• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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• v.4 no.6
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• pp.95-102
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• 2003

The Diffle-Hellman Key Exchange scheme can produce a common session key between the two communicators, but its problem is that it makes a man-in-the middle attack possible. To solve problems like these, several protocols have been put forward, and the Simple Authenticated Key Agreement (SAKA) Protocol is among them. This protocol has been suggested by Seo-Sweeney, Tseng, and Ku-Wang, respectively, In this paper, we will put forward a new protocol that has been improved from all the original protocols mentioned above, but is still safe and quick to use, While the existing protocol divides the common session key production stage and the verification stage, the protocol suggested in this paper takes care of both of those stages simultaneously, therefore improving the processing performance.

• 한국정보통신설비학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2008.08a
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• pp.163-165
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• 2008

Recently, Lu and Cao proposed a password-authenticated key exchange protocol in the three party setting, and the authors claimed that their protocol works within three rounds. In this paper, we analyze the protocol and show the protocol cannot work within three rounds. We also find two security flaws in the protocol. The protocol is vulnerable to an undetectable password guessing attack and an off-line password guessing attack.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.607-625
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• 2011

Two-party key exchange protocol is a mechanism in which two parties communicate with each other over an insecure channel and output the same session key. A key exchange protocol that is secure against an active adversary who can control and modify the exchanged messages is called authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol. LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin presented a strong security definition for public key infrastructure (PKI) based two-pass protocol, which we call the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model, and some researchers have provided eCK-secure AKE protocols in recent years. However, almost all protocols are provably secure in the random oracle model or rely on a special implementation technique so-called the NAXOS trick. In this paper, we present a PKI-based two-pass AKE protocol that is secure in the eCK security model. The security of the proposed protocol is proven without random oracles (under three assumptions), and does not rely on implementation techniques such as the NAXOS trick.

• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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• v.6 no.5
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• pp.27-43
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• 2005

EAP provides authentication for each entity based on IEEE Std 802.1x Wireless lAN and RADIUS/DIAMETER protocol, and it uses certificate, dual scheme(e.g., password and token) with the authentication method. The password-based authentication scheme for authenticated key exchange is the most widely-used user authentication method due to various advantages, such as human-memorable simplicity, convenience, mobility, A specific hardware device is also unnecessary, This paper discusses user authentication via public networks and proposes the Split Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange (SPAKE), which is ideal for both authenticating users and exchanging session keys when using a subsequent secure communication over untrusted network, And then we provides EAP authentication framework EAP-SPAKE by using it.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.18 no.5
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• pp.17-30
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• 2008

In the paper, we consider password-based authenticated key exchange with different passwords, where the users do not share a password between themselves, but only with the server. The users make a session key using their different passwords with the help of the server. We propose an efficient password-based authenticated key exchange protocol with different passwords which achieves forward secrecy without random oracles. In fact this amount of computation and the number of rounds are comparable to the most efficient password-based authenticated key exchange protocol in the random oracle model. The protocol requires a client only to memorize a human-memorable password, and all other information necessary to run the protocol is made public.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.14 no.8
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• pp.1843-1848
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• 2010

The Key exchange protocols are very crucial tools to provide the secure communication in the broadband satellite access network. They should be required to satisfy various requirements such as security, Key confirmation, and Key freshness. In this paper, we propose Two authenticated key exchange protocols Two Pass EKE-E(Encrypted Key Exchange-Efficient) and Two Pass EKE-S(Encrypted Key Exchange-Secure) are introduced. A basic idea of the protocols is that a password can be represented by modular addition N, and the number of possible modular addition N representing the password is $2^N$ The Two Pass EKE-E is secure against the attacks including main-in-the-middle attack and off-line dictionary attack, and the performance is excellent so as beyond to comparison with other authenticated key exchange protocols. The Two Pass EKE-S is a slight modification of the Two Pass EKE-E. The Two Pass EKE-S provides computational in feasibility for learning the password without having performed off line dictionary attack while preserving the performance of the Two Pass EKE-E.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.7 no.12
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• pp.3244-3260
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• 2013

A three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol allows two clients registered with a trusted server to generate a common cryptographic key from their individual passwords shared only with the server. A key requirement for three-party PAKE protocols is to prevent an adversary from mounting a dictionary attack. This requirement must be met even when the adversary is a malicious (registered) client who can set up normal protocol sessions with other clients. This work revisits three existing three-party PAKE protocols, namely, Guo et al.'s (2008) protocol, Huang's (2009) protocol, and Lee and Hwang's (2010) protocol, and demonstrates that these protocols are not secure against offline and/or (undetectable) online dictionary attacks in the presence of a malicious client. The offline dictionary attack we present against Guo et al.'s protocol also applies to other similar protocols including Lee and Hwang's protocol. We conclude with some suggestions on how to design a three-party PAKE protocol that is resistant against dictionary attacks.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.40 no.8
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• pp.1597-1605
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• 2015

Password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) is a protocol that a client stores its password to a server, authenticates itself using its password and shares a session key with the server. In multi-server PAKE, a client splits its password and stores them to several servers separately. Unless all the servers are compromised, client's password will not be disclosed in the multi-server setting. In attribute-based encryption (ABE), a sender encrypts a message M using a set of attributes and then a receiver decrypts it using the same set of attributes. In this paper, we introduce multi-server PAKE protocol that utilizes a set of attributes of ABE as a client's password. In the protocol, the client and servers do not need to create additional public/private key pairs because the password is used as a set of public keys. Also, the client and the servers exchange only one round-trip message per server. The protocol is secure against dictionary attacks. We prove our system is secure in a proposed threat model. Finally we show feasibility through evaluating the execution time of the protocol.

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.35 no.6
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• pp.465-473
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• 2008

The MQV protocol has been regarded as the most efficient authenticated Diffie- Hellman key exchange protocol, and standardized by many organizations including the US NSA. In Crypto 2005, Hugo Krawczyk showed vulnerabilities of MQV to several attacks and suggested a hashed variant of MQV, called HMQV, which provides the same superb performance of MQV and provable security in the random oracle model. In this paper we suggest an efficient authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol providing the same functionalities and security of HMQV without random oracles. So far there are no authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocols which are provably secure without using random oracles and achieve the same level of security goals of HMQV efficiently yet.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.388-395
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• 2009

Three-party authenticated key exchange protocol based on smartcards using XOR and hash function operation instead of the public key operation has been proposed in 2006. Recently, it is doing for research because of increasing interest in privacy. This paper pointed out that proposed three-party authenticated key exchange protocol in 2006 has some problems; it is user anonymity and slow wrong input detection, and then we proposed new one to overcome these problems.