• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Soil and Groundwater Environment Conference
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• 2004.04a
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• pp.289-292
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• 2004

In order to identify the origin and nature of the spilled oil in the potential source, we analyzed the pattern of alkyi PAM(Polynuclear Aromatic Hydrocarbons) in fuel standard and environmental samples. Alkyl PAM patterns are used for fuel-type identification in weathered environmental samples. Detection of alkyl PAH was achieved by operation CC/MS in the SIM mode. We chose ions of naphthalene(m/z 128), C1-naphthalene(m/z 142), C2-naphthalene(m/z 156), C3-naphthalene(m/z 170), C4-naphthalene(m/z 184) for the comparison of this pattern according to the type of fuel. We analyzed tile pattern of alkyl PAH in neat gasoline, kerosene, diesel, and JP-8, and in groundwater samples which were collected in monitoring wells. The distribution map of alkyl-naphthalene shows different patterns among four different fuel types (gasoline, kerosene, diesel, and JP-8). Particularly, tile distribution map of kerosene and JP-8 is found to be of value in identifying fuel type in that the difference is clear. Therefore distribution patterns of alkyl-PAH compounds provide another useful tool for fuel-type identification of petroleum fuels.

• Journal of Soil and Groundwater Environment
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.64-67
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• 2003

In order to identify the origin and nature of the spilled oil in the potential source, we analyzed the concentrations of specific fuel constituents in fuel standard and environmental samples. The ratios of pristane/phytane are virtually unaltered because these compounds have the same bolatility in environmental samples. These were useful to identify the source of the fuel oil and to assess the effect of microbial degradation and weathering of the fuel oil. We analyzed the ratios of pristane/phytane in neat white kerosene, boiler kerosene, JP-8 and diesel products from L and S gas station. The ratios of pristane/phytane in L-white kerosene and JP-8 was 3.10 $\pm$0.03 and 1.77 $\pm$ 0.01, respectively. Otherwise, the ratios of pristane/phytane in water phase after distribution of fuel oil and water was 2.97 $\pm$0.02 in case of white kerosene and 1.65 $\pm$ 0.02 in case of JP-8. It is apparent from the results that the ratios of pristane/phytane were as product-specific, especially between kerosene and JP-8, and therefore, can also be used for fuel type identification in free products and groundwater samples which were collected in monitoring wells.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.65-80
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• 2018

This paper attempts to estimate GHG emissions, primarily $CO_2$ ship emissions, at the port of Incheon in October 2014. This study employed a bottom-up approach based on Automatic Identification System (AIS) data to estimate the total amount of fuel consumption and the total amount of $CO_2$ emission produced as a result of fuel combustion. Using a sample of 330 ships operating at the port of Incheon in Korea, the total amount of $CO_2$ gases emitted from ships in October 2014 were estimated to be 164693.06 tons, with estimated total fuel consumption of 51953.64 tons. General cargo ships were most common type of ships, but they were less polluting compared to passenger ships. The detailed emission estimates by ship type revealed that passenger ships were the most polluting ships (81409.6 tons of emissions), followed by tugboats (37248.4 tons), cargo ships (32154.6 tons), ships used for other activities (9039.1 tons), chemical tankers (4027.06 tons), and fishing ships (814.048 tons), respectively.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.99-110
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• 2022

In decommissioning a nuclear power plant, numerous concrete structures need to be demolished and decontaminated. Although concrete decontamination technologies have been developed globally, concrete cutting remains problematic due to the secondary waste production and dispersion risk from concrete scabbling. To minimize workers' radiation exposure and secondary waste in dismantling and decontaminating concrete structures, the following conceptual designs were developed. A micro-blast type scabbling technology using explosive materials and a multi-dimensional contamination measurement and artificial intelligence (AI) mapping technology capable of identifying the contamination status of concrete surfaces. Trials revealed that this technology has several merits, including nuclide identification of more than 5 nuclides, radioactivity measurement capability of 0.1-10⁷ Bq·g^-1, 1.5 kg robot weight for easy handling, 10 cm robot self-running capability, 100% detonator performance, decontamination factor (DF) of 100 and 8,000 cm²·hr^-1 decontamination speed, better than that of TWI (7,500 cm²·hr^-1). Hence, the micro-blast type scabbling technology is a suitable method for concrete decontamination. As the Korean explosives industry is well developed and robot and mapping systems are supported by government research and development, this scabbling technology can efficiently aid the Korean decommissioning industry.

• Journal of Electrochemical Science and Technology
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.1-18
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• 2014

Li-air cell is an exotic type of energy storage and conversion device considered to be half battery and half fuel cell. Its successful commercialization highly depends on the timely development of key components. Among these key components, the catalyst (i.e., the core portion of the air electrode) is of critical importance and of the upmost priority. Indeed, it is expected that these catalysts will have a direct and dramatic impact on the Li-air cell's performance by reducing overpotentials, as well as by enhancing the overall capacity and cycle life of Li-air cells. Unfortunately, the technological advancement related to catalysts is sluggish at present. Based on the insights gained from this review, this sluggishness is due to challenges in both the commercialization of the catalyst, and the fundamental studies pertaining to its development. Challenges in the commercialization of the catalyst can be summarized as 1) the identification of superior materials for Li-air cell catalysts, 2) the development of fundamental, material-based assessments for potential catalyst materials, 3) the achievement of a reduction in both cost and time concerning the design of the Li-air cell catalysts. As for the challenges concerning the fundamental studies of Li-air cell catalysts, they are 1) the development of experimental techniques for determining both the nano and micro structure of catalysts, 2) the attainment of both repeatable and verifiable experimental characteristics of catalyst degradation, 3) the development of the predictive capability pertaining to the performance of the catalyst using fundamental material properties. Therefore, under the current circumstances, it is going to be an extremely daunting task to develop appropriate catalysts for the commercialization of Li-air batteries; at least within the foreseeable future. Regardless, nano materials are expected to play a crucial role in this field.

• Analytical Science and Technology
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.41-59
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• 2014

The aims of this work were the identification and the classification of fresh lubricants and used engine oils of vehicles for the application in forensic science field-80 kinds of fresh lubricants were purchased and 86 kinds of used engine oils were sampled from 24 kinds of diesel and gasoline vehicles with different driving conditions. The sample of lubricants and used engine oils were analyzed by GC/MS. The Bayesian model technique was developed for classification or identification. Both the wavelet fitting and the principal component analysis (PCA) techniques as a data dimension reduction were applied. In fresh lubricants classification, the rates of matching by Bayesian model technique with wavelet fitting and PCA were 97.5% and 96.7%, respectively. The Bayesian model technique with wavelet fitting was better to classify lubricants than it with PCA based on dimension reduction. And we selected the Bayesian model technique with wavelet fitting for classification of lubricants. The other experiment was the analysis of used engine oils which were collected from vehicles with the several mileage up to 5,000 km after replacing engine oil. The eighty six kinds of used engine oil sample with the mileage were collected. In vehicle classification (total 24 classes), the rate of matching by Bayesian model with wavelet fitting was 86.4%. However, in the vehicle's fuel type classification (whether it is gasoline vehicle or diesel vehicle, only total 2 classes), the rate of matching was 99.6%. In the used engine oil brands classification (total 6 classes), the rate of matching was 97.3%.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.