• Title/Summary/Keyword: lemon market

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A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns

  • HWANG, SUNJOO
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.38 no.2
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    • pp.87-101
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    • 2016
  • A person's life consists of two important stages: the first stage as a student and the second stage as a worker. In an integrated model of education and career concerns, I analyze the welfare effects of education. In Spence's job market signaling model, education as a sorting device improves efficiency by mitigating the lemon market problem. In contrast, in the integrated model, education as a sorting device can be detrimental to social welfare, as it eliminates work incentives generated by career concerns.

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A Study on Information Asymmetry and the Country of Origin Labeling in Live Small Fish Trade for Aquaculture and Naturalization (이식용수산물 교역의 정보비대칭과 원산지표시제도 영향에 관한 연구)

  • Park Seong-Kwae;Han Kyung-Sook
    • The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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    • v.37 no.1 s.70
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    • pp.45-71
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    • 2006
  • The main objective of this study is to analyze problems of the Country of Origin Labeling(COOL) in small live fish(SLF) trade by applying the asymmetric information theory which is called ${\ulcorner}$Lemon Market Theory${\lrcorner}$. The purpose of importing SLF is to enhance fishing household income and import substitution effect as well. SLF importation is quite different in its nature from importing general fish and fish products for final/direct consumption. SLF are imported for the purpose of domestic aquaculture and naturalization where domestic production/supply of SLF is less than domestic demand for or such species are not native to Korean waters. Information asymmetric problems arise even in SLF trade as the same way in general goods and services. However, the information asymmetry issues in SLF trade are much more complex than non-living goods because SLF are traded in the live state. To alleviate such problems the Korean government initiated the general COOL scheme to imported SLF. However, many experts argues that such policy on SLF would not be appropriate because of SLF's very nature. Applying the lemon market theory, we can analyze how information discovery schemes are able to signal correct information to SLF trading parties and to result in more symmetric information in SLF trade markets. This research carried out a case study about small live eel(SLF) trade and its farming. The results showed that applying the COOL to small live eels just right upon coming into fish farms tends to increase substantially fish farmer's income and at the same time to lower unnecessary transaction costs. In particular, such transaction costs by imposing simply the general COOL on SLF may easily outweigh its benefits. For instance, to resolve the problems, the Korean ministry of agriculture and forestry(KMAF) has developed a quite different COOL rules from the general ones and has applied them to imported live cattle and medium/small livestocks. The KMAF's differentiated COOL policy on some imported livestocks may be a good case which can be applied to imported SLF. In addition to the differentiated COOL on SLF, Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and traceability system would play crucial complementary roles in alleviating information asymmetry problems in SLF trade. Advanced fisheries tend to strengthen their SPS system rather than to adopt the general comprehensive COOL schemes into imported SLF trades and domestic market exchanges.

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A Study on the Architectural Status and Improvement of Korean Used Car Trade Facility - based on Benchmarking of Japanese Used Car Trade Facilities - (한국 중고차 거래소 건축 현황과 개선방안 연구 - 일본 중고차 거래소의 벤치마킹을 중심으로 -)

  • Song, Kyuman
    • Journal of the Architectural Institute of Korea Planning & Design
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    • v.35 no.6
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    • pp.47-58
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    • 2019
  • According to the Korea Ministry of Transportation report in 2015, domestic used car trade (3.66million) is twice the number of new car sales (1.84million). However, contrary to the quantitative growth of the used car trading volume, chaotic used-car market practice has not been improved and also, space that holds these markets (facilities) has remained at a very low level of quality. Lemon Market, asymmetry of information, false bait, tout, dual contracts, negative words that qualify the used car market information are still in place. The aim of this study was to understand the unique circumstances of the used car sales market distinguished from new cars, and to analyse the problems of recent domestic used car market facilities and afterwards to draw guidelines for new used car facility architecture. Through literature review, surveys, the characteristics of domestic used car market have been organised and field research and competitive analysis of the Korea used car market architecture is followed. As a result, empirical guideline for Korea used-car market facility is introduced.

