• International Area Studies Review
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.3-21
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• 2018

The WTO was established in 1995 as an organization which protects and promotes free trade among its members. However, since about this time they have signed many bilateral and multilateral FTAs and joined many other new international agreements and organizations, the purpose of which at times overlaps with that of the WTO. Some existing works on international organizations contend that these FTAs and many other IOs could weaken the role of the WTO as a promoter of free trade. However, the results of regression analyses on the use of the WTO do not support this argument, but show that the experiences of WTO members in these FTAs and many other IOs help them to use its dispute settlement mechanism more frequently

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.3-29
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• 2020

The WTO's dispute settlement system has played a significant role in settling trade disputes between countries, and its function and role have been expanded by handling about 596 disputes since its establishment in 1995. This shows that the WTO's dispute settlement system is gaining enormous trust among member countries that it recognizes as a fair, effective, and efficient system for resolving trade disputes. The U.S. remains uncooperative in the WTO dispute settlement system, citing disregard for the 90-day deadline for appeals, continued service by persons who are no longer A.B. members, issuing advisory opinions on issues not necessary to resolve a dispute, A.B. review of facts, and review of a member's domestic law de novo. The A.B. claims its reports are entitled to be treated as a precedent. These problems should be gradually improved through various discussions and agreements by establishing a multilateral forum for resolving disputes and gradually ending the problems through reform of the DSU.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.81-113
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• 2013

The World Trade Organization (WTO) offers remedies for non-compliance by the introduction of compensation or retaliation in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). There are no the provisions under the WTO DSU and it seems unclear what retaliation is attempting to achieve. Therefore, it is unclear whether the goal of WTO retaliation is to induce compliance or to restore the balance between the rights and the obligations of WTO members. It has been claimed the WTO has a strong dispute settlement system by providing retaliation when the recommendations and rulings of Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) are not complied with. But this seems to be inadequate to bring about effective and timely compliance. Especially there is a problem with free riding by a violating member because the level of retaliation is determined from the expiration of a reasonable period of time, providing an incentive to delay compliance. Also the level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment, according to DSU Article 22.4. However, if the member concerned objections to the level of the suspension proposed, the matter shall be referred to arbitration. The arbitrator shall not examine the nature of the suspension of concessions or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the nullification or impairment. The arbitrator makes an assessment standard of equivalence by comparing the suspension of concessions or other obligations and the nullification or impairment calculated in terms of the amount of trade. But it is necessary that other standards replace the quantitative standards when the level of the nullification or impairment cannot be quantified by concrete damages.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.157-177
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• 2017

World Trade Organization(WTO) has 164 members since it has established on 1995. It plays a significant role in solving the world trade disputes. The process of the dispute settlement mechanism includes five steps: Negotiation, Establishment of experts group, Deliberation of appellate body, Execution and Supervision of Verdict and the Sanctions for Default. It suggested that the higher rate of developed countries using mechanism to solving the disputes than developing countries solving disputes by mechanism through the analysis of dispute of WTO members. Meanwhile, the more powerful economic entity is, the more trade dispute will be. There are several problems of mechanism by analysis the recently famous cases of trade disputes: Overburden of experts panel, Low utilization rate of the mechanism of developing countries, Lack of economic competition policy and labor standard terms and Unfulfillment of retaliatory measures of developing countries towards developed countries. This paper propose proper solutions and advises to improve mechanism of WTO dispute settlement.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.187-210
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• 2019

