• Journal of Korean Society for Quality Management
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• v.47 no.4
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• pp.687-700
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• 2019

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate the interaction effects between price determinants of artworks. We expand the methodology in art market by applying machine learning techniques to estimate the price of artworks and compare linear regression and machine learning in terms of prediction accuracy. Methods: Moderated regression analysis was performed to verify the interaction effects of artistic characteristics on price. The moderating effects were studied by confirming the significance level of the interaction terms of the derived regression equation. In order to derive price estimation model, we use multiple linear regression analysis, which is a parametric statistical technique, and k-nearest neighbor (kNN) regression, which is a nonparametric statistical technique in machine learning methods. Results: Mostly, the influences of the price determinants of art are different according to the auction types and the artist 's reputation. However, the auction type did not control the influence of the genre of the work on the price. As a result of the analysis, the kNN regression was superior to the linear regression analysis based on the prediction accuracy. Conclusion: It provides a theoretical basis for the complexity that exists between pricing determinant factors of artworks. In addition, the nonparametric models and machine learning techniques as well as existing parameter models are implemented to estimate the artworks' price.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartD
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• v.14D no.4 s.114
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• pp.395-406
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• 2007

The development of e-commerce made a great effect on all the aspect of marketing mix. Especially, marketing stimuli of Halfplaza.com, excessive price discounts and auction by order of arrival, spread out gradually in internet shopping mall industry. The study showed that excessive price discounts combined with auction by order of arrival increased consumer's perceived value, but decreased perceived risk. In conclusion, legal protections must be established since consumers tend to be vulnerable to various marketing mix of deceptive e-commerce players.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.144-170
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• 2010

This paper considers the effect of various types of procurement auction system on competition focusing on the rate of successful bidding. We analyze the number of bidders and the rate of successful bids using online procurement data of the Public Procurement Service. The average number of bidders is 301 and the average rate of successful bids is 87.42% while the weighted average rate is 75.13%. These numbers show that there is quite strong competition among bidders and the rate is lower as the expected price is higher. When we analyze the data of price procurement auction, the rate is also shown to be lower as the expected price is higher. Furthermore, the rate decreases as the number of bidders increases which naturally makes the competition stronger. Meanwhile, the analysis finds that the inclusion of the onsite bidding, the PQ(Pre-Qualification) result, or major-10 winning companies cannot explain the rate much in our data. In case of turnkey-alternative, the average rate of successful bidding for 484 cases record 90.20%. The average is 84.89% with 120 alternatives and 91.97% with 364 cases of turnkey. The reason why the rate of turnkey-alternative is lower than that of price procurement auction is the lack of competition as well as the systematic difference. By setting up a model, we are able to explain the difference in rate caused by the respective reason. When we suppose there are 3 bidders in case of price procurement auction for a project that exceeds 100 billion won, the rate is expected to be around 64%. This implies that difference of 26% is caused by the systemic difference and 3% by the lack of competition. Therefore, we conclude that the difference in rate between turnkey-alternative and price procurement auction is caused mainly by the systemic difference. In case of PPP(Public Private Partnership) projects, among 154 projects in total, only 40% has more than 2 bidders that compete. The average number of bidders is 1.88 which is less than 2, and the average rate of successful bids is 90%. In sum, under the price procurement auction, there is strong competition which is reflected by the rate of successful bids. However, there is room to decrease the rate by strengthening the competition under the turnkey-alternative. Also with PPP projects, we expect the rate can be steadily reduced with revived competition among bidders.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.36 no.4
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• pp.1-32
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• 2014

Auction is widely used in allocation and procurement of resources due to its desirable properties: efficiency and revenue maximization. It is well-known, however, that auction may fail to achieve efficiency when allocative externalities exist. Such a result may happen in the auction of the resources that are very scarce, for example, radio spectrum. This is because allocation of the resources has effects on competition of the firms in the aftermarket, and thus a firm that utilizes the resources less efficiently may make a higher bid to lessen competition. This paper shows first that efficient allocation may not be achieved by auction even when the number of bidders is 2, while it is shown in the literature that auction may result in inefficient allocation when the number of bidders is greater than or equal to 3. There exist 2 firms, who make a bid to win the scarce resources that increase the value or decrease the production cost of their own product. After the auction ends, the firms engage in Bertrand competition on the Hotelling line. Inefficient allocation may happen even under the second-price auction rule, and it happens only when the firms are different in the initial value or the initial cost of their products as well as in the value of the auctioned resources. The firm who has been the leader loses a large portion of the market if it fails to win the auction, and thus makes a high bid even when the other firm can use the resources more efficiently. Allocative efficiency Pareto improves when the smaller firm's bid counts more than the leader's bid. This paper suggests a modified rule that the smaller firm wins the auction when its bid multiplied by some constant is greater than the leader's bid. The multiplier can be calculated from the market shares. It is equal to 1 when the two firms are the same, and is increasing in the leader's market share. Allocation is efficient in a strictly larger set of parameters under the modified rule than under the standard second-price auction rule.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.12
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• pp.535-545
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• 2019

