• Strategy21
• /
• s.34
• /
• pp.236-261
• /
• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.

• Journal of Korean Society of Archives and Records Management
• /
• v.19 no.1
• /
• pp.95-115
• /
• 2019

The relocation project of the US military base in South Korea is a large-scale national project aimed at ensuring a stable presence of US troops stationed in South Korea and strengthening the future-oriented Korea-US Alliance by relocating the US military base scattered across the country to Pyeongtaek. The purpose of this study is to examine the classification of records produced by various agencies involved in the relocation project, including the MND USFK Base Relocation Office that is the main body of the project, and provide basic data for systematic records management in the future. This study aims to ensure the people's right to know and achieve the objective of the transmission of the military documentary heritage at a macro level.

• Journal of Animal Science and Technology
• /
• v.56 no.1
• /
• pp.1.1-1.2
• /
• 2014

We anticipate that this new alliance between The Korean Society of Animal Science and Technology and BioMed Central will elevate our journal one step higher, and facilitate easier access for those overseas as well as domestic researchers, who in turn will support us to contribute updated research outcomes in this field. We cordially invite all of you to participate and submit the results of your research so that everyone can learn and strive towards the goals that we all share.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
• /
• v.13 no.3
• /
• pp.47-66
• /
• 2012

This paper aims at investigating and identifying the factor that has led the back and forth relationship between China and the United States since 1989. Previous studies on this subject addressed the issue by taking either of two approaches: one with the micro view that interprets the back and forth relationship in the context of the end of the Cold war, on other hand, with the macro view that interprets the fragile relationship in the context of the rise of China. However, neither of the approaches explains with sufficiency the question at hand. Hence for the inquiry, this article suggests a fresh view by exploring alternative method of using a cognitive map of each nation's leader, Jiangzemin and Bill Clinton. This article provides an empirical analysis through the Selected works of Jiangzemin and the speeches of Bill Clinton in 1998 for the first time in the field of Sino-US relationship studies in Korea. With the results of the cognitive map analysis, we can reach the following four points. Firstly, indicators of the forth relationship between China and the US are: i) the recognition by Bill Clinton on the importance of China's economic growth and; ii) the US's cooperation of science technology with China. Second, the conflict between China and the US results from the discordance of opinions on the matter of human rights and military power. Second, the conflict will inevitably arise on environmental issues around the globe including a global warming. Third, while China has yet to find a legitimate reason to agree upon these issues with the US, the US urges China of its cooperation. Lastly, Both China and the US attach great importance to the alliance with Japan. This implicates that relatively, issues involving Japan take more control in the China-US relationship, than those of Korea Peninsula.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
• /
• v.41 no.3
• /
• pp.287-295
• /
• 2015

Due to the latest agreement between the military authorities of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States (US) of America, Korea's annual contribution to the budget of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) rose as high as close to 1 trillion won. This seemingly prohibitive amount has led to the questioning of military critics regarding determination criteria, wholesomeness of cost, alignment of incentives, and implementational transparency, etc. As these sources of mistrust can potentially undermine the congruence of alliance, we attempt to devise a scientific means to test the validity of Korea's budget contribution. Specifically, we use the real options approach (ROA) to estimating the interval of the fair prices of maintaining the USFK. We consider the USFK as an insurance against foreign incursions, and this enables us to assume their role as a put option. Upon a hypothetical war breakout, the daily cumulative size of the Korean economy is estimated by implementing the simulated loss ratios of assets and population. As a result, the strategic value (put premium) of the USFK is exponentially higher the sooner the US forces are augmented following an intrusion. Also, Korea's payments toward the USFK in 2011 and 2012 appear theoretically fairly valued.

