• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제16권4호
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• pp.458-464
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• 2014

In the future, an increasing number of heterogeneous networks will be connected with each other. Each of them has its own interest. Existing systems lack good incentive mechanisms to attract more networks to participate in cooperations. In this paper, we design an auction-based incentive mechanism for routing protocols applied in heterogeneous networking which is computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and truthful. Through several simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the properties of our mechanism.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제12권1호
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• pp.159-177
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• 2018

Participatory sensing is becoming popular and has shown its great potential in data acquisition for ambient assisted living. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism in participatory sensing for ambient assisted living, which benefits both the platform and the mobile devices that participated in the sensing task. Firstly, we analyze the profit of participant and platform, and a Stackelberg game model is formulated. The model takes privacy, reputation, power state and quality of data into consideration, and aims at maximizing the profit for both participant and publisher. The discussion of properties of the game show that there exists an unique Stackelberg equilibrium. Secondly, two algorithms are given: one describes how to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium and the other presents the procedures of employing the incentive strategy. Finally, we conduct simulations to evaluate the properties and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. Simulation results show that the proposed incentive mechanism works well, and the participants and the publisher will be benefitted from it. With the mechanism, the total amount of sensory data can be maximized and the quality of the data can be guaranteed effectively.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제13권3호
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• pp.266-276
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• 2011

In wireless networks, it is well-known that intermediate nodes can be used as cooperative relays to reduce the transmission energy required to reliably deliver a message to an intended destination. When the network is under a central authority, energy allocations and cooperative pairings can be assigned to optimize the overall energy efficiency of the network. In networks with autonomous selfish nodes, however, nodes may not be willing to expend energy to relay messages for others. This problem has been previously addressed through the development of extrinsic incentive mechanisms, e.g., virtual currency, or the insertion of altruistic nodes in the network to enforce cooperative behavior. This paper considers the problem of how selfish nodes can decide on an efficient energy allocation and endogenously form cooperative partnerships in wireless networks without extrinsic incentive mechanisms or altruistic nodes. Using tools from both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, the three main contributions of this paper are (i) the development of Pareto-efficient cooperative energy allocations that can be agreed upon by selfish nodes, based on axiomatic bargaining techniques, (ii) the development of necessary and sufficient conditions under which "natural" cooperation is possible in systems with fading and non-fading channels without extrinsic incentive mechanisms or altruistic nodes, and (iii) the development of techniques to endogenously form cooperative partnerships without central control. Numerical results with orthogonal amplify-and-forward cooperation are also provided to quantify the energy efficiency of a wireless network with sources selfishly allocating transmission/relaying energy and endogenously forming cooperative partnerships with respect to a network with centrally optimized energy allocations and pairing assignments.

• 경영과정보연구
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• 제35권1호
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• pp.287-305
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• 2016

본 연구는 기업 지배구조 개선을 위한 핵심 통제장치임에도 불구하고 지금까지 지배구조 개선과 관련하여 중요하게 여겨지지 않았던 경영자 유인보상제도가 다른 기업 지배구조 통제장치와 어떠한 상호관련성을 가지는지를 확인해 보고 기업 지배구조 통제장치가 기업가치에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지를 확인해보고자 하였다. 이를 위해 경영자 유인보상제도에 대한 대리변수로 보상위원회 도입을 고려하였고 기업 지배구조 통제 장치로 외부 대주주의 감시통제(외부 대주주 지분율), 외국인 투자자의 감시통제(외국인 지분율), 소유-경영의 결합을 통한 지배구조 개선(경영자 지분율), 사외이사 제도(사외이사 비율), 채권자의 감시 통제(부채비율), 기업이 속한 산업에서의 경쟁강도(경쟁강도) 등을 고려하여 보상위원회 도입과의 상호관련성과 기업 가치에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 금융업을 제외한 유가증권 시장에 상장된 기업을 대상으로 회귀분석을 통해 실증분석한 결과를 요약하면, 먼저 보상위원회 도입과 기업 지배구조 통제장치 사이의 상호관련성을 확인한 결과 상호관련성이 거의 없는 것으로 나타났고, 일부 변수에서 기업 지배구조 통제장치와 보상위원회 도입 사이에 상호관련성 보다는 인과관계가 확인되었다. 또한 기업 지배구조 통제장치가 기업가치에 미치는 영향을 분석한 결과 보상위원회 도입 여부와 외국인 지분율만이 기업가치에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 분석되었다. 이런 결과는 아직까지 국내 대부분의 기업에서 기업 지배구조 개선을 위한 유용한 통제장치로 경영자 유인보상제도를 적극적으로 활용하고 있지 않고, 기업 지배구조 개선을 위해 도입한 사외이사 제도 등이 기업가치 증대에 긍정적인 역할을 수행할 수 있도록 하는 제도적 개선 등이 필요하다고 결론지을 수 있겠다.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• 제15권5호
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• pp.1036-1054
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• 2019

Recently, concomitant with a surge in numbers of Internet of Things (IoT) devices with various sensors, mobile crowdsensing (MCS) has provided a new business model for IoT. For example, a person can share road traffic pictures taken with their smartphone via a cloud computing system and the MCS data can provide benefits to other consumers. In this service model, to encourage people to actively engage in sensing activities and to voluntarily share their sensing data, providing appropriate incentives is very important. However, the sensing data from personal devices can be sensitive to privacy, and thus the privacy issue can suppress data sharing. Therefore, the development of an appropriate privacy protection system is essential for successful MCS. In this study, we address this problem due to the conflicting objectives of privacy preservation and incentive payment. We propose a privacy-preserving mechanism that protects identity and location privacy of sensing users through an on-demand incentive payment and group signatures methods. Subsequently, we apply the proposed mechanism to one example of MCS-an intelligent parking system-and demonstrate the feasibility and efficiency of our mechanism through emulation.