The Effect of Inaccurate Quality Signaling under Information Asymmetry

  • Seung Huh
    • Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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    • v.14 no.1
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    • pp.231-246
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    • 2023
  • Purpose - This study attempts to provide a new theoretical perspective on the quality signaling and its impact on a market under information asymmetry, focusing on how the accuracy and the cost of quality signaling affect sellers' and buyers' profit, suggesting appropriate designs of quality signaling methods which mitigates information asymmetry. Design/methodology/approach - In order to examine the effect of quality signaling on strategic interactions within the market, we establish an analytic model where market outcomes are determined by seller's quality claim and price, and buyers are risk-neutral. By investigating this analytic model through relevant game trees, we find the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the market and predict related market outcomes based on sellers' quality signaling strategy. Findings - Our analytic model shows counterintuitive results that seller profit will be the lowest with inaccurate quality signaling and the highest with no quality signaling, mostly due to the certification cost. Consequently, sellers should proceed with caution if the quality signaling is less than accurate, as it may backfire. We believe that this is due to the fact that the inaccuracy of quality signaling causes some confusion and uncertainty in both sellers and buyers' decision to maximize profit, making it hard for sellers to predict buyers' behavior. Research implications or Originality - Although the sources and types of quality signaling errors have been investigated in the literature, there has not been satisfactory understanding regarding how inaccuracy of quality certification affects specific market outcomes. We expect that our theoretical model would provide important implications on how to utilize quality signaling to solve adverse selection issues in markets under information asymmetry.

The Truth about Sellers' Lies: Why Dishonesty Loses in Markets under Information Asymmetry

  • Huh, Seung
    • Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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    • v.11 no.4
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    • pp.21-36
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    • 2020
  • Purpose - This study analyzes the effect of sellers' dishonesty on various market outcomes such as seller profit, buyer profit, and market welfare, through precisely measuring the level of sellers' information disclosure and its economic impacts. As an explicit observation of sellers' dishonesty is not easy in most other settings, this study is expected to suggest unique and meaningful implications on the effect of sellers' incomplete information disclosure to researchers, managers, and policy makers. Design/methodology/approach - In order to precisely measure the level of sellers' dishonesty under information asymmetry, this study analyzes the data from an incentive-based economic experiment using z-Tree software. This experimental method enables us to focus on the strategic interactions among participants, observe the integrity of seller's information disclosure, and reproduce real market situations. Findings - The analysis of sellers' dishonesty has provided the following important and counterintuitive findings about the reality of buyer-seller interactions under information asymmetry. First, sellers' lies do not affect seller profit even when they are very intensive. Second, sellers' dishonesty negatively affects buyer profit and the entire market welfare. Third, a seller's quality claim has a positive effect on the seller profit only when a seller is being honest. Research implications or Originality - This study analyzes sellers' dishonesty using incentive-based economic experiment using z-Tree software which provides a straightforward examination on dishonest behavior of sellers, that is not readily available with other types of observational or experimental data.

Sellers' Economic Incentives to Disclose Negative Information in Online Markets

  • HUH, Seung
    • The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management
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    • v.9 no.2
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    • pp.33-43
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    • 2021
  • Purpose: This study aims to verify sellers' economic incentives for voluntarily disclosing negative information in online markets and provide practical guidelines to online sellers in terms of whether, when, and how sharing low quality to buyers increase sales. Research design, data and methodology: Our model examines the number of bidders in Internet auctions to measure potential demand and uses count data analysis following previous studies that have also analyzed the number of bidders in auctions. After checking over-dispersion and zero-inflation in our data, we have run a Poisson regression to analyze the effect of sharing negative information on sales. Results: This study presents a counterintuitive result that low-quality sellers can increase their demand by fully disclosing negative information in an online market, if appropriate risk-reducing methods are employed. Our finding thus shows that there exists economic incentive for online sellers to voluntarily disclose negative information about their products, and that the context of transactions may affect this incentive structure as the incentive varies across product categories. Conclusions: As the positive impact of disclosing negative information has rarely been studied so far, this paper contributes to the literature by providing a unique empirical analysis on the impact of sellers' honesty on sales. By verifying economic incentives of disclosing low quality with actual online sales data, this study suggests practical implications on information disclosure strategy to many online sellers dealing with negative information.

Sooty Mold of Persimmon (Diospyros kaki) Caused by Cladosporium cladosporioides

  • Kwon, Jin-Hyeuk;Park, Chang-Seuk
    • The Plant Pathology Journal
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    • v.19 no.5
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    • pp.266-268
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    • 2003
  • In 2002, sooty mold was observed on persimmon (Diopyros kald) from the Jinju Agricultural Products Wholesale Market in Gyeongnam, Korea. The lesion of the sooty mold usually appeared as scars or wounds formed on the surface of the fruits. The symptom started with water soaking lesion, then the fruit softened rapidly. Colony of the causal pathogenic fungus was dark green in color on potato dextrose agar. The diameter of growing hyphae was 1-2 $\mu\textrm{m}$. The mostly one-celled conidia were ovoid, lemon or cylinder in shape, blastophores, and sized 46-132 $\mu\textrm{m}$. Erected conidiophores were long-branched chains and their lengths varied from 24 to 346 $\mu\textrm{m}$ with 2-5 $\mu\textrm{m}$ width. The optimum temperature for mycelial growth was about 2$0^{\circ}C$. Based on their mycological characteristics, the fungus was identified as Cladosporium cladosporioides. This is the first report in Korea of the sooty mold of persimmon caused by the said fungus.

