• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제34권4호
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• pp.123-138
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• 2009

This study examined the first- and second-best pricing by stable dynamics in congested transportation networks. Stable dynamics, suggested by Nesterov and de Palma (2003), is a new model which describes and provides a stable state of congestion in urban transportation networks. The first-best pricing in user equilibrium models introduces user-equilibrium in the system-equilibrium by tolling the difference between the marginal social cost and the marginal private cost on each link. Nevertheless, the second-best pricing, which levies the toll on some, but not all, links, is relevant from the practical point of view. In comparison with the user equilibrium model, the stable dynamic model provides a solution equivalent to system-equilibrium if it is focused on link flows. Therefore the toll interval on each link, which keeps up the system-equilibrium, is more meaningful than the first-best pricing. In addition, the second-best pricing in stable dynamic models is the same as the first-best pricing since the toll interval is separately given by each link. As an effect of congestion pricing in stable dynamic models, we can remove the inefficiency of the network with inefficient Braess links by levying a toll on the Braess link. We present a numerical example applied to the network with 6 nodes and 9 links, including 2 Braess links.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.35-69
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• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

• 한국콘텐츠학회논문지
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• 제16권7호
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• pp.146-153
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• 2016

본 연구에서는 연속시간 M/M/1 대기행렬 시스템에서 고객들의 평형행동과 서버의 최적 가격책정 전략에 대해 다룬다. 본 연구에서는 두가지 유형의 가격지불 모형을 고려한다. 첫 번째로, 정액지불 모형은 고객의 시스템 내 체류시간에 관계없이 고정된 요금을 부과한다. 두 번째로, 정률지불 모형은 고객의 시스템 내 체류시간에 비례하여 요금을 부과한다. 각 지불 모형에서 시스템을 이탈하는 고객의 보상은 체류시간에 반비례한다. 본 연구는 각 가격지불 모형에서 단위시간당 서버의 기대수익을 최대화하기 위한 가격책정 전략과 그 전략에 따른 고객의 시스템 입장행동에 대해 분석한다. 마지막으로 수치예제를 통해 정액지불 모형과 정률지불 모형을 비교분석하고, 서버측면에서 어떤 가격지불 모형을 선택해야하는 지를 살펴본다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제8권4호
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• pp.1192-1207
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• 2014

Dynamic spectrum sharing is a key technology to improve spectrum utilization in wireless networks. The elastic spectrum management provides a new opportunity for licensed primary users and unlicensed secondary users to efficiently utilize the scarce wireless resource. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic framework for dynamic spectrum allocation where the primary users rent the unutilized spectrum to the secondary users for a monetary profit. In reality, due to the ON-OFF behavior of the primary user, the quantity of spectrum that can be opportunistically shared by the secondary users is limited. We model this situation with the renewal theory and formulate the spectrum pricing scheme with the Bertrand game, taking into account the scarcity of the spectrum. By the Nash-equilibrium pricing scheme, each player in the game continually converges to a strategy that maximizes its own profit. We also investigate the impact of several properties, including channel quality and spectrum substitutability. Based on the equilibrium analysis, we finally propose a decentralized algorithm that leads the primary users to the Nash-equilibrium, called DST. The stability of the proposed algorithm in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is also studied.

• 한국건축시공학회지
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• 제8권6호
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• pp.65-74
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• 2008

The aim is to get comprehensive view point for the price of apartment. Apartment construction cost is the sun of land cost and building cost. Land price reflects the value of location where building stands. When the gap between price and affordability is narrow enough, effective demand promote apartment construction. The today's trends of rising price, which began in apartment housing, spreads to real estates market and finally overall consumer price. Problem is that price is decided only by supplier's interest. Equilibrium-pricing is common process in housing market. However it is important to review hedonic price and the factor of housing services and focused on the affordability of demanders. AHP analysis was used to study real needs and preference of demanders and dealt with 200 interviewees with brief checklists. We found that social factor is more important than building cost or site development. Especially location of apartment is most important to affect environment quality and accessibility to facilities.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제2권4호
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• pp.494-499
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• 2007

In this paper, we have investigated how transmission network constraints can be modeled in an electricity market equilibrium model. Under Cournot competition assumption, a game model is set up considering transmission line capacity constraints. Based on locational marginal pricing principle, market clearing is formulated as a total consumers# benefit maximization problem, and then converted to a conventional optimal power flow (OPF) formulation with a linearized transmission model. Using market clearing formulation, best response analysis is formulated and, finally, Nash equilibrium is formulated. In order for illustration, a numerical study for a four node system with two generating firms and two loads are presented.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제5A권1호
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• pp.85-92
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• 2005

In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. We analyze the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions and propose a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction. We assume that spot markets are operated as uniform pricing auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid. Depending on the bids of generation companies, market demands are allocated to each company accordingly. The uniform pricing auction in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium originating from the Nash idea. Based on the so called residual demand curve, we can derive the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies, analytically. Finally, we present an efficient means to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to illustrate the basic idea of the proposed methodology. From this, we can see the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem, even though further future analysis is required.

