• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.11a
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• pp.134-136
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• 2003

The deregulated electricity market is operated with respect to theory of economical efficiency, and therefore, the system operator requires data with fast contingency ranking for security of the bulk power system. This paper compares the weather dependant probabilistic risk index(PRI) with the system performance index for power flow in the IEEE-RBTS. also, the system performance index for power flow presents the power system stability. The probabilistic risk index can be classified into normal weather and adverse weather. This paper proposes calculation method using the probabilistic risk index in determining contingency ranking requiring for security under the deregulated electricity market.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.11 no.12
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• pp.5803-5819
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• 2017

In this paper, we proposed a contract theory based cooperative spectrum sharing scheme with joint power and bandwidth optimization under asymmetric information, where the primary user (PU) does not know the secondary users' (SUs) private information. To improve performance, PU needs to provide incentives to stimulate nearby SUs to help forward its signal. By using contract theory, PU and SUs' negotiations are modeled as a labor market. PU and SUs act as the employer and employees, respectively. Specifically, SUs provide labor (i.e. the relay power, which can be used for forwarding PU's signal) in exchange for the reward (i.e. the spectrum access bandwidth which can be used for transmitting their own signals). PU needs to overcome a challenge how to balance the relationship between contributions and incentives for the SUs. We study the optimal contract design which consists of relay power and spectrum access bandwidth allocation. We show that the most efficient SUs will be hired by the PU to attend the cooperative communication. PU can achieve the same maximum utility as in the symmetric information scenario. Simulation results confirm that the utility of PU is significantly enhanced with our proposed cooperative spectrum sharing scheme.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.403-405
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• 2000

This paper presents a N-player game theory application for analyzing power transactions in a deregulated energy marketplace such as PoolCo, where, participants, especially, generating entities, maximize their net profits through optimal bidding strategies (i.e., bidding prices and bidding generations). In this paper, the electricity market for power transactions is modeled as a non-cooperative. N-player game with complete information, where the solution is determined in a continuous strategy domain having recourse to the Nash equilibrium idea.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.1050-1072
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• 2011

It is well known that international cooperation is considerably more difficult because of the difference of interests, level of technology of the partners, social and culture as well as various macro-environmental conditions. This case study aims to investigate the success factors of international R&D collaboration between two firms. For it, an in-dept interview was conducted to the Etri-Microsoft Information Security Lab. A comprehensive research on theories, such as resource-based theory, network theory, relationship marketing theory and market power perspective was done as well. The results show clear objectives, communications based on trust, core competence on which the counterpart can rely on, consideration on the government decision process as well as the environment are important for success.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.12
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• pp.597-602
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• 2002

The restructuring of power industry is still going on all over the world for last several decades. Many kinds of restructuring model have been studied, proposed, and applied. Among those models, power pool is more popular than other. This paper assumes the power pool market structure having competitive generation sector, and a new method is presented to build a bidding strategy in that market. The utilities participating in the market have the perfect information of their cost and price functions, but they don't know which strategy to be chosen by others. To define one's strategy as a vector, we make utility's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's strategy using Nash equilibrium or stochastic methods. And he also has to forecast the system demand. According to this forecasting result, his payoffs can be changed. Considering these all conditions, we formulate a bidding game problem and apply noncooperative game theory to that problem for the optimal strategy or solution. Some restrictive assumption are added for simplification of solving process. A numerical example is given in Case Study to show essential features and concrete results of this approach.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.6
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• pp.259-264
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• 2006

This paper addresses the collusive bidding that functions as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Cooperative game is formulated and the equation of its Nash Equilibrium (NE) is derived on the basis of the supply function model. Gencos' willingness to selectively collude is expressed through a bargain theory. A Collusion Incentive Index(CII) for representing the willingness is defined through computing the Gencos' profits at NE. In order to keep the market non-cooperative, the market operator has to know the highest potentially collusive combination among the Gencos. Another index, which will be called the Collusion Monitoring Index(CMI), is suggested to detect the highest potential collusion and it is calculated using the marginal cost functions of the Gencos without any computation of NE. The effectiveness of CMI for detecting the highest potential collusion is verified through application on many test market cases.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.1
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• pp.79-84
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• 2005

