• 제목/요약/키워드: equilibrium-pricing

검색결과 74건 처리시간 0.026초

Game Theory based Dynamic Spectrum Allocation for Secondary Users in the Cell Edge of Cognitive Radio Networks

  • Jang, Sungjin;Kim, Jongbae;Byun, Jungwon;Shin, Yongtae
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • 제8권7호
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    • pp.2231-2245
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    • 2014
  • Cognitive Radio (CR) has very promising potential to improve spectrum utilization by allowing unlicensed Secondary Users (SUs) to access the spectrum dynamically without disturbing licensed Primary Users (PUs). Mitigating interference is a fundamental problem in CR scenarios. This is particularly problematic for deploying CR in cellular networks, when users are located at the cell edge, as the inter-cell interference mitigation and frequency reuse are critical requirements for both PUs and SUs. Further cellular networks require higher cell edge performance, then SUs will meet more challenges than PUs. To solve the performance decrease for SUs at the cell edge, a novel Dynamic Spectrum Allocation (DSA) scheme based on Game Theory is proposed in this paper. Full frequency reuse can be realized as well as inter-cell interference mitigated according to SUs' sensing, measurement and interaction in this scheme. A joint power/channel allocation algorithm is proposed to improve both cell-edge user experience and network performance through distributed pricing calculation and exchange based on game theory. Analytical proof is presented and simulation results show that the proposed scheme achieves high efficiency of spectrum usage and improvement of cell edge SUs' performance.

Energy-Saving Strategy for Green Cognitive Radio Networks with an LTE-Advanced Structure

  • Jin, Shunfu;Ma, Xiaotong;Yue, Wuyi
    • Journal of Communications and Networks
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    • 제18권4호
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    • pp.610-618
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    • 2016
  • A green cognitive radio network (CRN), characterized by base stations (BSs) that conserve energy during sleep periods, is a promising candidate for realizing more efficient spectrum allocation. To improve the spectrum efficiency and achieve greener communication in wireless applications, we consider CRNs with an long term evolution advanced (LTE-A) structure and propose a novel energy-saving strategy. By establishing a type of preemptive priority queueing model with a single vacation, we capture the stochastic behavior of the proposed strategy. Using the method of matrix geometric solutions, we derive the performance measures in terms of the average latency of secondary user (SU) packets and the energy-saving degree of BSs. Furthermore, we provide numerical results to demonstrate the influence of the sleeping parameter on the system performance. Finally, we compare the Nash equilibrium behavior and social optimization behavior of the proposed strategy to present a pricing policy for SU packets.

A Task Scheduling Strategy in Cloud Computing with Service Differentiation

  • Xue, Yuanzheng;Jin, Shunfu;Wang, Xiushuang
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • 제12권11호
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    • pp.5269-5286
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    • 2018
  • Task scheduling is one of the key issues in improving system performance and optimizing resource management in cloud computing environment. In order to provide appropriate services for heterogeneous users, we propose a novel task scheduling strategy with service differentiation, in which the delay sensitive tasks are assigned to the rapid cloud with high-speed processing, whereas the fault sensitive tasks are assigned to the reliable cloud with service restoration. Considering that a user can receive service from either local SaaS (Software as a Service) servers or public IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) cloud, we establish a hybrid queueing network based system model. With the assumption of Poisson arriving process, we analyze the system model in steady state. Moreover, we derive the performance measures in terms of average response time of the delay sensitive tasks and utilization of VMs (Virtual Machines) in reliable cloud. We provide experimental results to validate the proposed strategy and the system model. Furthermore, we investigate the Nash equilibrium behavior and the social optimization behavior of the delay sensitive tasks. Finally, we carry out an improved intelligent searching algorithm to obtain the optimal arrival rate of total tasks and present a pricing policy for the delay sensitive tasks.

균형(均衡)퓨처가격(價格)(equilibrium futures prices)을 예측하기 위한 재무성(財務省) 장기채권(長期債券)(Treasury bond)의 퓨처옵션가격(價格)(futures option prices)에 대한 연구(硏究) (Treasury Bond Futures Option Prices as.Predictors of Equilibrium Futures Prices)

  • 김원기
    • 재무관리연구
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    • 제8권1호
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    • pp.199-212
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    • 1991
  • 주식옵션(stock options)에 대한 연구에 비교하여 상품 및 퓨처 옵션(commodity & futures options)에 대한 연구는 선진국에서도 지금 한참 연구를 하고 있는 단계에 있다. 우리나라에서도 이 분야에 대한 이론을 바탕으로 하는 제도를 곧 도입하려는 준비를 하고 있다. 본 연구는 블랙의 '블랙의 컴모디티 옵션의 가격모형(Black commodity option pricing model)'을 이용하여 재무성 장기채권의 퓨처의 균형가격을 예측하는데 있다. 이 블랙모형의 적용가능성을 검증해 본 것이다. 실제퓨처가격(observed futures prices)과는 달리 재무성 장기채권 퓨처 옵션에서의 묵시적 퓨처가격(futures prices implicit)은 시장효율성(market efficiencies)의 전제하에 성립되거나, 아니면 옵션가격모형을 사용하여서는 아니되거나 둘 중의 하나이거나 둘 다 섞이거나 일 것이다. 본 실증적인 연구, 즉 묵시적인 표준편차(implied standard deviations)를 사이멀테니어스(simultaneously)하게 계산한 묵시적인 퓨처가격(implied futures prices)을 사용한 실증적인 연구는 옵션모델에 의하여 퓨처가격을 계산하는 데에 문제가 있음을 발견하였다. 그 이유는 옵션가격결정모형을 이용하여 계산한 재무성 장기채권의 퓨쳐가격은 재무성 장기채권의 미래가격변동의 방향을 제시하는 지표로써 사용할 수 없기 때문일 것이다. 우리나라에서도 이 분야에 대한 이론과 제도를 곧 도입하는 입장에서 선행되는 문헌이 될 것이다.