• 대한토목학회논문집
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• 제28권5D호
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• pp.649-654
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• 2008

비가산경로비용(Non Additive Path Cost)에서 경로를 구성하는 링크통행비용의 합이 경로통행비용과 일치하지 않는다. 비가산성 비용의 적지 않은 사례가 교통부문에 존재하고 있으나 교통망 균형모형은 대부분 가산경로비용 가정에 의존하고 있다. 이 경우 교통망모형은 경로에 속해있는 링크의 통행비용에 선형적으로 증가한다는 경우에 한정된다. 비가산경로비용 대표적인 예로서 특정지역을 출입하는 통행료 체계를 들 수 있다. 이 체계는 차량이 진입(Entry)하면서 인식되고 진출(Exit)하면서 통행료가 정산되므로 링크의 요금이 경로에 선형적으로 반영되지 않는다. 본 연구는 지역기반 통행료 부과체계를 중심으로 새로운 Wordrop 균형모형을 제안한다. 제안된 모형은 비가산경로비용을 가산경로비용으로 전환되기 위해 이진표식변수를 도입한다. 제안된 모형은 경로를 열거하지 않고, 기존의 최적경로탐색기법과 비선형알고리즘이 적용이 가능하며, 수식과 해법에서 네트워크의 변형이 요구되지 않는다는 측면에서 기존에 제안된 모형보다 일반화되었다고 할 수 있다. 증명과 사례연구를 통하여 모형을 검증한다.

• 대한교통학회지
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• 제27권2호
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• pp.145-155
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• 2009

본 연구는 구역혼잡통행료(Area pricing)와 진입통행료(Cordon pricing)의 최적 부과경계와 요금수준을 탐색하고 이들 두 방식이 차선정책수단으로서 최선의 정책수단인 이론적 혼잡통행료에 비해 교통혼잡의 완화와 후생상 어떤 차별적 효과가 있는지를 보여준다. 본 연구는 장기적으로 혼잡통행료가 생산 및 소비시장과 토지시장의 균형을 변화시킴에 따라 이들을 고려하기 위해 일반균형조건 아래 단핵도시에서 징수방식들을 비교하고 있다. 연구결과 구역혼잡통행료와 진입통행료의 최적 부과경계는 도시반경이 22km인 경우 도시 중심으로부터 3km 떨어진 구역경계에 동일하게 위치하며 최적 부과경계 아래 최적 요금은 구역혼잡통행료가 진입통행료에 비하여 약간 높은 것으로 분석되었다. 이론적 혼잡통행료에 가장 근접한 사회적 효용 개선효과를 발생시키는 징수방식은 구역혼잡통행료이며 진입통행료가 구역혼잡통행료 보다 낮은 개선효과를 발생시키는 것으로 평가되었다. 교통환경 개선효과 역시 사회적 효용개선효과와 동일하게 통행속도와 일일 평균통행시간에서 구역혼잡통행료가 진입통행료에 비하여 높은 개선효과를 가져오는 것으로 나타났다.

• 대한교통학회지
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• 제25권5호
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• pp.183-193
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• 2007

전통적으로 혼잡통행료는 교통시설의 한계사회비용과 한계개인비용의 차이를 혼잡통행료로 부과함으로써 사용자 균형(user equilibrium)상태의 도로망을 체계최적(system optimum)으로 유도하는 한계비용가격(marginal cost pricing) 또는 최적혼잡통행료(first-optimal pricing)이론에 근거를 두고 있다. 이러한 이론을 기초로 본 연구에서는 가변수요를 갖는 다계층 도로이용자를 대상으로 링크 최적혼잡통행료의 이론적 특성을 살펴보고 혼잡통행료 징수에 따른 계층간 그리고 지역간 형평성을 분석하기 위한 방법론을 연구한다. 여기서, 도로이용자가 경험하는 경로통행비용은 시간요소(통행시간)와 화폐요소(혼잡통행료)의 2가지 판단기준으로 구성되고 시간가치에 의해 하나의 단위로 전환(trade off)이 가능하다. 경로 통행비용이 시간단위로 환산될 경우, 최적혼잡통행료는 시간단위 체계최적 조건으로부터 도출될 수 있고 경로통행비용이 화폐단위로 환산될 경우, 최적혼잡통행료는 화폐단위 체계최적 조건으로부터 도출될 수 있다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 이러한 체계최적 조건으로부터 도출된 최적혼잡통행료를 산정하는 모형을 개발하고 이를 통하여 계층간 형평성을 살펴본다.