• Clinical and Experimental Reproductive Medicine
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.209-217
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• 2009

Objective: To analyze current issues and to propose alternatives for "the cryopreserved embryos generated before 2005". Methods: The differences in attitude among the stakeholders such as sperm donors, oocyte donors, and IVF clinics were presupposed. We want to forecast the impediments which occur inevitably in the process of "getting the informed consent" and "discarding the cryopreserved embryos generated before 2005". Results: Even though there is a specific guideline for "the cryopreserved embryos generated before 2005" at November 23, 2006, no consensus about the process related to "getting the informed consent" has been made. Conclusion: Unavoidably, it seems to be entering a period of massive discard of "the cryopreserved embryos generated before 2005". This is actually opposed to the intent of the Bioethics and Safety Act, which is to protect human dignity and prevent harm to human beings. We have to make reasonable due process to determine the destiny of "the cryopreserved embryos generated before 2005".

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.85-114
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• 2023

The purpose of this study is to analyze Russia-Central Asia relations since the launch of the EAEU in 2015 and forecast the future from a structural realism perspective. Bilateral relations have both elements of close cooperation and elements of conflict. Russia and Central Asia, which have the characteristics of an authoritarian alliance, also have a symbiotic relationship in which they have no choice but to cooperate with each other to maintain the regime. Based on this, Russia has made various efforts to reunify Central Asia. Central Asia also has no choice but to cooperate with Russia for its survival, but at the same time, it has expanded its scope of cooperation in the international community to avoid being subjugated to Russia again. However, as China's power expands, Russia's relative weakness, and wariness toward Russia increases after the Ukraine War, the gap in bilateral relations is widening. In particular, as China's influence grows, Russia's nervousness also increases. This is why Putin visits Central Asia and holds active summit talks even during the war in Ukraine. If competition between Russia and China surfaces, there is a high possibility that the international order in Central Asia will become unstable. However, it is still unlikely that the power of Russia and China will reverse in Central Asia. Above all, the security, historical, and cultural connections between Russia and Central Asia are areas that are difficult for China to catch up with. Therefore, a weakening of Russia's influence compared to the past is inevitable, but its superiority is expected to continue. If Russia breaks away from belligerence and transforms into an attractive cooperative partner, there is a possibility that bilateral relations will take an upward turn again. However, it seems unlikely that such changes and innovations will occur under the Putin regime. Therefore, the biggest obstacle to realizing Putin's goal of reunifying Central Asia is Putin himself.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.1-26
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• 2023

This article will analyze and forecast important variables and dynamics in global power politics after the war in Ukraine. It tries to use several perspectives to analyze international relations, particularly liberal internationalism and structural realism. In short, core variables are as follows; First, how is the US-led liberal international order and globalization being adjusted? Second, how will the U.S.-China strategic competition, which is the biggest and structural variable, cause changes in the international order in the future? The third variable, how stable are Sino-Russia relations in the context of a structuring U.S.-China-Russia strategic new triangle? Fourth, to what extent will third middle hedging states outside the U.S. and China be able to exercise strategic autonomy in the face of multipolarization? To summarize, the first of these four variables is the largest basic variable at the global political and economic level in terms of its impact on the international community, and it has been led by the United States. The second variable, in terms of actors, seems to be the most influential structural variable in global competition, and the US-China strategic competition is likely to be a long game. Thus the world will not be able to escape the influence of the competition between the two global powers. For South Korea, this second variable is probably the biggest external variable and dilemma. The third variable, the stability of Sino-Russia relations, determines balance of global power in the 21st century. The U.S.-China-Russia strategic new triangle, as seen in the current war in Ukraine, will operate as the greatest power variable in not only global power competition but also changes in the international order. Just as the U.S. is eager for a Sino-Russia fragmentation strategy, such as a Tito-style wedge policy to manage balance of power in the early years of the Cold War, it needs a reverse Kissinger strategy to reset the U.S.-Russia relationship, in order to push for a Sino-Russia splitting in the 21st century. But with the war in Ukraine, it seems that this fragmentation strategy has already been broken. In the context of Northeast Asia, whether or not the stability of Sino-Russia relations depends not only on the United States, but also on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, the fourth variable is a dependent variable that emerged as a result of the interaction of the above three variables, but simultaneously it remains to be seen that this variable is likely to act as the most dynamic and independent variable that can promote multilateralism, multipolarization, and pan-regionalism of the global international community in the future. Taking into account these four variables together, we can make an outlook on the change in the international order.