• Proceedings of the Korean Institute Of Construction Engineering and Management
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• 2004.11a
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• pp.462-467
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• 2004

Design-build, which is defined as single source responsibility for design and construction, has been widely used in large public works since governmental formulation of measure for encouraging use of design-build in 1996. However, civic groups and small and medium sized enterprises are highlighting over-competition and unbalanced market shares of conglomerate in domestic design-bid market and insisting on decrease in the use of design-build and absorption into the lowest-price bidding. This study collected information about cost, schedule, quality, new technology adoption from 51 civil design-build projects and measured their performance.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.78-90
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• 2015

Due to a significant decrease in the number of construction projects in the domestic market of Korea, overseas expansion of the Korean construction companies has been accelerated in recent years. However, the practice of bidding at a low price and lacking information about foreign new markets caused many companies to fail in their entries to these markets. As a measure to prevent such failures, this study has developed a framework which first defines the key research items that must be identified beforehand and then classifies them into a structured way so that the construction companies can actually use this framework to be better prepared for their forays into the new markets. The framework was actually applied for a construction project in Morocco, and its usefulness was proven by the user's successful participation into the project, nevertheless the application and result was limited. Although perhaps this framework should be applied to many more construction projects for its validity to be verified and for its structure to be better standardized, the framework still has its value due to the following two reasons: first, it has systemized the research items that had been only conceptually defined but had never been organized, and second it can be utilized as a investigation tool at the marketing stage.

• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.57-65
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• 2014

Risk factors are the reason behind cost overruns and delays in long-term large-scale IT service projects. Major risks originate from the integration of complex IT system components, including software, hardware, and solutions; the competitive bidding process; the turnkey and firm-fixed price nature of contracts; and the project execution environment. We have identified several risk factors such as delay in acceptance, low quality of deliverables, delay in payment, adding and changing requirements and scope, unclear definition of roles and responsibilities of the buyer and supplier, and unclear procedures of change and quality management during the project execution phase. One needs to manage risks proactively before signing the contract. In order to weed out or lower the risk factors well in advance, we need to identify and remove risk factors contained in contract clauses and attached contract documents. We propose a checklist for assessing IT service project contracts. To validate the checklist's utility, we applied it to an IT service project in the finance industry. The results show that the checklist is effective in identifying and removing risk factors pertaining to IT service projects.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.34 no.6
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• pp.1881-1891
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• 2014

Full system of turnkey deliberation committee in 2010 was abolished and permanent Deliberation committee was introduced. So far, ordering organization selected the best method suitable for the design and comprehensive evaluation method in the turnkey bid construction. Comprehensive evaluation method have bid price design score coordination, weighted basis, the best design approach fixed amount, five successful bidder decision method in addition. Design deliberation branch committee in the successful bidder decision way configured and operated branch members of special design consultation committee, But main agent changed from committee deliberation pull system to permanent committee deliberation, as well as and The lobby burden was not improved. This similar to the past at the portion of the design deliberation and the way of the design deliberation in the turnkey bid construction. Therefore it is necessary to improve the design deliberation system. In other words, design score and technology competition should be adapted to determine a successful bid. This study suggested the operating system of the design deliberation, the decision method problems of the successful bidder and ways to improve the design deliberation.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.109-135
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• 2010

This study estimated the social benefits of establishment 01 the Taehwa Field Ecology Park in Ulsan Metropolitan City, using CVM(Contingent Valuation Method) with multiple choices in consideration of respondent's uncertainty. The estimation results 01 lour logit models show that the probability of willingness-to-pay increases significantly with higher income, higher evaluation on the relevancy of establishment of the Park, and male gender, and decreases significantly with the bidding price. Truncated mean household WTP is estimated as 2,409.4 KRW in the MBYES model with the most efficient estimates of WTP among four models. On the basis of the WTP estimates, the present values of total social benefits in Ulsan Metropolitan City are estimated as 236.5 bill ion KRW when applying the 5% discount rate. This result shows that the present values of total social benefits are greater than the total costs in all models, and thus may prove the economic relevancy of the investment for the ecology park establishment.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.1
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• pp.85-92
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• 2005

