• Proceedings of the Korea Information Processing Society Conference
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• 2003.11c
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• pp.1759-1762
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• 2003

최근 키 분배 프로토콜과는 다르게 하드웨어에 암호키를 저장하여 사용하는 것과 달리, 사용자가 기억할 수 있는 길이의 패스워드(password)를 사용해 서버와의 인증과 키 교환을 동시에 수행하는 패스워드 기반 키 분배 프로토콜이 제안되고 있다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 패스워드 기반의 키 분배 프로토콜 중 BPKA(Balanced Password-authenticated Key Agreement)에 속하는 DH-EKE(Diffie-Hellman Encrypted Key Exchange), PAK(Password-Authenticated Key exchange), SPEKE(Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange) 프로토콜을 비교 분석하고, 이를 바탕으로 기존의 BPKA 프로토콜에 비해 적은 연산량을 가지면서 사용자와 서버가 각기 다른 정보를 갖는 패스워드-검증자 기반 프로토콜을 제안한다. 본 논문에서 제안하는 패스워드 기반 키 분배 프로토콜의 안전성 분석을 위해 Active Impersonation 과 Forward Secrecy, Off-line dictionary attack, Man-in-the -middle Attack 등의 공격모델을 적용하였다.

• Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea TC
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• v.42 no.2 s.332
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• pp.33-38
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• 2005

In this paper, we propose a password-based authenticated key exchange protocol which authenticates each other and shares a session key using only a small memorable password between a client and a server over an insecure channel. The proposed protocol allows an authenticated client to freely change a his/her own password. The protocol is also secure against various attacks and provides the perfect forward secrecy. Furthermore, it has good efficiency compared with the previously well-known password-based protocols with the same security requirements.

• Proceedings of the Korea Institutes of Information Security and Cryptology Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.77-82
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• 2003

본 논문에서는 ElGamal 암호 기반에 PAK(Password-Authenticated Key Exchange) 프로토콜을 적용하여, 새로운 패스워드-인증 키 분배 프로토콜을 제안하고자 한다. ElGamal 암호 기법에서 사용자와 서버의 공개키와 개인키로 미리 공유된 패스워드와 비밀 정보를 암호문으로 전송하고 복호함으로써 서버-클라이언트 상호 인증을 하고, 비밀 정보를 근거로 세션키를 나누어 갖는 것이 이 프로토콜의 목적이다. 또한 설계 시 패스워드-인증 키 교환 프로토콜에서의 보안 요구사항을 고려하여 패스워드 기반의 인증 키 분배 프로토콜에서 요구하는 보안 요구사항을 만족하고 있다.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.525-535
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• 2005

A password-based authenticated tripartite key exchange protocol based on A. Joux's protocol was proposed. By using encryption scheme with shared password, we can resolve man-in-the-middle attack and lack of authentication problems. We also suggested a scheme to avoid the offline dictionary attack to which symmetric encryption schemes are vulnerable. The proposed protocol does not require a trusted party which is required in certificate or identity based authentication schemes. Therefore in a ad hoc network which is difficult to install network infrastructure, the proposed protocol would be very useful. The proposed protocol is more efficient in computation aspect than any existing password-based authenticated tripartite key exchange protocols. When it is used as a base line protocol of tree based group key exchange protocol, the computational weak points of the proposed protocol are compensated.

• Journal of KIISE:Computer Systems and Theory
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• v.33 no.1_2
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• pp.110-118
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• 2006

Cryptographic protocol design in a two-party setting has of tel ignored the possibility of simultaneous message transmission by each of the two parties (i.e., using a duplex channel). In particular, most protocols for two-party key exchange have been designed assuming that parties alternate sending their messages (i.e., assuming a bidirectional half-duplex channel). However, by taking advantage of the communication characteristics of the network it may be possible to design protocols with improved latency. This is the focus of the present work. We present three provably-secure protocols for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) which require only a single round. Our first, most efficient protocol provides key independence but not forward secrecy. Our second scheme additionally provides forward secrecy but requires some additional computation. Security of these two protocols is analyzed in the random oracle model. Our final protocol provides the same strong security guarantees as our second protocol, but is proven secure in the standard model. This scheme is only slightly less efficient (from a computational perspective) than the previous ones. Our work provides the first provably- secure one-round protocols for two-party AKE which achieve forward secrecy.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.351-358
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• 2013

In 2008, Pointcheval and Zimmer have presented multi-factor authenticated key exchange protocol with client's secret key, password, biometrics. However, it has been found to be flawed by Hao and Clarke if an attacker has single authentication factor (password), then the attacker can deduce other authentication factors. Interestingly, its countermeasure has not been presented due to the difficulty of design and structural problem. In this paper, an efficient countermeasure is briefly presented and its security is discussed as well.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.7 no.5
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• pp.1313-1327
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• 2013

How to make people keep both the confidentiality of the sensitive data and the privacy of their real identity in communication networks has been a hot topic in recent years. Researchers proposed privacy-preserving authenticated key exchange protocols (PPAKE) to answer this question. However, lots of PPAKE protocols need users to remember long secrets which are inconvenient for them. In this paper we propose a lightweight three-party privacy-preserving authentication key exchange (3PPAKE) protocol using smart card to address the problem. The advantages of the new 3PPAKE protocol are: 1. The only secrets that the users need to remember in the authentication are their short passwords; 2. Both of the users can negotiate a common key and keep their identity privacy, i.e., providing anonymity for both users in the communication; 3. It enjoys better performance in terms of computation cost and security. The security of the scheme is given in the random oracle model. To the best of our knowledge, the new protocol is the first provably secure authentication protocol which provides anonymity for both users in the three-party setting.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartC
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• v.11C no.3
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• pp.277-286
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• 2004

Password-based mechanism is widely used methods for user authentication. Password-based mechanisms are using memorable passwords(weak ferrets), therefore Password-based mechanism are vulnerable to the password guessing attack. To overcome this problem, man password-based authenticated key exchange protocols have been proposed to resist password guessing attacks. Recently, Seo-Sweeny proposed password-based Simple Authenticated Key Agreement(SAKA) protocol. In this paper, first, we will examine the SAKA and authenticated key agreement protocols, and then we will show that the proposed simple authenticated key agreement protocols are still insecure against Advanced Modification Attack. And we propose a password-based Simple Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol secure against Advanced Modification Attack.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.159-172
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• 2011

A designated verifier signature is a special type of digital signature, which convinces a designated verifier that she has signed a message in such a way that the designated verifier cannot transfer the signature to a third party. A strong designated verifier signature scheme enhances the privacy of the signer such that no one but the designated verifier can verify the signer's signatures. In this paper we present two generic frame works for constructing strong designated verifier signature schemes from any secure ring signature scheme and any deniable one-pass authenticated key exchange protocol, respectively. Compared with similar protocols, the instantiations of our construction achieve improved efficiency.

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.252-258
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• 2004

In this paper, we propose a new authenticated key exchange protocol in which client and sever can mutually authenticate and establish a session key over an insecure channel using only a human memorable password. The proposed protocol is based on Diffie-Hellman scheme and has many of desirable security attributes: It resists off-line dictionary attacks mounted by either Passive or active adversaries over network, allowing low-entropy Passwords to be used safely. It also offers perfect forward secrecy, which protects past sessions when passwords are compromised. In particular, the advantage of our scheme is that it is secure against an impersonation attack, even if a server's password file is exposed to an adversary. The proposed scheme here shows that it has better performance when compared to the previous notable password-based key exchange methods.