• Industry Promotion Research
• /
• v.8 no.1
• /
• pp.35-45
• /
• 2023

This paper addressed the analysis of the trend and direction of the US defense strategy based on their third offset strategy and presented the practical policy implication of ensuring the security of South Korea appropriately in the future national defense environment. The countermeasures for the development ability of advanced weapon systems and secure core technologies for Korea were presented in consideration of the US third offset strategy for the future national defense environment. First, to carry out the innovation of national defense in Korea based on artificial intelligence(AI), the long-term basis strategy for the operation of the unmanned robot and autonomous weapon system should be suggested. Second, the platform for AI has to be developed to obtain the development of algorithms and computing abilities for securing the collection/storage/management of national defense data. Lastly, advanced components and core technologies are identified, which the Korean government can join to develop with the US on a basis of the Korea-US alliance, and the technical cooperation with the US should be stronger.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.34
• /
• pp.58-92
• /
• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
• /
• v.22 no.2
• /
• pp.53-75
• /
• 2016

This article presents a descriptive analysis on national security policy platforms promoted by the ruling parties of South Korea during general and presidential elections. National security platforms made during the elections campaigns are a window that allows us to see how the ruling party perceives the threat environment, opportunity-structures, policy preferences and material capabilities faced by the state. South Korea presents a unique case since it faces constant military threats from North Korea and interacts with China and the United States. Therefore, the national security policy platforms, which are explicitly campaigned during the general and presidential elections, showcases the worldview of the ruling party. The study essentially focuses on three areas of the platforms - its threat perception on North Korea, the ROK-US alliance and the future vision for the Korean peninsula by covering two presidential elections and three general elections for the last 20 years.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.34
• /
• pp.5-25
• /
• 2014

On July 3~4, 2014, the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Seoul might be seen as a step on the path toward strategic outcomes for both country. For South Korea, Seoul shrewdly retains some degree of self-reliance by balancing between ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership relationship and ROK-US alliance. For China, Beijing appears to put its interests on the Korean Peninsula increasingly within China's larger geopolitical influence. To what extent can ROK-China relationship maintain futuristic strategic cooperative partnership between them? As we observed joint press communiques of the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit on July 3, 2014, four agendas of bilateral relationship between Seoul and Beijing can be identified: intractable rivalry between the two great powers, North Korea nuclear issues, disparities of their displeasure with Japan denying the past wrongdoing and enhancing its military capabilities and Chinese imposing of its core interests on its Korea policy. With these evolving strategic environments, however, China and the ROK appear justifiably be pleased with the state of their relations: their strategic cooperative partnership is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region and continues to grow broader and deeper.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.39
• /
• pp.114-139
• /
• 2016

Korea and China are neighboring countries with close contacts in many areas from long time ago, and have shared interests in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in deepening economic relationship which has been mutually complementary in their nature. Therefore their bilateral relations has been developed at a remarkable pace to the extent that it can't be better than now. However, the differences in their responses to North Korean nuclear test and ensuing long-range ballistic missile test-fire and the Chinese strong concern on the possible deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) anti-missile system in Korea show that there are some weaknesses in their relations. For example, Korea is not still confident that China would fully implement the sanction measures contained in the UNSC resolution and I argue that Chinese proposal of parallel negotiation of the denuclearization and the replacement of Korean armistice with the Peace Agreement is not much persuasive. In THAAD issue, if Korea comes to conclusion in the future that THAAD is the most effective way to counter North Korean threats, Korea should make every efforts to assure China that Korea-US alliance is not targeting China, and the THAAD is a defensive system, not damaging Chinese security. In the longer-term, deepening strategic distrust and competition between the US and China in this part of East Asia, changing nature of economic cooperation between Korea and China, and the revival of 'great country mentality' by Chinese people together with the rising nationalism in both Korea and China would cast shadow on Korea-China relation in the years ahead, unless properly handled. In this regard, I suggest that the security communications between the two countries be further strengthened, and the tri-lateral dialogue channel be established among the three countries of Korea, the US and China, particularly on North Korean issues. I also suggest the new pattern of economic cooperation be sought, considering the changing economic environment in China, while strengthening the efforts to understand each other through more interactions between the two peoples.