• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.1
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• pp.47-85
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• 1989

The Fundamental purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to establish uniform rules applicable to international air transportation. The emphasis on the benefits of uniformity was considered important in the beginning and continues to be important to the present. If the desire for uniformity is indeed the mortar which holds the Warsaw system together then it should be possible to agree on a worldwide liability limit. This liability limit would not be so unreasonable, that it would be impossible for nations to adhere to it. It would preclude any national supplemental compensation plan or Montreal Agreement type of requirement in any jurisdiction. The differentiation of liability limits by national requirement seems to be what is occurring. There is a plethora of mandated limits and Montreal Agreement type 'voluntary' limits. It is becoming difficult to find more than a few major States where an unmodified Warsaw Convention or Hague Protocol limitation is still in effect. If this is the real world in the 1980's, then let the treaty so reflect it. Upon reviewing the Warsaw Convention, its history and the several attempts to amend it, strengths become apparent. Hijackings of international flights have given rise to a number of lawsuits by passengers to recover damages for injuries suffered. This comment is concerned with the liability of an airline for injuries to its passengers resulting from aviation terrorism. In addition, analysis is focused on current airline security measures, particularly the pre-boarding screening system, and the duty of air carriers to prevent weapons from penetrating that system. An airline has a duty to exercise a high degree of care to protect its passengers from the threat of aviation terrorism. This duty would seemingly require the airline to exercise a high degree of care to prevent any passenger from smuggling a weapon or explosive device aboard its aircraft. In the case an unarmed hijacker who boards having no instrument in his possession with which to promote the hoax, a plaintiff-passenger would be hard-pressed to show that the airline was negligent in screening the hijacker prior to boarding. In light of the airline's duty to exercise a high degree of care to provide for the safety of all the passengers on board, an acquiescene to a hijacker's demands on the part of the air carrier could constitute a breach of duty only when it is clearly shown that the carrier's employees knew or plainly should have known that the hijacker was unarmed. A finding of willful misconduct on the part of an air carrier, which is a prerequisite to imposing unlimited liability, remains a question to be determined by a jury using the definition or standard of willful misconduct prevailing in the jurisdiction of the forum court. Through the willful misconduct provision of the Warsaw Convention, air carrier face the possibility of unlimited liability for failure to implement proper preventive precautions against terrorist. Courts, therefore, should broadly construe the willful misconduct provision of the Warsaw Convention in order to find unlimited liability for passenger injuries whenever air carrier security precautions are lacking. In this way, the courts can help ensure air carrier safety and prevention against terrorist attack. Air carriers, therefore, would have an incentive to increase, impose and maintain security precautions designed to thwart such potential terrorist attacks as in the case of Korean Air Lines Flight No.858 incident having a tremendous impact on the civil aviation community. The crash of a commercial airliner, with the attending tragic loss of life and massive destruction of property, always gives rise to shock and indignation. The general opinion is that the legal system could be sufficient, provided that the political will is there to use and apply it effectively. All agreed that the main responsibility for security has to be borne by the governments. I would like to remind all passengers that every discovery of the human spirit may be used for opposite ends; thus, aircraft can be used for air travel but also as targets of terrorism. A state that supports aviation terrorism is responsible for violation of International Aviation Law. Generally speaking, terrorism is a violation of international law. It violates the soverign rights of the states, and the human rights of the individuals. I think that aviation terrorism as becoming an ever more serious issue, has to be solved by internationally agreed and closely co-ordinated measures. We have to contribute more to the creation of a general consensus amongst all states about the need to combat the threat of aviation terrorism.

• Radiation Oncology Journal
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.393-402
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• 1997

Purpose : When an x-ray beam of small field size is irradiated to target area containing an air cavity, such as larynx, the underdosing effect is observed in the region near the interfaces of air and soft tissue. With a larynx model, air cavity embedded in tissue-equivalent material, this study is intonded for examining Parameters, such as beam quality, field size, and cavity size, to affect the dose distribution near the air cavity. Materials and Methods : Three x-rar beams, 4-, 6- and 10-MV, were employed to Perform a measurement using a 2cm $(width){\times}L$ (length in cm, one side of x-ray field used 2cm (height) air cavity in the simulated larynx. A thin window parallel-plate chamber connected to an electrometer was used for a dosimetry system. A ratio of the dose at various distances from the cavity-tissue interface to the dose at the same points in a homogeneous Phantom (ebservedlexpected ratio, O/E) normalized buildup curves, and ratio of distal surface dose to dose at the maximum buildup depth were examined for various field sizes. Measurement for cavity size effect was performed by varying the height (Z) of the air cavity with the width kept constant for several field sizes. Results : No underdosing effect for 4-MV beam for fields larger than $5cm\times5cm$ was found For both 6- and 10-MV beams, the underdosing portion of the larynx at the distal surface was seen to occur for small fields, $4cm\times4cm\;and\;5cm\times5cm$. The underdosed tissue was increased in its volume with beam energy even for similar surface doses. The relative distal surface dose to maximum dose was changed to 0.99 from 0.95, 0.92, and 0.91 for 4-, 6-, and 10-MV, respectively, with increasing field size, $4cm\times4cm\;to\;8cm\times8cm$, For 6- and 10-MV beams, the dose at the surface of the cavity is measured less than the predicted by about two and three percent. respectively. but decrease was found for 4-MV beam for $5cm\times5cm$ field. For the $4cm\timesL\timesZ$ (height in cm). varying depth from 0.0 to 4.8cm, cavity, O/E> 1.0 was observed regardless of the cavity size for any field larger than about $8cm\times8cm$. Conclusion : The magnitude of underdosing depends on beam energy, field size. and cavity size for the larynx model. Based on the result of the study. caution must be used when a small field of a high quality x-ray beam is irradiated to regions including air cavities. and especially the region where the tumor extends to the surface. Low quality beam. such as. 4-MV x-ray, and larger fields can be used preferably to reduce the risk of underdosing, local failure. In the case of high quality beams such as 6- and 10-MV x-rays, however. an additional boost field is recommended to add for the compensation of the underdosing region when a typically used treatment field. $8cm\times8cm$, is employed.