In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. We analyze the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions and propose a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction. We assume that spot markets are operated as uniform pricing auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid. Depending on the bids of generation companies, market demands are allocated to each company accordingly. The uniform pricing auction in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium originating from the Nash idea. Based on the so called residual demand curve, we can derive the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies, analytically. Finally, we present an efficient means to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to illustrate the basic idea of the proposed methodology. From this, we can see the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem, even though further future analysis is required.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.1 no.3
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• pp.133-142
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• 2012

Cournot model is one of representative models among many game theoretic approaches available for analyzing competitive market models. Recent years have witnessed various kinds of attempts to model competitive electricity markets using the Cournot model. Cournot model is appropriate for oligopoly market which is one characteristic of electric power industry requiring huge amount of capital investment. When we use Cournot model for the application to electricity market, it is prerequisite to assume the downward sloping demand curve in the right direction. Generators in oligopoly market could try to maximize their profit by exercising the market power like physical or economic withholding. However advanced electricity markets also have demand side bidding which makes it possible for the demand to respond to the high market price by reducing their consumption. Considering this kind of demand reaction, Generators couldn't abuse their market power. Instead, they try to find out an equilibrium point which is optimal for both sides, generators and demand. This paper suggest a quantitative analysis between market variables based on econometrics for estimating demand responses in smart grid environment.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2007.07a
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• pp.127-129
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• 2007

Since the competitive market environment was introduced into the electric power industry, the structure of the industry has been changing from vertically integrated system to functionally unbundled and decentralized system composed of multiple (decision-making) market participants. So the market participants such as Gencos or LSE (load serving entity) need to forecast the market clearing price and thus build their offer or bidding strategies. Not just these market players but also a market operator is required to perform market analysis and ensure simulation capability to manage and monitor the competitive electricity market. For fulfilling the demand for market simulation, many global venders like GE, Henwood, Drayton Analytics, CRA, etc. have developed and provided electricity market simulators. Most of these simulators are based on the optimization formulation which has been used mainly for the least cost resource planning in the centralized power system planning and operation. From this standpoint, it seems somehow inevitable to face many challenges on modeling competitive market based on the method of traditional market simulators. In this paper, we propose a kind of new method, which is MAS based market simulation. The agent based model has already been introduced in EMCAS, one of commercial market simulators, but there may be various ways of modeling agent. This paper, in particular, seeks to introduce an model for MAS based market simulator.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.36 no.8
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• pp.691-698
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• 2012

Local freight forwarder's circle is suffering worsening profitability and insecure employment from over-competition which caused by a saturated local logistics market. It is emerging UN procurement market for local freight forwarders. However it is needed to study on successful entry, market status and supporting measures from government and research institute. Currently there are no national research data of UN procurement market in logistics sectors but as per the writer's experience and viewpoint to UN bidding, it would seem that appropriate measures should be made such as government's enhanced support for overseas advancement, price competitiveness, building global network and development of education program for trainees associated with current overseas internship program by government.

• Journal of Science and Technology Studies
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.1-40
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• 2019

Built upon ethnographic method such as participant observation and in-depth interview, this study analyzes the material culture of electronic flower auctions at Yangjae Flower Market. From the viewpoint of Actor-Network Theory(ANT), this research examines how human actors like dealers and auctioneers interact with nonhuman actors such as market devices and these interactions form networks called "agencement." This research is focused on three main objectives: first, to study how the performance of auctions - i.e. the interactions between auctioneers and dealers - change in the wake of new market devices in the auctions; secondly, to look into what changes artifacts bring to the social relationships between auctioneers and dealers; lastly, to analyze the influence of new market devices on auction price in the market. The results of this research are as follows. First, the appearance of new market devices generates changes in the performance of auctions, which means the change of 'agencement' of flower auctions. Direct interactions between auctioneers and dealers turned into indirect interactions through new market devices. Moreover, the changes in the agencement brought changes to the identity of auctioneers and dealers. Secondly, the new agencement caused by the inflow of new market devices formed the trust between the devices and human actors, which gave rise to the trust in electronic auction and in counterpart actors as well. In addition, new market devices lowered direct interactions between auctioneers and dealers and thus made more equal relationships between the two than before. Lastly, market devices like trading screen reduced the leverage of auctioneers by providing dealers with bidding information previously possessed by auctioneers much openly and dealers were able to decide auction prices in more reasonable and dispassionate manner. Economic agency, power, trust, price, and information in the market is material and sensory.