• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
• /
• v.30 no.3C
• /
• pp.176-184
• /
• 2005

In this paper, we implemented an Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC) processor for Digital Transmission Contents Protection (DTCP), which is a standard for protecting various digital contents in the network. Unlikely to other applications, DTCP uses ECC algorithm which is defined over GF(p), where p is a 160-bit prime integer. The core arithmetic operation of ECC is a scalar multiplication, and it involves large amount of very long integer modular multiplications and additions. In this paper, the modular multiplier was designed using the well-known Montgomery algorithm which was implemented with CSA(Carry-save Adder) and 4-level CLA(Carry-lookahead Adder). Our new ECC processor has been synthesized using Samsung 0.18 m CMOS standard cell library, and the maximum operation frequency was estimated 98 MHz, with the size about 65,000 gates. The resulting performance was 29.6 kbps, that is, it took 5.4 msec to process a 160-bit data frame. We assure that this performance is enough to be used for digital signature, encryption and decryption, and key exchanges in real time environments.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
• /
• v.25 no.4
• /
• pp.727-738
• /
• 2015

Until recently, power analysis is one of the most popular research issues among various side channel analyses. Since Differential Power Analysis had been first proposed by Kocher et al., various practical power analyses correspond with software/hardware cryptographic devices have been proposed. In this paper, we analyze vulnerability of countermeasure against power analysis exploiting single power trace of public cryptographic algorithm. In ICICS 2010, Clavier et al. proposed Horizontal Correlation Analysis which can recover secret information from a single exponentiation trace and corresponding countermeasures. "Blind operands in LIM", one of their countermeasures, exploits additive blinding in order to prevent leakage of intermediate value related to secret information. However, this countermeasure has vulnerability of having power leakage that is dependant with the message known by an adversary. In this paper, we analyzed vulnerabilities by three attack scenarios and proved them by practical correlation power analysis experiments.