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과점산업(寡占産業)에서의 진입제한가격(進入制限價格) (Limit Pricing by Noncooperative Oligopolists)

  • 남일총
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • 제12권1호
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    • pp.127-148
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    • 1990
  • 이 논문의 기본목표는 Bain 이래 논란의 대상이 되어 온 기존기업들에 의한 진입제한가격(進入制限價格)의 형성이 일반적으로 가능한가, 가능하다면 어떠한 메커니즘을 통해 형성되는 가를 밝히고, 진입제한가격이론(進入制限價格理論)이 한국경제에 갖는 의의를 찾아보는데 있다, 이 논문에서 밝혀질 주요결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 다수의 기존기업(旣存企業)이 각자의 이윤극대화(利潤極大化)를 추구하며 카르텔을 형성하지 않는 때에도 기존기업(旣存企業)과 잠재적(潛在的) 신규기업간(新規企業間)에 정보의 불균형이 존재하는 경우 진입제한가격(進入制限價格)이 채택될 가능성이 있다. 둘째, 이러한 과점기업(寡占企業)들에 의한 진입제한가격형성(進入制限價格形成)은 암묵적 담합의 새로운 형태로 해석할 수 있다. 셋째, 진입제한가격형성(進入制限價格形成)은 각종 회계자료(會計資料)가 공표되지 않을 경우에 가능하다. 넷째, 기존기업(旣存企業)의 수(數)가 증가하여 산업(産業)이 완전경쟁산업(完全競爭産業)에 접근해 감에 따라 진입제한가격(進入制限價格)이 형성될 가능성은 사라지게 된다.

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An Efficient Game Theory-Based Power Control Algorithm for D2D Communication in 5G Networks

  • Saif, Abdu;Noordin, Kamarul Ariffin bin;Dimyati, Kaharudin;Shah, Nor Shahida Mohd;Al-Gumaei, Yousef Ali;Abdullah, Qazwan;Alezabi, Kamal Ali
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • 제15권7호
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    • pp.2631-2649
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    • 2021
  • Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is one of the enabling technologies for 5G networks that support proximity-based service (ProSe) for wireless network communications. This paper proposes a power control algorithm based on the Nash equilibrium and game theory to eliminate the interference between the cellular user device and D2D links. This leadsto reliable connectivity with minimal power consumption in wireless communication. The power control in D2D is modeled as a non-cooperative game. Each device is allowed to independently select and transmit its power to maximize (or minimize) user utility. The aim is to guide user devices to converge with the Nash equilibrium by establishing connectivity with network resources. The proposed algorithm with pricing factors is used for power consumption and reduces overall interference of D2Ds communication. The proposed algorithm is evaluated in terms of the energy efficiency of the average power consumption, the number of D2D communication, and the number of iterations. Besides, the algorithm has a relatively fast convergence with the Nash Equilibrium rate. It guarantees that the user devices can achieve their required Quality of Service (QoS) by adjusting the residual cost coefficient and residual energy factor. Simulation results show that the power control shows a significant reduction in power consumption that has been achieved by approximately 20% compared with algorithms in [11].

An Integrated Game Theoretical Approach for Primary and Secondary Users Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks

  • Kim, Jong-Gyu;Nguyen, Khanh-Huy;Lee, Jung-Tae;Hwang, Won-Joo
    • 한국멀티미디어학회논문지
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    • 제14권12호
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    • pp.1549-1558
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    • 2011
  • In this paper, we address the problem of bandwidth sharing among multiple primary users and multiple secondary users in a cognitive radio network. In cognitive radio networks, effective spectrum assignment for primary and secondary users is a challenge due to the available broad range of radio frequency spectrum as well as the requisition of harmonious coexistence of both users. To handle this problem, firstly, Bertrand game model is used to analyze a spectrum pricing in which multiple primary users emulate with each other to acquire maximal profit. After that, we employ Cournot game to model the spectrum sharing of secondary users to obtain optimal profit for each user also. Simulation results show that our scheme obtains optimal solution at Nash equilibrium.

