• Journal of the Korean Society of Radiology
• /
• v.8 no.4
• /
• pp.211-216
• /
• 2014

Radium is rock or soil of crust or uranium of building materials after radioactivity collapse process are created colorless and odorless inert gas that accrue well in sealed space like basement. It inflow to lung circulate respiratory organ and caused lung cancer because of deposition of lung or bronchial tubes. In this study, the air in the elementary school classroom nongdoeul tonkatsu place of measured values were compared using the calculated annual internal radiation exposure. La tonkatsu exposure measured in primary school classroom at least five schools when you close the windows in the average floor 0.56mSv 2 floors ground floor windows when opened 0.384mSv 048mSv 3 floors, 2 floor levels of the same three layers 0.31mSv 0.296mSv the human exposure to radon and radiation on the first floor of 3 floors above ground in a lot of exposure was moderate. When you close the window from the first floor up 0.384mSv 056mSv 3 floors with a minimum annual radiation exposure due to natural radiation in the 16 to 23.3 percent minimum 2.4mSv accounted for. When I opened the window to the maximum annual radiation exposure 2.4mSv 0.296mSv 0.31mSv least a minimum of 12.3 to 12.91% accounted for Results suggest that more than five chodeunghakgyoeun La tonkatsu domestic radon measurements conducted below regulatory requirements and internal exposure has also fall within the normal range. People The less the radiation exposure to the human body because it reduces the impact in the classroom in elementary school vent windows often reduced to the maximum radon concentration in the air, if called tonkatsu be able to reduce radiation exposure for the immune system is weak and elementary will be helpful to experiment more in the future for the school authorities called tonkatsu investigation is done to him if the action to establish a more secure school building facilities is thought would be helpful.

• Economic and Environmental Geology
• /
• v.35 no.3
• /
• pp.179-189
• /
• 2002

The Geology of the Shizhuyuan W-Sn-Bi-Mo deposits, situated 16 Ian southeast of Chengzhou City, Hunan Province, China, consist of Proterozoic metasedimentary rocks, Devonian carbonate rocks, Jurassic granitic rocks, Cretaceous granite porphyry and ultramafic dykes. The Shizhuyuan polymetallic deposits were associated with medium- to coarse-grained biotite granite of stage I. According to occurrences of ore body, ore minerals and assemblages, they might be classified into three stages such as skarn, greisen and hydrothernlal stages. The skarn is mainly calcic skarn, which develops around the Qianlishan granite, and consists of garnet, pyroxene, vesuvianite, wollastonite, amphibolite, fluorite, epidote, calcite, scheelite, wolframite, bismuthinite, molybdenite, cassiterite, native bismuth, unidetified Bi- Te-S system mineral, magnetite, and hematite. The greisen was related to residual fluid of medium- to coarse-grained biotite granite, and is classified into planar and vein types. It is composed of quartz, feldspar, muscovite, chlorite, tourmaline, topaz, apatite, beryl, scheelite, wolframite, bismuthinite, molybdenite, cassiterite, native bismuth, unknown uranium mineral, unknown REE mineral, pyrite, magnetite, and chalcopyrite with minor hematite. The hydrothermal stage was related to Cretaceous porphyry, and consist of quartz, pyrite and chalcopyrite. Scheelite shows a zonal texture, and higher MoO) content as 9.17% in central part. Wolframite is WO); 71.20 to 77.37 wt.%, FeO; 9.37 to 18.40 wt.%, MnO; 8.17 to 15.31 wt.% and CaO; 0.01 to 4.82 wt.%. FeO contents of cassiterite are 0.49 to 4.75 wt.%, and show higher contents (4.]7 to 4.75 wt.%) in skarn stage (Stage I). Te and Se contents of native bismuth range from 0.00 to 1.06 wt.% and from 0.00 to 0.57 wt.%, respectively. Unidentified Bi-Te-S system mineral is Bi; 78.62 to 80.75 wt.%, Te; 12.26 to 14.76 wt.%, Cu; 0.00 to 0.42 wt.%, S; 5.68 to 6.84 wt.%, Se; 0.44 to 0.78 wt.%.