If the real estate auction market indicators are relevant and meaningful, they can be meaningful information to the real estate market in connection with general real estate. The purpose of this study is to examine whether time-supply logic is applied in auction market by identifying time series correlations for the number of auctions, the auction rate, and the auction price rate, which are major indicators of real estate auction market. The real estate types were classified into three categories: residential real estate, land, and commercial real estate. The monthly time series of auctions in the metropolitan real estate were compiled for 96 months. Based on this data, the auction market model for each type was established and the mutual influences between the indicators were analyzed. As a result, the supply and demand indicators, the number of auctions and the auction rate, showed the nature of supply and demand according to the supply and demand logic of the market. However, the correlation was high for residential real estate and relatively low for commercial real estate. the auction rate has a long-term impact on price indicators, especially residential real estate, which is quantitatively explanatory and significant. The three auction-related indicators differ in degree, but there is a correlation, especially for residential real estate, which can be useful information for policy making.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.40 no.9
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• pp.1802-1807
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• 2015

The cloud computing service provides physical IT resources to VM instances to users using virtual technique and the users pay cost of VM instances to service provider. The auction model based on cloud computing provides available resources of service provider to users through auction mechanism. The users bid spot instances to process their a job until its deadline time. If the bidding price of users is higher than the spot price, the user will be provided the spot instances by service provider. In this paper, we propose a new bidding strategy to minimize the total cost for job completion. Typically, the users propose bidding price as high as possible to get the spot instances and the spot price get high. we lower the spot price using proposed strategy and minimize the total cost for job completion. To evaluate the performance of our strategy, we compare the spot price and the total cost for job completion with real workload data.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.658-669
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• 2016

The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably results in asymmetric-valued long term evolution (LTE) spectrum allocation that stems from different timing for twice improvement in capacity between competing operators, given spectrum allocations today. This motivates us to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation. In this paper, we formulate the interactions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by comparing the latest result of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea, which serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum auction designs.

• Journal of the Korean Home Economics Association
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• v.48 no.5
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• pp.1-15
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• 2010

The purpose of this study was to find the characteristics of internet auction user groups by the levels of addictive tendencies among high school students. The questionnaire was conducted from December 16 to 23, 2008, and 288 high school students who were living in Cheongju area were selected. The main results were as follows. First, 13.4% of respondents were visiting internet site almost every day, and about 20% of them stayed more than 2 hours for visiting the internet auction site. Second, the price of purchasing goods through internet auction site(shopping mall) was less than 50,000 won. Third, the level of addictive tendencies of respondents was under average(2.08 out of 5 point scale), and about 10% of them evaluated by themselves as an internet auction. Fourth, relatively higher addictive tendencies group showed the characteristics such as lower self-esteem, higher depression, and higher feeling of isolation, internet related(general internet use, internet shopping, and internet game) addictive tendencies, and more often visiting and staying longer in internet auction sites and other internet sites.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.12
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• pp.5616-5642
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• 2016

Different from traditional auctions, electronic auctions provide a platform to allow bidders and auctioneers merchandise to each other over network anytime and anywhere. Auctioneers can publish information of goods, and bidders can choose the interested targets through this bidding platform. To ensure the fairness and security of electronic auctions, Li et al. have proposed a practical electronic auction scheme which can confirm the requirement of strong anonymity, bidding privacy, and secret bidding price. However, we have found out that Li et al.'s scheme may lurk the risk of the denial-of-service attack during the bidding phase in a sealed-bid auction. Thus, we propose a brand-new sealed-bid auction mechanism, in which the essentials of e-auction can be firmly preserved. In particular, each bidder only needs to register at the center once and then can join to multiple plays launched by different auctioneers. Moreover, the correctness of mutual authentication is confirmed according to the BAN logic model.