• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.146
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• pp.79-114
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• 2018

In this article I investigate the critical fundamental truth of the practical philosophy of Kim Doo-Huhn who has not become known in our Korean society but should be paid respect at any cost in the history of practical philosophy, and whom we should take the important case of a philosophical lesson, focused on 'the Dialectic of Theory of Value' which makes up an essential framework of his practical philosophy.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.111-140
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• 2014

In this paper, the main subjects with which I deal are as follows: (1) Is Distancing Philosophy from the real ruling power a way of practical-philosophical resistance, based on social reformation as a axiological directivity of Kim Tae-Gil's ethical thought, though it is negative type of resistance? Or is it a sort of transformed value-free opportunist behavior which allows antidemocratic ruling group to coerce the people into submission, assuming an uncompromising stand seemingly? (2) Is Kim's defense argument on the opening of the course of National Ethics and the all-out activation of National Ethics education under Park's Yushin Regime derived from his own philosophical belief? Or is it brought out from the external conditions and circumstances surrounding Kim Tae-Gil which forces him to participate in the national undertaking for the settlement of the course of National Ethics in the university? The 'provisional' answers about the two subjects are as follows: (1) Kim's Distancing Philosophy is a type of practical philosophical revolt against the dictatorship power under Yushin Regime, though it is negative form of resistance. We can accept this philosophical elucidation above all by confirming the fact that the reform of reality is the main ethical trait running through his entire ethical thought system. However distancing philosophy disclose the crucial limits to allow itself to boil to the philosophical practice compromising with real ruling power eventually, though it is intended upon its own social ethical directivity and conviction. (2) The primary factor which affects Kim to propose such an advocation argument on the course of National Ethics and the education of National Ethics is the external conditions and circumstances surrounding him, especially the power-relation between he and ruling group and intimate human relation between he and his superior philosophers who carries out the role of a ideologue for the Yushin Regime, rather than his own philosophical belief. But no matter what primary factor, Kim's action to make a advocating argument to support the course and the education of National Ethics is to blame, on that account that he cannot adequately his social responsibility and role given to him as a reformist moral philosopher who will pursue the realization of righteous democratic society. Along with that, It is not too enough to criticize him sharply for such defending action. The reason is that his supporting stance for National Ethics education is brought out, by not adhering closely to the philosophical way of distancing from the dictatorial power devoid of political legitimacy and moral justification.