In many countries, the electric power industry is undergoing significant changes known as deregulation and restructuring. These alterations introduce competition in generation and retail and require open access to the transmission network. The competition of the electric power industry causes many issues to surface. Among them, unbundling of the transmission service is probably the most complicated as it is a single and integrated sector and the transmission revenue requirement must be allocated to market participants in a fair way. In these situations, it is valuable to research the methodologies to allocate transmission usage. The power tracing method offers useful information such as which generators supply a particular load or how much each generator (load) uses a particular transmission line. With this information, we can allocate required transmission revenue to market participants. Recently, several algorithms were proposed for tracing power flow but there is no dominant power tracing method. This paper proposes a power tracing method based on graph theory and complex-current distribution. For practicability, the proposed method for transmission usage allocation is applied to IEEE 30 buses and compared with the method proposed by Felix F.Wu.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.41-48
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• 2011

Recently, the increasing power of distributors has given them the opportunity of introducing private brand (PB) products. Based on the game theory, this study analyzes the decision making of a distributor regarding the optimal pricing and quality strategies for the PB product. By analyzing the game model, it is shown that the pricing mechanism heavily depends not only on the market power of the distributor but on the quality of the PB product. It is also shown that, counter intuitively, as the market power of the distributor increases, the optimal quality of the PB product should be decreased.

• Journal of Science and Technology Studies
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.1-40
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• 2019

Built upon ethnographic method such as participant observation and in-depth interview, this study analyzes the material culture of electronic flower auctions at Yangjae Flower Market. From the viewpoint of Actor-Network Theory(ANT), this research examines how human actors like dealers and auctioneers interact with nonhuman actors such as market devices and these interactions form networks called "agencement." This research is focused on three main objectives: first, to study how the performance of auctions - i.e. the interactions between auctioneers and dealers - change in the wake of new market devices in the auctions; secondly, to look into what changes artifacts bring to the social relationships between auctioneers and dealers; lastly, to analyze the influence of new market devices on auction price in the market. The results of this research are as follows. First, the appearance of new market devices generates changes in the performance of auctions, which means the change of 'agencement' of flower auctions. Direct interactions between auctioneers and dealers turned into indirect interactions through new market devices. Moreover, the changes in the agencement brought changes to the identity of auctioneers and dealers. Secondly, the new agencement caused by the inflow of new market devices formed the trust between the devices and human actors, which gave rise to the trust in electronic auction and in counterpart actors as well. In addition, new market devices lowered direct interactions between auctioneers and dealers and thus made more equal relationships between the two than before. Lastly, market devices like trading screen reduced the leverage of auctioneers by providing dealers with bidding information previously possessed by auctioneers much openly and dealers were able to decide auction prices in more reasonable and dispassionate manner. Economic agency, power, trust, price, and information in the market is material and sensory.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.349-364
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• 2012

This study focuses on systematic structure of factors, which affect commercialization of ocean science and technology (OST), applying both grounded theory methodology (GTM) and semantic network analysis methodology (SNAM) by using in-depth interviews with 8 specialists previously experienced in the same field. This study further focuses on clarification of the distinctiveness and universality of commercialization factors on OST by comparatively analyzing on the commercialization factors of general sciences and technologies. Using SNAM, it was determined that commercialization success required connected support system, government support, technology marketing, technology power and characteristics of commercialized entities, which were identified as dominant factors. GTM presented an outcome that connected support systems among participants in commercialization and found that research institute strategies are significant factors in the core phenomenon of commercialization, while technology marketing, technology power and market-oriented technology are important conditions. In addition, the factors of technology, market, connection of participants and government support of commercialized entities are shown as equally important factors for commercialization of ocean science and technology. Secondly, SNAM results indicate that ocean science characteristics depend on a network of government support, research institute strategy, organization and manpower, capital power, and technology marketing, as these ocean science characteristics have been identified as significant factors in the GTM study. It has been determined that technology, market and government support should be connected in order for commercialization of ocean science and technology (OST). Moreover, commercialization methods, applied to the marketing of commercialization of ocean science and technology is differentiated from others since commercialization success is more relevant to these factors.