Review of Functional Volatile Component in Essential Oil of Medicinal and Aromatic Plants (자원식물의 기능성 정유성분 이용 고찰)

  • 정해곤;방진기;성낙술;김성민
    • KOREAN JOURNAL OF CROP SCIENCE
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    • v.48
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    • pp.41-48
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    • 2003
  • The number of natural products obtained from plants has now reached over 100,000 and new chemical compounds are being discovered ever year. Medicinal and Aromatic plants and their extracts have been used for centuries to relieve pain, aid healing, kill bacteria and insects are important as the antifungal and anti-herbivore agents with further compounds being involved in the symbiotic associations. Although their functions in plants have not been fully established, it is Known that some substances have growth regulatory properties while others are involved in pollination and seed dispersal. The complex nature of these chemicals are usually produced in various types of secretory structures which is an important character of a plant family and also influenced and controlled by genetic and ecological factors. Detailed anatomical description of these structures ave relevant to the market value of the plants, the verification of authenticity of a given species and for the detection of substitution or adulteration. Volatile oils are used for their therapeutic action for flavoring of lemon, in perfumery of rose or as starting materials for the synthesis of other compounds of turpentine. For therapeutic purposes they are administered as inhalations of eucalyptus oil, peppermint oil, as gargles and mouthwashes of thymol and transdermally many essential oils including those of lavender, etc. With these current trend for using volatile components in essential oil will be increasing in the future in Korea and in the world as well.

The Role of Information Search Cost on Seller's Disclosure of Negative Information (정보 검색 비용이 판매자의 부정적 정보 공개에 미치는 영향에 대한 연구)

  • Huh, Seung
    • Journal of Convergence for Information Technology
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    • v.11 no.4
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    • pp.230-241
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    • 2021
  • This study has attempted to provide an important understanding about the information asymmetry in markets through empirical analysis on how the disclosure of low quality can increase demand even in the short run. More specifically, this study has extended the previous findings from the related literature by considering the effect of information search cost and providing empirical evidences about the effect of voluntary disclosure of low quality, using an experimental method with purchase scenarios. The results from our analysis show that reduced perceived risk have an important effect on sharing negative information, while the effect of information search cost is minimal. We also explain the circumstances whereby the information disclosure of a seller with low-quality product can enhance not only the seller's profitability but also customers' welfare by increasing the market demand and the demand for the seller claiming high quality.

The Impact of An Interaction between Product Quality and Perceived Risk on Seller Profit

  • Seung HUH
    • The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management
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    • v.11 no.2
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    • pp.23-32
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    • 2023
  • Purpose: This study examines the effect of full information disclosure on seller profit when there exists information asymmetry between sellers and buyers, focusing on the risk averseness of buyers. By investigating the interaction between product quality and perceived risk through online sales data, we attempt to figure out the incentive structure of full information disclosure specifically when buyers are risk-averse, so that we can suggest more feasible information disclosure strategy to sellers. Research design, data and methodology: Our empirical model analyzes the sales data of collectible goods from a major online seller using Poisson regression. In our model, we have specifically considered risk-averseness of buyers by estimating the interaction effect between the product quality and perceived risk on seller profit, aiming for a more precise empirical analysis on sellers' incentive structure of full disclosure. Results: Our empirical analysis strongly supports the effect of interaction between product quality and perceived risk, showing that the incentive for full disclosure is much stronger when product quality is higher, and vice versa. Therefore, sellers are strongly encouraged to voluntarily reveal product weaknesses when their product quality is higher than average, while it is more profitable to hide any product defects when quality claim is lower than average. Conclusions: This study supports the related literature by confirming economic incentives for full disclosure, and also supplements and strengthens previous studies by presenting that the effect of interaction between product quality and perceived risk strongly affects seller profit. Our unique finding supports both mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure arguments and presents practical implications to marketing managers by suggesting that seller's incentive for revealing weaknesses depends on the level of seller's product quality.