• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.27-44
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• 1996

The purpose of the thesis is providing a new formulation for the transit assignment problem. The existing models dealing with the transit assignment problem don't consider the congestion effects due to the insufficient capacity of transit vehicles. Besides, these models don't provide solutions satisfying the Wardrop's user equilibrium conditions. The congestion effects are considered to be concentrated at the transit stops. For the transit lines, the waiting times at the transit stops are dependent on the passenger flows. The new model suggests the route section cost function analogous to the link performance function of the auto assignment to reflect the congestion effects in congested transit network. With the asymmetric cost function, the variational inequality programming is used to obtain the solutions satisfying Wardrop's condition. The diagonalization algorithm is introduced to solve this model. Finally, the results are compared with those of EMME/2.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.61-83
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• 2009

This study developed a variable demand traffic assignment model by stable dynamics. Stable dynamics, suggested by Nesterov and do Palma[19], is a new model which describes and provides a stable state of congestion in urban transportation networks. In comparison with the user equilibrium model, which is based on the arc travel time function in analyzing transportation networks, stable dynamics requires few parameters and is coincident with intuitions and observations on congestion. It is therefore expected to be a useful analysis tool for transportation planners. In this study, we generalize the stable dynamics into the model with variable demands. We suggest a three stage optimization model. In the first stage, we introduce critical travel times and dummy links and determine variable demands and link flows by applying an optimization problem to an extended network with the dummy links. Then we determine link travel times and path flows in the following stages. We present a numerical example of the application of the model to a given network.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.25-31
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• 2018

In this paper, we consider the game theoretic approach to investigate the transmit power optimization problem where D2D users share the uplink of the cellular system. Especially, we formulate the transmit power optimization problem as a non cooperative power control game. In the user wide sense, each user may try to select its transmit power level so as to maximize its utility in a selfish way. In the system wide, the transmit power levels of all users eventually converge to the unique point, called Nash Equilibrium. We first formulate the transmit power optimization problem as a non cooperative power control game. Next, we examine the existence of Nash Equilibrium. Finally, we present the numerical example that shows the convergence to the unique transmit power level.

• 한국ITS학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2004.11a
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• pp.338-342
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• 2004

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.103-112
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• 2006

Priority-based network service has been widely adopted for the Internet traffic management in the context of IETF differentiated services, and computing optimal prices for such priority-based service is the key topic in many pricing literature. While the equilibrium analysis has been commonly used to this end, many have criticized the validity of the underlying assumption of equilibrium analysis that user utility functions are precisely known. In this paper, we propose a solution for bridging the gap between the existing theoretical work on optimal pricing and the unavailability of precise user utility information in real networks. In the proposed method, the service provider obtains more and more accurate estimates of user utility functions from the initial imprecise knowledge by iteratively changing the price of service levels and observing the users' decisions under the changed price. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we have developed a general principle for estimating the user utility functions. Second, we have developed a novel method for setting the prices that can optimize the extraction of the knowledge about user utility functions. The extensive simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.65-77
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• 1987

Congestion occurs whenever users interfere with each other, while competing for scarce resources. In a congested market, such as a telecommunication service market, users of telecommunication services incur costs in using the service in addition to the price. The user's own time costs involved in learning to use the service, waiting for the service, and making use of the service are typically greater than the price of telecommunication services. A market equilibrium analysis is performed in which a method for user demand aggregation is developed. The effects of price changes on user demands and market demands for congested services are examined. It is found that total market demands may increase as the price for less-congested services increase under certain demand conditions. This suggests that a nonuniform pricing scheme for a congested service may improve the utilization of the congested system. The sign of price cross-elasticity for congested services is show to vary with demand conditions. A possible complementary property of congested services is found and the implication of such a property is discussed. It is argued that such a complementary property may lead to a cross subsidy in a market with congestion. Finally, comparisons between uniform pricing and nonuniform pricing policies are made. A specific numerical example is given to show that a nonuniform pricing policy may be Pareto superior to a uniform pricing policy.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.1192-1207
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• 2014

Dynamic spectrum sharing is a key technology to improve spectrum utilization in wireless networks. The elastic spectrum management provides a new opportunity for licensed primary users and unlicensed secondary users to efficiently utilize the scarce wireless resource. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic framework for dynamic spectrum allocation where the primary users rent the unutilized spectrum to the secondary users for a monetary profit. In reality, due to the ON-OFF behavior of the primary user, the quantity of spectrum that can be opportunistically shared by the secondary users is limited. We model this situation with the renewal theory and formulate the spectrum pricing scheme with the Bertrand game, taking into account the scarcity of the spectrum. By the Nash-equilibrium pricing scheme, each player in the game continually converges to a strategy that maximizes its own profit. We also investigate the impact of several properties, including channel quality and spectrum substitutability. Based on the equilibrium analysis, we finally propose a decentralized algorithm that leads the primary users to the Nash-equilibrium, called DST. The stability of the proposed algorithm in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is also studied.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2006.11a
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• pp.599-617
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• 2006

A network model and a Genetic Algorithm(GA) is proposed to solve the simultaneous estimation of the trip distribution and traffic assignment from traffic counts in the congested networks in a logit-based Stochastic User Equilibrium (SUE). The model is formulated as a problem of minimizing the non-linear objective functions with the linear constraints. In the model, the flow-conservation constraints of the network are utilized to restrict the solution space and to force the link flows meet the traffic counts. The objective of the model is to minimize the discrepancies between the link flows satisfying the constraints of flow-conservation, trip production from origin, trip attraction to destination and traffic counts at observed links and the link flows estimated through the traffic assignment using the path flow estimator in the legit-based SUE. In the proposed GA, a chromosome is defined as a vector representing a set of Origin-Destination Matrix (ODM), link flows and travel-cost coefficient. Each chromosome is evaluated from the corresponding discrepancy, and the population of the chromosome is evolved by the concurrent simplex crossover and random mutation. To maintain the feasibility of solutions, a bounded vector shipment is applied during the crossover and mutation.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.24 no.2 s.88
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• pp.169-178
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• 2006

Traffic assignment has been used both for predicting travel demands and for evaluating the tools for alleviating congestion on road network in advance. Some assignment models have been proposed such as equivalent mathematical minimization method, variational inequality problem, nonlinear complementary problem and fixed point method, in following the principle of Wardrop (1952) that no driver can not Improve his travel cost by unilaterally changing his route. Recently Jin(2005a) presented a traffic assignment model based on dynamic process. This paper proposes a solution algorithm for the model of Jin and assesses the performances. Compared to the Frank-Wolfe method, which has been wildly used for solving the existing assignment models, the proposed algorithm is expected to be more efficient because it does not need to evaluate the objective function. Two numerical examples are used for assessing the algorithm, and they show that the algorithm converges to user equilibrium of Wardrop.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.28 no.5
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• pp.117-129
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• 2010

This study presents a sensitivity analysis method for stochastic user equilibrium of multi-modal network flows. We consider a multi-modal network consisting of a road network for passenger cars physically separated from a transit network for public transport. We first establish a sensitivity analysis method with respect to arbitrary link parameters and perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to link capacity and transit line frequency as practical link parameters. Next, We establish a sensitivity analysis method and perform the sensitivity analysis with respect to modal split by passenger car and public transit. As with the elasticity of economics, these results can be important information for analyzing changes in travel behavior due to the changes in operation and policy of transportation facilities, as well as for analyzing the effects of these operational changes and policies. These results also can be utilized as a tool to constitute a multi-modal network design problem by using cooperative game theory.