• The Journal of Engineering Geology
• /
• v.31 no.4
• /
• pp.659-669
• /
• 2021

The purpose of this study is to elucidate the relationship between occurrence of natural radioactive materials such as ²³⁸U and ²²²Rn and original mixing ratio of helium isotope of groundwater from various geology, and to suggest the underground aquifer environment from helium original mixing data. 9 groundwater samples were collected from five study areas, and ²³⁸U, Rn-222 and helium isotope were analyzed. A high ²³⁸U content of the range of 218~477 ㎍ /L in the groundwater occurs in the twomica granite. ⁴He air-crust mixing ratio and the Rn-222 content show a rough relation, that is, Rn-222 content increases according to the increase of ⁴He crust mixing ratio. Because of helium and radon are an inert gas, their behavior in underground environment is assumed as an analogous. The ²³⁸U content and He isotope in groundwater does not show any distinct correlation. The groundwater can be classified as three groups (air, air-crust mixing, crust-mantle mixing origin) on the diagram of ³He/⁴He vs ⁴He/²⁰Ne, which is composed of original mixing line from air-crust-mantle end members. This original mixing of helium can provide the information of underground aquifer characteristic such as the connection with surface environment or isolation condition from air environment.

• Korean Journal of Mineralogy and Petrology
• /
• v.35 no.3
• /
• pp.313-331
• /
• 2022

Natural or native abiotic molecular hydrogen (H₂) is a major component in natural gas, however yet its importance in the global energy sector's usage as clean and renewable energy is underestimated. Here we review the occurrence and geological settings of native hydrogen to demonstrate the much widesprease H₂ occurrence in nature by comparison with previous estimations. Three main types of source rocks have been identified: (1) ultramafic rocks; (2) cratons comprising iron (Fe²⁺)-rich rocks; and (3) uranium-rich rocks. The rocks are closely associated with Precambrian crystalline basement and serpentinized ultramafic rocks from ophiolite and peridotite either at mid-ocean ridges or within continental margin(Zgonnik, 2020). Inorganic geological processes producing H₂ in the source rocks include (a) the reduction of water during the oxidation of Fe²⁺ in minerals (e.g., olivine), (b) water splitting due to radioactive decay, (c) degassing of magma at low pressure, and (d) the reaction of water with surface radicals during mechanical breaking (e.g., fault) of silicate rocks. Native hydrogen are found as a free gas (51%), fluid inclusions in various rock types (29%), and dissolved gas in underground water (20%) (Zgonnik, 2020). Although research on H₂ has not yet been carried out in Korea, the potential H₂ reservoirs in the Gyeongsang Basin are highly probable based on geological and geochemical characteristics including occurrence of ultramafic rocks, inter-bedded basaltic layers and iron-copper deposits within thick sedimentary basin and igneous activities at an active continental margin during the Permian-Paleogene. The native hydrogen is expected to be clean and renewable energy source in the near future. Therefore it is clear that the origin and exploration of the native hydrogen, not yet been revealed by an integrated studies of rock-fluid interaction studies, are a field of special interest, regardless of the presence of economic native hydrogen reservoirs in Korea.

• Economic and Environmental Geology
• /
• v.56 no.6
• /
• pp.847-870
• /
• 2023

The safe disposal of high-level radioactive waste requires accurate predictions of the long-term geochemical behavior of radionuclides. To achieve this, the present study was conducted to model geochemical behaviors of uranium (U), plutonium (Pu), and palladium (Pd) under different hydrogeochemical conditions that represent deep groundwater in Korea. Geochemical modeling was performed for five types of South Korean deep groundwater environment: high-TDS saline groundwater (G1), low-pH CO₂-rich groundwater (G2), high-pH alkaline groundwater (G3), sulfate-rich groundwater (G4), and dilute (fresh) groundwater (G5). Under the pH and Eh (redox potential) ranges of 3 to 12 and ±0.2 V, respectively, the solubility and speciation of U, Pu, and Pd in deep groundwater were predicted. The result reveals that U(IV) exhibits high solubility within the neutral to alkaline pH range, even in reducing environment with Eh down to -0.2 V. Such high solubility of U is primarily attributed to the formation of Ca-U-CO₃ complexes, which is important in both G2 located along fault zones and G3 occurring in granitic bedrocks. On the other hand, the solubility of Pu is found to be highly dependent on pH, with the lowest solubility in neutral to alkaline conditions. The predominant species are Pu(IV) and Pu(III) and their removal is predicted to occur by sorption. Considering the migration by colloids, however, the role of colloid formation and migration are expected to promote the Pu mobility, especially in deep groundwater of G3 and G5 which have low ionic strengths. Palladium (Pd) exhibits the low solubility due to the precipitation as sulfides in reducing conditions. In oxidizing condition, anionic complexes such as Pd(OH)₃^-, PdCl₃(OH)₂^-, PdCl₄^2-, and Pd(CO₃)₂^2- would be removed by sorption onto metal (hydro)oxides. This study will improve the understanding of the fate and transport of radionuclides in deep groundwater conditions of South Korea and therefore contributes to develop strategies for safe high-level radioactive waste disposal.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
• /
• 1993.06a
• /
• pp.1051-1054
• /
• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.