ALLOCATION AND PRICING IN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AND THE FREE RIDER THEOREM

  • Beckmann, Martin J.
    • 한국경영과학회지
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    • 제3권1호
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    • pp.31-46
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    • 1978
  • Consider a time interval during which the demand for trips is fixed (e.g. the rush hour period). The traveller has a choice between various public modes, whose travel times and fares are fixed, and the automobile mode, for which travel time and cost depend on the volume of traffic flow on those roads, which are subject to congestion. We consider the equilibrium in terms of a representative travellerm, who choses for any trip the mode and route with the least combined money and time cost. When several (parallel) model or routes are chosen, then the combined cost of money and time must be equal among these. Our problem is first, to find the optimal flows of cars and of public mode carriers on the various links of their networks and second the optimal fares for trips by the variousmodes. The object is to minimize the total operating costs of the carriers and car plus the total time costs to travellers. The optimal fares are related to, but not identical with the dual variables of the underlying Nonlinear Program. They are equal to these dual variables only in the case, when congestion tolls on trips or on the use of specific roads are collected from automobile users. When such tolls are not collected, they must be passed on as subsidies to travellers using competing modes. The optimal fares of public modes are then reduced by the amounts of these subsidies. Note that subsidies are not a flat payment to public carriers, but are calculated on the basis of tickets sold. Fares and subsidies depend in general on tile period considered. They will be higher during periods of higher demand. When the assumption of fixed trip demand is relaxed, this tare system is no longer best, but only second best since too much traffic will, in general, be generated. The Free Rider Theorem states the following : Suppose road tolls can be charged, so that a best pricing system for public modes is posssible. Then there may exist free rides on some routes and modes, but never on a complete round trip.

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Price-based Resource Allocation for Virtualized Cognitive Radio Networks

  • Li, Qun;Xu, Ding
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • 제10권10호
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    • pp.4748-4765
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    • 2016
  • We consider a virtualized cognitive radio (CR) network, where multiple virtual network operators (VNOs) who own different virtual cognitive base stations (VCBSs) share the same physical CBS (PCBS) which is owned by an infrastructure provider (InP), sharing the spectrum with the primary user (PU). The uplink scenario is considered where the secondary users (SUs) transmit to the VCBSs. The PU is protected by constraining the interference power from the SUs. Such constraint is applied by the InP through pricing the interference. A Stackelberg game is formulated to jointly maximize the revenue of the InP and the individual utilities of the VNOs, and then the Stackelberg equilibrium is investigated. Specifically, the optimal interference price and channel allocation for the VNOs to maximize the revenue of the InP and the optimal power allocation for the SUs to maximize the individual utilities of the VNOs are derived. In addition, a low‐complexity ±‐optimal solution is also proposed for obtaining the interference price and channel allocation for the VNOs. Simulations are provided to verify the proposed strategies. It is shown that the proposed strategies are effective in resource allocation and the ±‐optimal strategy achieves practically the same performance as the optimal strategy can achieve. It is also shown that the InP will not benefit from a large interference power limit, and selecting VNOs with higher unit rate utility gain to share the resources of the InP is beneficial to both the InP and the VNOs.

국내 석유시장에서 비대칭 가격조정에 관한 연구 (A Study on Asymmetric Price Adjustment in Domestic Petroleum Market)

  • 김진형
    • 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
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    • 제24권3호
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    • pp.523-549
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    • 2015
  • 본 연구에서는 생산비용의 변화에 대해 비대칭적 조정을 허용하는 오차수정모형을 바탕으로 국내 석유제품시장에서 자기가격과 경쟁가격의 변동에 대한 정유사들의 가격조정 행태를 분석하고 나아가 국제유가 및 환율의 변동에 대한 정유사들의 반응을 계량적으로 추정해 이들 가격의 비대칭적 특성을 분석하였다. 이를 위해 자동차연료인 휘발유와 경유를 분석대상으로 선정하고, 이들 유종에 대한 정유사별 세전공급가격을 석유공사의 Opinet으로부터 수집하였으며, 수집한 자료는 2009년 4월 5주부터 2015년 1월 3주까지의 주별 자료로서 관측치는 총 300개에 이른다. 정유사 공급가격은 국제유가 및 환율의 변동에 대해 양적으로 비대칭적 조정이 이루어지고 있음을 추정결과는 유의적으로 잘 나타내고 있다. 누적조정금은 대부분의 경우 이들 변수가 하락할 때보다 상승할 경우에 더 크게 나타난다. 시장점유율이 높은 정유사일수록 누적조정금은 크게 나타나 이들 정유사가 국제유가 및 환율의 변동에 민감하게 반응해 가격조정에서도 선도적 역할을 하고 있을 가능성을 시사한다. 한편 자기가격 및 경쟁가격의 균형이탈에 대한 정유사의 반응은 암묵적 가격담합과 경쟁적 가격조정의 두 행태가 동시에 나타난다. 암묵적 가격담합은 경쟁가격의 움직임과 같은 방향으로 가격을 조정해 상대가격과 일정수준을 유지하려는 조정행태를 의미하며, 추정결과 정유사들 반응의 대부분은 여기에 해당되었다. 일부 정유사는 경쟁가격의 상향이탈시 자기가격을 하향조정해 시장수요를 확보하려는 경쟁적 가격조정행태를 취하고 있음을 보인다.