the hegemony of East Asia, and Korea was sharply divided into modernization and pro-Japanese camps. Third, during the time of Japanese colonial rule, the dress codes having set by the modernization policies during the time of enlightenment were abandoned and colonial uniforms for the colonial system was meticulously introduced. During this period, Western or Japanese-style uniforms were the symbol of the ruling ideology. In the mean time, Hanbok, particularly "White Clothing (白衣)", emerged as a representation of the opposition ideology. However, due to Japan's coercive power and strong zeal for "Great orient (大東亞)", white clothing remained as a mere symbol. Meanwhile, Reformists (實力養成論者) movement toward improving quality of life followed a similar path of the Japanese policies and was eventually incorporated into the ruling ideology. Fourth, dresses as representations of ruling ideologies were enforced by organizational powers, such as organizations and laws, and binding policies, and changes in such dresses were more significant when the ruling ideologies were stronger. Clothing of the opposition ideology was expressed as an aggregation of public consciousness. During the period, the subjects of ruling ideology and the objects who were granted modernization benefits were different although their drives for colored clothing with short hair (色衣斷髮) for modernization were similar.
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