• International Area Studies Review
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.618-642
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• 2009

Currently the nations which join the WTO shall observe understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes in WTO agreement. In addition this agreement provides it will be able to apply dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. Korea and the United States are accomplishing an important role as the core members of the WTO. Regardless of this, The Korea - US FTA is providing a separate dispute settlement system. This paper pursues a comparative analysis concerning rules and procedures of dispute settlement between The Korea - US FTA and the WTO, and furthermore derives problems from the viewpoint of effectiveness, and suggests alternatives and implications in view of trade policy. I hope this study contributes to setting-up and development of national trade policy and is applied to FTA negotiation hereafter.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.155-187
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• 2017

In the US, the Sections 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 are still being used to resolve disputes. The U.S' such unilateral retaliations grounded on the Sections 301 of the Trade Act, in fact, violate the WTO agreements and hinder the development of international trade as the trade partner may assume it as a reprisal move impeding the fair settlement of disputes. Here, this study is going to examine the characteristics and functions of the WTO dispute settlement system briefly and compare the countermeasures recognized to be legitimate by the WTO with the U.S' unilateral retaliation. Also, this author will analyse the US-Japan Automobiles (DS6) and EC-Bananas III (DS27) as one of the typical cases resulted from the unilateral retaliation. According to the result, these cases do not conform to WTO-consistency, and it implies that it is absurd to accept the US' unilateral retaliation internationally. In conclusion, presently, it is a global trend to solidify protectionism, and to vitalize trade and resolve trade disputes efficiently, it is needed to prohibit the recourse to unilateral retaliations and also positively apply the WTO dispute settlement system(DSU) defining rules about how to strengthen the multilateral system.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.3-21
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• 2018

The WTO was established in 1995 as an organization which protects and promotes free trade among its members. However, since about this time they have signed many bilateral and multilateral FTAs and joined many other new international agreements and organizations, the purpose of which at times overlaps with that of the WTO. Some existing works on international organizations contend that these FTAs and many other IOs could weaken the role of the WTO as a promoter of free trade. However, the results of regression analyses on the use of the WTO do not support this argument, but show that the experiences of WTO members in these FTAs and many other IOs help them to use its dispute settlement mechanism more frequently

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.3-29
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• 2020

The WTO's dispute settlement system has played a significant role in settling trade disputes between countries, and its function and role have been expanded by handling about 596 disputes since its establishment in 1995. This shows that the WTO's dispute settlement system is gaining enormous trust among member countries that it recognizes as a fair, effective, and efficient system for resolving trade disputes. The U.S. remains uncooperative in the WTO dispute settlement system, citing disregard for the 90-day deadline for appeals, continued service by persons who are no longer A.B. members, issuing advisory opinions on issues not necessary to resolve a dispute, A.B. review of facts, and review of a member's domestic law de novo. The A.B. claims its reports are entitled to be treated as a precedent. These problems should be gradually improved through various discussions and agreements by establishing a multilateral forum for resolving disputes and gradually ending the problems through reform of the DSU.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.157-177
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• 2017

World Trade Organization(WTO) has 164 members since it has established on 1995. It plays a significant role in solving the world trade disputes. The process of the dispute settlement mechanism includes five steps: Negotiation, Establishment of experts group, Deliberation of appellate body, Execution and Supervision of Verdict and the Sanctions for Default. It suggested that the higher rate of developed countries using mechanism to solving the disputes than developing countries solving disputes by mechanism through the analysis of dispute of WTO members. Meanwhile, the more powerful economic entity is, the more trade dispute will be. There are several problems of mechanism by analysis the recently famous cases of trade disputes: Overburden of experts panel, Low utilization rate of the mechanism of developing countries, Lack of economic competition policy and labor standard terms and Unfulfillment of retaliatory measures of developing countries towards developed countries. This paper propose proper solutions and advises to improve mechanism of WTO dispute settlement.

• Journal of Korean Electronics
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• v.21 no.12
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• pp.44-62
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• 2001

• The tire
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• s.192
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• pp.7-11
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• 1997

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.519-547
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• 2004

This paper analyze problems about scope of specific trade obligations(STOs), principle of dispute settlement procedure, and non-parties in context of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety(POB), which based on sub-paragraph 31(i) of DDA WTO Ministrial Declaration. The implications based on result of this study are as follows. First, to accept the wider scope of STOs under POB in Korea, importing country, won't be harmful to LMOs and Bioindustry. Instead, it will ensure a high level of biosafety concerning the import of LMOs. Exporters can take different kinds of trade measures to countervail adverse effect on the export of LMOs in this case. Therefore importer will endure the aftereffect. However, if korea were in exporter's place, to accept the wider scope STOs under POB will not have a good influence on the export of LMOs. Korea, therefore, should devise scheme for responding to debate about the STOs in MEAs, which have to be based on cost-benefit analysis and scenarios taking into account of speed and level in biotechology progress, status and trend of LMOs R&D and production, and condition of other industries. Second, it is not easy to agree with applying to what's rule between the POB and WTO for settlement dispute. Because there is the incompatibility between the POB characterized according to social rationality and WTO's rules for safety and environmental protection characterized according to scientific rationality. This issue have to be discussed for long period due to gap like that. Accordingly Korea, one of major LMOs importing countries, should suggest continuously that the effort is needed to ensure an adequate level of protection in transboundary movements of LMOs and scientific, environmental and socio-economic study. Third, in case of dispute between party and non-party of the POB, the duties under the WTO of non-party of the POB(if WTO member country) is valid. The country, therefore, will try to settle dispute based on WTO's rules. However, international society have to ensure for sound and safe use of LMOs in the field of transboundary movements. Accordingly Korea should devise scheme for preventing the possibility of dispute between party and non-party of the POB(if WTO member country), which is supported by policy options under the POB.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.181-217
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• 1995

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.187-210
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• 2019

This article examines the necessity for the introduction of an ICSID Appellate System. In comparison with the WTO appellate system, the ICSID ad hoc Committee has a very limited mandate. An annulment inquiry under the ICSID arbitration system barely focuses on whether the arbitral decision resulted from a justifiable process. As long as there is procedural legitimacy, the resulting awards remain unaffected under the annulment procedure, irrespective of mistakes of fact or law. In contrast, in the WTO DSS the AB substantively reviews panel rulings and suggestions that are founded on any deficiency of objectivity or error in the interpretation of a particular WTO provision. This defect intrinsic in the annulment procedure could cause injustice to a party earnestly interested in correcting recognized misapplication of law by ICSID tribunals. Accordingly, the establishment of an appellate system would result in a more substantive and procedural review of awards. The creation of such an ICSID appellate system would ensure thorough scrutiny of the decisions of the tribunal of first instance, leading to better reasoned outcomes. This could lead to a crystallization of predictability in investment relations. The end result would be that fairness, clarity, reliability, and legality in the ICSID adjudicative process would be unassailable, to the advantage of all the contracting parties.