• East Asian Journal of Business Economics (EAJBE)
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.1-11
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• 2016

This study investigated commercial power theory of traditional market through the analysis of literature review. Consumers' store selection models are made up a theory based on normative hypothesis, theory of mutual reaction, utility function estimation model, and cognitive-behavioral model. Detailed models are as follows. Normative hypothesis based theory is divided into Reilly's retail gratification theory and Converse's revised retail g ratification theory. Interaction theory is composed of Huff's probability gratification theory, MCI model and Multi-nominal Logit Model (MNL model). There are four models in retail organization position theory such as central place theories, single store position theory, multi store position - assign model, and retail growth potential model. In case of single store position theory, theoretical and empirical techniques have developed for a decision to optimum single store position. Those are like these, a check list, the most simple and systematic method, analogy, and microanalysis technique. Aforementioned models are theoretical and mathematical commercial power measurement and/or model. The study has rather limitations because the variation factors included in formula are only a part of actual commercial power. Therefore, further study shall be made continuously to commercial power areas and variables.

• Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
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• v.26 no.1_2
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• pp.337-347
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• 2008

Based on social welfare maximum theory, the optimal scale of power plants entering generation power market being is researched. A static non-cooperative game model for short-term optimization of power plants with different cost is presented. And the equilibrium solutions and the total social welfare are obtained. According to principle of maximum social welfare selection, the optimization model is solved, optimal number of power plants entering the market is determined. The optimization results can not only increase the customer surplus and improve power production efficiency, but also sustain normal profits of power plants and scale economy of power production, and the waste of resource can also be avoided. At last, case results show that the proposed model is efficient.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.165-184
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• 2020

In this study, the factors affecting opportunism in the relationship between suppliers and key accounts were analyzed from the viewpoint of transaction cost theory, market power theory, and relationship marketing theory. As a result of the hypothesis test, Hypothesis 1 stating that demand volatility will have a positive effect on opportunism and Hypothesis 2 that transaction-specific investment will have a positive effect on opportunism were also supported. In addition, Hypothesis 3 stating that channel power will have a positive effect on opportunism was also supported. Lastly, Hypothesis 4 stating that relational commitment will have a negative effect on opportunism was not supported, along with Hypothesis 5 stating that transaction satisfaction will have a negative effect on opportunism. The theoretical and practical implications of this study are as follows. This study has identified the antecedents of opportunism by comprehensively applying the transaction cost theory, market power theory, and relationship marketing theory. In addition, this study can identify what a company should manage specifically to lower opportunism by identifying the antecedents of opportunism. The limitations of this study and the directions for future studies are as follows. First, not all of the antecedents of opportunism of key accounts have been extensively investigated from the viewpoint of the transaction cost theory, market power theory, and relationship marketing theory. In the future, it is necessary to identify additional factors. Second, the study was conducted only in the supplier's viewpoint. In future studies, it is expected that more accurate research results can be obtained by simultaneously examining not only the supplier's point of view but also the buyer's point of view.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.19-21
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• 2000

This paper presents a game theory application for analyzing power transactions and market design in a deregulated energy marketplace such as PoolCo. The conventional least-cost approaches for the generation resource schedule can not exactly handle recent real-world situations. A systematic tool using game theory for the market participants is presented such that it determines the net profits through the optimal bidding strategies including the strategies for the bidding prices and bidding generations. We treat this power transaction game as incomplete information one, which means each market participants does not know other's cost function. And the demand elasticity of the energy price is considered for the realistic modeling of the deregulated marketplace.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.49 no.6
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• pp.266-271
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• 2000

The electric power industries are moving from the conventional monopolistic or vertically integrated environments to deregulated and competitive environments, where each participant is concerned with profit maximization rather than system-wide costs minimization. Consequently, the conventional least-cost approaches for the generation resource schedule can not exactly handle real-world situations. This paper presents a game theory application for analyzing power transactions and market design in a deregulated energy marketplace, where the market participants determine the net profits through the optimal bidding strategies. The demand elasticity of the energy price is considered for the realistic modeling of the deregulated marketplace.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.1
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• pp.67-72
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• 2004

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of generating firms in a competitive market where the firms are provided with payment for generating reactive power. Reactive support for voltage control is an integral and critical part of power system operations. Since reactive support is unbundled in a competitive market under open access transmission, it is treated as one of ancillary services. The operation costs and opportunity costs for reactive support are compensated by payment to the firms, hence their bidding strategies will be affected. The opportunity costs are evaluated from the foregone profits of a generator in making sales in real power market by providing reactive support instead of real power. Game theory approach is used to analysis the transaction strategies of real power by the bimatrix method in this paper. Through computing the Nash equilibrium in a sample system, an incentive of a generator for improving the reactive generating capacity is found to be effective and the variations of the profits are analyzed as the demand power factor changes.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.9
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• pp.487-493
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• 2004

The electric power industry throughout the world is undergoing considerable changes from the vertically integrated utility structure to the deregulated market. However, the deregulated electricity market is operated with respect to theory of economical efficiency, and therefore, the system operator requires data with fast contingency ranking for security of the bulk power system. This paper compares the weather dependant probabilistic risk index(PRI) with the system performance index for power flow in the IEEE-RTS. The system performance index for power flow presents the power system stability. This paper presents fast calculation method for determining contingency ranking using the weather dependant probabilistic risk index(PRI). The probabilistic risk index can be classified into the case of normal and adverse weather. This paper proposes calculation method using the probabilistic risk index in determining contingency ranking required for security under the deregulated electricity market.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.51-59
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• 2018

Despite the advantages of energy arbitrage using energy storage systems (ESSs), the high cost of ESSs has not attracted storage owners for the arbitrage. However, as the costs of ESS have decreased and the price volatility of the electricity market has increased, many studies have been conducted on energy arbitrage using ESSs. In this study, the existing two-period model is modified in consideration of the ESS cost and risk-free contracts. Optimal investment strategies that maximize the sum of external effects caused by price changes and arbitrage profits are formulated by market participants. The optimal amounts of ESS investment for three types of investors in three different market structures are determined with game theory, and strategies in the form of the mixed-complementarity problem are solved by using the PATH solver of GAMS. Results show that when all market participants can participate in investment simultaneously, only customers invest in ESSs, which means that customers can obtain market power by operating their ESSs. Attracting other types of ESS investors, such as merchant storage owners and producers, to mitigate market power can be achieved by increasing risk-free contracts.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07a
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• pp.778-780
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• 2005

Electric power industry throughout the world is restructured. The electric power industry has a characteristics of an oligopoly with an imperfect competition. In Korea rules, all information is not available. So the strategy under such incomplete information market differ firm those under complete information system in game theory. This paper presents a analysis technique if Korea ma rket model with incomplete information.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.192-207
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• 1998

This paper focuses on the relationship between innovation and export performance of technology-based firms in Korea. This study analyses the relationship between innovative activity and firm's performances using a sample of 760 technology-based firms in Korea. As for the firm's performance indicators, export is employed. The empirical results support that innovation has a positive effect on firm's export performance. However, for small and medium firms, the relationship between innovative activity and export performance is an U-shape quadratic form, which shows that small firms takes a minimum innovative expenditure in order to access the abroad market. Also, with product differentiation, innovative firms tends to devot more to domestic market than to abroad market. Therefore, it can be concluded that innovative activity builds market power and accelerates export performance. And product differentiation through advertising expenditure make innovative firms less exporting.