• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제28권4호
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• pp.115-129
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• 2003

This paper suggests that the profit sharing contract can be Pareto optimal for both supplier and the purchaser. It is shown that Pareto optimal risk sharing contract can be obtained even though the decisions are made in a decentralized manner. The effect of risk attitude of the members of the supply chain is discussed. We examined various aspects of the risk sharing contract such as risk altitude, bargaining power, and cost of information system. The different risk attitude changes the optimal parameters and decision variables. Especially, we proved that, when both the supplier and the purchaser are risk averse, the purchaser orders less quantity than when the one is risk neutral and the other is risk averse. If the fixed cost for the information system is big enough to satisfy a certain condition, it is Pareto optimal not to share the profit and the purchaser takes all the risk even though he is risk averse.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제14권3호
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• pp.248-274
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• 2015

This study discusses a contract to promote collection and recycling of used products in a green supply chain (GSC). A collection incentive contract is combined with a reward-penalty contract. The collection incentive contract for used products is made between a retailer and a manufacturer. The reward-penalty contract for recycling used products is made between a manufacturer and an external institution. A retailer pays an incentive for collecting used products from customers and delivers them to a manufacturer with a product order quantity under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer remanufactures products using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts by sharing the reward from an external institution. Product demand information is assumed as (i) the distribution is known (ii) mean and variance are known. Besides, the optimal decisions for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recyclable parts under decentralized integrated GSCs. The analysis numerically investigates how (1) contract for recycling activity, (ii) product demand information and (iii) quality of recyclable parts affect the optimal operation for each GSC. Supply chain coordination to shift IGSC is discussed by adopting Nash Bargaining solution.

• 한국시뮬레이션학회논문지
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• 제31권1호
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• pp.19-27
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• 2022

본 연구는 하나의 공급자와 하나의 소매자가 구성된 분산화된 공급사슬에서 도매가 계약과 수익공유 계약, 수량유연 계약, 판매환급 계약을 비교·분석한다. 선행 연구의 결과에 따라 공급사슬 조정(coordination)이 이루어지는 각 조정 계약의 모수를 설정하였다. 이들 모수의 조합에 대해 @RISK를 활용하여 시뮬레이션을 수행하고 공급사슬 조정을 이루는 상태 하에서 계약의 성사율과 각 계약에 유리한 참여자를 평가한다. 결과적으로 수량 유연 계약은 소매자 쪽에 가장 유리하고 판매환급 계약은 공급자 쪽에 가장 유리하다. 수익공유 계약은 공급자와 소매자의 이익 재배분에 가장 넓은 범위에서 선택할 수 있어 더 유연하게 사용할 수 있음을 밝혔다.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제53권
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• pp.3-29
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• 2012

This article examines the Practical Suggestions in the Contract for the Turnkey Supply of an Industrial Plant based on a study focused on the commentary of "ICC Model Contract" clause which is encouraged by ICC. Especially practical issues are inquired into on business and legal perspective as follows. First, in regard to supply of technical documentation, equipment and spare parts, it is important to supplier and purchaser to agree on obtaining technical documents necessary for installing and operating plant, and also components necessary for it's maintenance. Second, it is about erection, testing, taking over and training chapter. Both parties need to agree about the process of the arrival of equipments and assembly conducted by the supplier and following examination and also training purchaser to operate it Third, when it comes to price, payment conditions, bank guarantees, parties are to make decision on the pricing, payment conditions and currency of contract-payment. Lastly, it is necessary to reach an agreement of the issue of whether it is to be defined as delay or non-performance of the contract and also it's consequences about rights and obligation.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제35권4호
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• pp.17-31
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• 2010

This study investigates two-stage return policy and recycling issues in an e-marketplace supply chain consisting of consumers, a retailer and a manufacturer. The manufacturer, a focal company in the e-marketplace supply chain, considers the recycling of commercial returns so offers the retailer a buy-back contract of which transfer payment consists of a wholesale price and a buy-back price. Then, under the given contract offer, the retailer determines a selling price and a return policy to control consumers' demand and return requests. We consider the retailer's opportunistic behavior and supply chain coordination issues based on the principal-agent paradigm. We compare the first-best and second-best optima and conduct comparative static analyses to evaluate the performance results of the buy-back contract and provide important managerial implications.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제37권2호
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• pp.45-56
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• 2012