• 한국컴퓨터정보학회논문지
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• 제16권7호
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• pp.137-148
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• 2011

전통적인 클라이언트-서버 방식과는 달리 협조적 분산시스템 환경에서는 시스템에 참여하는 구성원들이 공통의 목표를 달성하기 위해 자신들의 자원을 자발적으로 제공하므로 참여자의 수에 관계없이 양질의 서비스 제공이 가능하다. 하지만 이기적인 참여자들의 경우 시스템으로부터 서비스를 제공받으면서도 자신들의 자원은 공유하지 않는 경우가 발생하는데 이를 무임승차라 한다. 협조적 분산시스템 환경에서 무임승차자의 수가 늘어나면 서비스 제공을 위한 시스템의 수용력은 줄어들게 되고, 종국에는 공유지의 비극, 즉 시스템으로부터 아무도 서비스를 제공받을 수 없는 현상이 발생한다. 따라서 성공적인 협조적 분산시스템을 구현하기 위해서는 무임승차 방지를 위한 효과적인 인센티브 메커니즘 개발이 필수적이다. 협조적 분산시스템환경에서 인센티브 메커니즘이 갖는 중요성 때문에 지금까지 수많은 종류의 인센티브 메커니즘들이 개발되어 왔지만 인센티브 메커니즘의 성능을 판단하기 위한 기준이 불분명하였다. 따라서 본 논문은 광범위한 관련 연구를 통해 협조적 분산시스템 환경을 위한 일반적인 인센티브 디자인고려사항들을 도출한다. 본 논문에서 도출된 고려사항들은 관련 연구자들에게 협조적 분산시스템 환경에서 무임승차방지를 위한 효과적인 인센티브 메커니즘 디자인을 위한 가이드라인 및 성능 척도를 제공할 것이다.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• 제25권4호
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• pp.763-783
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• 2015

Online customer reviews (i.e., electronic word-of-mouth) has gained considerable interest over the past years. However, a knowledge gap exists in explaining the mechanisms among the factors that determine the product sales in online retailing environment. To fill the gap, this study adopts a principal-agent perspective to investigate the effect of customer reviews and customer incentives on product sales in online retail stores. Two customer review factors (i.e., average review ratings and the number of reviews) and two customer incentive factors (i.e., price discounts and special shipping offers) are used to predict product sales in regression analysis. The sales ranking data collected from the video game titles at Amazon.com are used to analyze the direct effects of the four factors and the interaction effects between customer review and customer incentive factors to product sales. Result reveals that most relationships exist as hypothesized. The findings support both the direct and interaction effects of customer reviews and incentive factors on product sales. Based on the findings, discussions are provided with regard to the academic and practical contributions.

• Asian Journal of Innovation and Policy
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• 제10권3호
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• pp.274-293
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• 2021

Utilizing outside knowledge for innovation is an important task for companies in the competitive economy. Due to the rapid advance in the internet communication technology, the number and quality of innovation sourcing methods are increasing. We select co-creation, personalization and in-house R&D as the representative forms of innovation sourcing and suggest a game theory model that enables the comparative analysis between them. The decision and surplus outcome of the innovation mechanisms are compared under various settings of the input parameters of the model. The stakeholders voluntarily participate into all mechanisms when the product price is moderately high and the participation cost is low, while co-creation is the only feasible one when the product quality is niche. When the participation cost is relatively high, personalization outperforms co-creation.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제10권4호
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• pp.1460-1470
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• 2015

This paper presents an approach to solve the long-term generation expansion planning problem of the restructured electricity industry using an agent-based environment. The proposed model simulates the generation investment decisions taken by a particular agent (i.e. a generating company) in a market environment taking into account its competitors’ strategic investment. The investment decision of a particular company is modeled taking into account that such company has imperfect foresight on the future system development hence electricity prices. The delay in the construction of new plants is also explicitly modeled, in order to compute accurately the yearly revenues of each agent. On top of a conventional energy market, several capacity incentive mechanisms including capacity payment and capacity market are simulated, so as to assess their impact on the investment promotion for generation expansion. Results provide insight on the investment cycles as well as dynamic system behavior of long-term generation expansion planning in a competitive electricity industry.

• 기술혁신학회지
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• 제5권2호
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• pp.212-227
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• 2002

This study reviews the institutional frameworks of Open Source software and develops the stylized facts of Open Source software innovation. Open Source software have to solve two difficult problems for encouraging innovation. First, the source code of Open Source software program should be open and freely distributed and it is very difficult for developers to appropriate the results of their investments. Second, as Open Source software development process is characterized by the participation of communities of developers, it is not easy to coordinate and manipulate the development process. These difficulties of developing Open Source Software have been solved by the particular incentive schemes and coordinating mechanisms. This study reviews the study on the motivation of Open Source software development and the mechanisms which coordinate innovation process of Open Source software with peer review and meritocracy, and how these characteristics promote innovation in Open Source software communities.