• Title/Summary/Keyword: maritime navigation

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An Analytical Study on Rational use of Undersea Space (해저공간의 합리적 활용을 위한 분석적 연구)

  • Won-Jo Jung;Nam-Ki Park
    • Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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    • v.47 no.3
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    • pp.147-154
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    • 2023
  • This study aims to determine the necessity, role, utilization, and operation and management plan in relation to the underwater space platform where humans can newly reside. It provides a comprehensive opinion on the need for creating undersea space and operation plans based on opinions of industry-university-affiliated organizations involved in the R&D project of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries for the utilization of undersea space and external experts participating in marine technology development. In this study, a survey was conducted on researchers participating in the construction of a Korean submarine space platform. FGI was conducted on marine technology development experts. Results were then derived. As a result of the analysis, the need for subsea space construction was found to be high. As for the role of subsea space, the most common opinion was to develop technology for utilizing subsea space and to secure marine science research functions. It was found that the creation of subsea space would have a positive impact on the domestic industry, especially the deep-sea development industry and the shipbuilding/offshore structure industry. In terms of utilization, after the end of the seabed space test bed, the response to utilization as a marine observation base and marine ecosystem research had the highest proportion. As for expected inconvenience, discomfort in the psychological environment was the highest. Experts suggest that securing a continuous budget is most important for stable operation in the future and that securing a manpower budget is essential for itemized budgets. In addition, it was judged that it would be appropriate to establish a prior agreement from the time of the prior agreement and prepare a countermeasure before proceeding with the project in order to ensure ownership issues, consignment management issues, and cost issues when using the project after the end of the project.

The State of Marine Pollution in the Waters adjacent to Shipyards in Korea - 3. Evaluation of the Pollution of Heavy Metals in Offshore Surface Sediments around Major Shipyards in Summer 2010

  • Kim, Kwang-Soo
    • Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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    • v.21 no.3
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    • pp.223-233
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    • 2015
  • In order to evaluate the pollution of heavy metals in offshore surface sediments around shipyards in Korea, surface sediment samples were collected at eleven stations around four major shipyards located in the southeastern coast of Korea in summer 2010 and nine kinds of heavy metals such as copper(Cu), zinc(Zn), cadmium(Cd), lead(Pb), chrome(Cr), arsenic(As), mercury(Hg), iron(Fe) and aluminum(Al) in sediments were analyzed. The concentrations of Cu at all sampling stations were in the range of 47.10~414.96 mg/kg and exceeded TEL(Threshold Effects Level) 20.6 mg-Cu/kg of Korean marine environmental standards for offshore sediments and ERL(Effect Range-Low) 34.0 mg-Cu/kg. The concentrations of Cu at seven stations around four shipyards were 65.18~414.96 mg/kg and exceeded PEL(Probable Effects Level) 64.4 mg-Cu/kg of Korean marine environmental standards for offshore sediments. The concentration of Cu at one station around B-shipyard was 414.96 mg/kg and exceeded ERM(Effect Range-Median) 270.0 mg-Cu/kg. The concentrations of Zn at all stations were in the range of 135.09~388.79 mg/kg which exceeded ERL 150.0 mg-Zn/kg. The concentrations of Zn at seven stations around four shipyards were 157.57~388.79 mg/kg and exceeded PEL 157.0 mg-Zn/kg. The concentration of Zn at one station around B-shipyard was 388.79 mg/kg and was approaching ERM 410.0 mg-Zn/kg. The concentrations of Cd at all stations were in the range of 0.11~0.54 mg/kg and were below TEL 0.75 mg-Cd/kg and ERL 1.2 mg-Cd/kg. The concentrations of Pb at all stations were in the range of 18.04~105.62 mg/kg. The concentrations of Pb at two stations around B-shipyard were 73.87~105.62 mg/kg which exceeded TEL 44.0 mg-Pb/kg and ERL 46.7 mg-Pb/kg, and were below PEL 119.0 mg-Pb/kg and ERM 218.0 mg-Pb/kg. The concentrations of Cr at all stations were in the range of 51.26~85.39 mg/kg. The concentration of Cr at one station around B-shipyard was 85.39 mg/kg and exceeded ERL 81.0 mg-Cr/kg. The concentrations of As at all stations were in the range of 8.70~22.15 mg/kg which exceeded ERL 8.2 mg-As/kg and were below ERM 70.0 mg-As/kg. The concentrations of As at eight stations around A-shipyard, B-shipyard and D-shipyard were 14.93~22.15 mg/kg which exceeded TEL 14.5 mg-As/kg and were below PEL 75.5 mg-As/kg. The concentrations of Hg at all stations were in the range of 0.02~0.35 mg/kg. The concentrations of Hg at three stations around A-shipyard were 0.11~0.13 mg/kg which were almost equal to TEL 0.11 mg-Hg/kg. Those at two stations around B-shipyard were 0.27~0.35 mg/kg which exceeded TEL 0.11 mg-Hg/kg and ERL 0.15 mg-Hg/kg, and were below PEL 0.62 mg-Hg/kg and ERM 0.71 mg-Hg/kg. The concentrations of Fe and Al at all stations were in the range of 2.90 3.66 % and 3.12 6.80 %, respectively. These results imply that heavy metals such as copper, zinc, lead, arsenic and mercury were likely to be transferred to marine environment from shipyards, especially from B-shipyard.

Estimation of the CY Area Required for Each Container Handling System in Mokpo New Port (목표 신항만의 터미널 운영시스템에 따른 CY 소요면적 산정에 관한 연구)

  • Keum, J.S.
    • Journal of Korean Port Research
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    • v.12 no.1
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    • pp.35-46
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    • 1998
  • The CY can be said to function in various respect as a buffer zone between the maritime and overland inflow-outflow of container. The amount of storage area needed requires a very critical appraisal at pre-operational stage. A container terminal should be designed to handle and store containers in the most efficient and economic way possible. In order to achieve this aim it is necessary to figure out or forecast numbers and types of containers to be handled, CY area required, and internal handling systems to be adopted. This paper aims to calculate the CY area required for each container handling system in Mokpo New Port. The CY area required are directly dependent on the equipment being used and the storage demand. And also the CY area required depends on the dwell time. Furthermore, containers need to be segregated by destination, weight, class, FCL(full container load), LCL(less than container load), direction of travel, and sometimes by type and often by shipping line or service. Thus the full use of a storage area is not always possible as major unbalances and fluctuations in these flow occuring all the time. The calculating CY area must therefore be taken into account in terms of these operational factors. For solving such problem, all these factors have been applied to estimation of CY area in Mokpo New Port. The CY area required in Mokpo New Port was summarized in the conclusion section.

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A Study on Jurisdiction under the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions (국제항공테러협약의 관할권 연구)

  • Kim, Han-Taek
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.24 no.1
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    • pp.59-89
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    • 2009
  • The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

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