This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a component manufacturer and a product manufacturer. The component manufacturer provides components for the product manufacturer based on a vendor-managed inventory type of supply contract, and also faces demands from the market with the option of to accept or reject each incoming demand. Using the Markov decision process model, we examine the structure of the optimal production control and inventory rationing policy. Two types of heuristics are presented. One is the fixed-buffer policy and the other uses two linear functions. We implement a computational study and present managerial insights based on the observations.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• 제19권4호
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• pp.513-526
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• 2023

Supply chain coordination plays a critical role in improving the enterprise performance and the competitive advantage of fresh e-commerce. This study explores the coordination problem of a two-echelon fresh produce e-commerce supply chain comprising a fresh e-commerce enterprise and a fresh supplier in a novel framework. In this framework, the fresh e-commerce sells fresh produce and provides promotion effort; meanwhile, the fresh supplier deliveries fresh produce and provides freshness-keeping effort. Specifically, the optimal decisions under centralized and decentralized decision-making are compared, and it is found that centralized decision-making is more profitable. Based on this work, we created a cost-sharing and revenue-sharing combination contract. This study demonstrates that this contract effectively coordinates the supply chain and makes both parties achieve Pareto optimization when the parameters meet certain conditions. Finally, the feasibility and validity of the contract are presented through a numerical example.

• 한국산업경영시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국산업경영시스템학회 2002년도 춘계학술대회
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• pp.343-348
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• 2002

We are concerned with a long-term replenishment contract for the ARIMA demand process in a supply chain. The chain is composed of one supplier, one buyer and consumers for a product. The replenishment contract is based upon the well-known (s, Q) policy but allows us to contract future replenishments at a time with a price discount. Due to the larger forecast error of future demand, the buyer should keep a higher level of safety stock to provide the same level of service as the usual (s, Q) policy. However, the buyer can reduce his purchase cost by ordering a larger quantity at a discounted price. Hence, there exists a trade-off between the price discount and the inventory holding cost. For the ARIMA demand process, we present a model for the contract and an algorithm to find the number of the future replenishments. Numerical experiments show that the proposed algorithm is efficient and accurate.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• 제5권2호
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• pp.1-23
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• 1999

We investigate a supply chain arrangement where a manufacturing company outsources it sassmbly operations to two contract manufacturers. Each contract manufacturer is different in improvement capability : e.g., one is more capable than the other. This improvement capability is supposed to in-duce supply cost reduction that ultimately benefits the manufacturing company. Over time, the manufacturer has to decide how much it should outsource to each contract manufacturer and how much processde/assembled the semi-finished units should be when they re shipped back to the manufacturing company from the contract manufacturers. We employ the optimal control theory to answer the questions, and suggest numerical examples focused on the relationship among the optimal outsourcing amounts, contract manufacturer's improvement capabilities, and their capacity con-straints.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제41권2호
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• pp.101-127
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• 2016

Irrational ordering decisions of supply chain members have been gaining growing importance in the area of supply chain management. Irrational ordering behaviors that deviate from the profit maximizing decisions in the newsvendor settings have observed with human experiments in recent research. These behaviors can be modeled with several typical decision bias elements. This bias in ordering decisions affects the performance of supply chain contracts designed based on the assumption that the supply chain members make optimal decisions, making it necessary to design supply chain contracts by considering the irrationality. The purpose of this research is to derive a method to design the revenue sharing contract that considers human irrationality in ordering decisions. This research considers a simple two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer, where the supplier is assumed to be perfectly rational while the retailer making newsvendor type ordering decisions displays irrational ordering behaviors. Under this environment, this research analytically models the revenue sharing contract to maximize the total supply chain profit or the supplier's own profits while considering the three decision bias patterns of the retailer, which include the pull-to-center effect, the prospect theory, and the increased subjective sensitivity to the revenue sharing ratio. Irrationality parameters are measured through human experiments based on which and through numerical simulations, we showed that significant improvements in the supply chain performance can be achieved.