This article examines the necessity for the introduction of an ICSID Appellate System. In comparison with the WTO appellate system, the ICSID ad hoc Committee has a very limited mandate. An annulment inquiry under the ICSID arbitration system barely focuses on whether the arbitral decision resulted from a justifiable process. As long as there is procedural legitimacy, the resulting awards remain unaffected under the annulment procedure, irrespective of mistakes of fact or law. In contrast, in the WTO DSS the AB substantively reviews panel rulings and suggestions that are founded on any deficiency of objectivity or error in the interpretation of a particular WTO provision. This defect intrinsic in the annulment procedure could cause injustice to a party earnestly interested in correcting recognized misapplication of law by ICSID tribunals. Accordingly, the establishment of an appellate system would result in a more substantive and procedural review of awards. The creation of such an ICSID appellate system would ensure thorough scrutiny of the decisions of the tribunal of first instance, leading to better reasoned outcomes. This could lead to a crystallization of predictability in investment relations. The end result would be that fairness, clarity, reliability, and legality in the ICSID adjudicative process would be unassailable, to the advantage of all the contracting parties.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.465-486
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• 2014

This paper intends to analyse some legal issues on US-Orange Juice Case. Brazil's WTO challenge is to the methods undertaken by US in calculating antidumping duties in administrative reviews of Brazilian Orange Juice. Panel resulted that conforms with earlier Appellate Body decision outlawing the use of 'weighted average to transaction zeroing. This paper note that panel's stance was driven from 'stability and predictability' within the DSB system. There was a de facto form of stare decisis. However, Panel in US-Orange Juice recognized that Appellate Body decision is wrong about finding zeroing to be violation of the fair comparison requirement of the Article 2.4 of the WTO Anti-Dumping agreement. Zeroing dispute of WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement will be continued that because this matter. Fortunately, the American government announced it would be stop zeroing system of administrative reviews. As result, Carefully, We anticipate that US-Orange Juice's decision is the end of zeroing method on the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.247-280
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• 2020

For customs-free and liberalization on the trade of aircraft parts, the WTO Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft was separately concluded as plurilateral trade agreement at the time of launching WTO in 1995, and currently 33 countries including the United States and the EU are acceded but Korea does not. Major details of the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft include product coverage, the elimination of customs duties and other charges, the prohibition of government-directed procurement of civil aircraft, the application of the Agreement on Subsides and Countervailing Measures, and the consultation on issues related to this Agreement and dispute resolution. Article 89 paragraph 6 of the current Customs Act was newly established on December 31, 2018, and the tariff reduction rate for imports of aircraft parts will be reduced in stages from May 2019 and the tariff reduction system will be abolished in 2026. Accordingly, looking at the impact of the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft on the aviation industry, first, as for the impact on the air transport industry, an tariff allotment of the domestic air transport industry is expected to reach about 160 billion won a year from 2026, and upon acceding to the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, the domestic air transport industry will be able to import aircraft parts at no tariff, so it will not have to pay 3 to 8 percent import duties. Second, as for the impact on the aviation MRO industry, if the tariff reduction system for aircraft parts is phased out or abolished in stages, overseas outsourcing costs in the engine maintenance and parts maintenance are expected to increase, and upon acceding to the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, the aviation MRO industry will be able to import aircraft parts at no tariff, so it will reduce overseas outsourcing costs. If the author proposes a policy direction for the trade liberalization of aircraft parts to ensure competitiveness of the aviation industry, first, as for the tariff reduction by the use of FTA, in order to be favored with the tariff reduction by the use of FTA, it is necessary to secure the certificate of origin from foreign traders in the United States and the EU, and to revise the provisions of Korea-Singapore and Korea-EU FTA. Second, as for the push of acceding to the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, it would be resonable to push the acceding to Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft for customs-free on the trade of aircraft parts, as the tariff reduction method by the use of FTA has limits. Third, as for the improvement of the tariff reduction system for aircraft parts under the Customs Act, it is expected that there will take a considerable amount of time until the acceding to the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, so separate improvement measures are needed to continue the tariff reduction system of aircraft parts under Article 89 paragraph 6 of the Customs Act. In conclusion, Korea should accede to the WTO Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft to create an environment in which our aviation industry can compete fairly with foreign aviation industries and ensure competitiveness by achieving customs-free and liberalization on the trade of aircraft parts.