• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.24 no.65
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• pp.11-22
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• 2001

Recently, many studies on the supply chain management have been published due to increasing attention placed on the design and performance analysis of the supply chain as a whole. Using the Beer distribution game introduced in Sterman[1995], we develop a simple order-up-to-R inventory model to minimize sum of the inventory holding cost and shortage cost under probabilistic demand. We show that performance of the model is robust through extensive simulation experiment. Applying the model to serially connected supply chain, we observe that, if the unit shortage cost is relatively high, R value computed independently is an optimal solution.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.43-61
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• 2014

This research is an application of game theory to developing the supplier selection and demand allocation mechanism, which are the essential and major research areas of supply chain planning and operation. In this research, the most popular and widely accepted mechanism, the progressive reverse auction is analyzed and compared with the other game theoretic approach, Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in the viewpoint of holistic efficiency of supply chain operation. To logically and exquisitely compare the efficiencies, a heuristic algorithm based on Genetic Algorithm is devised to find the other optimal demand allocation plan. A well known metric, profit-cost ratio, as well as profit functions for both suppliers and buyer has been designed for evaluating the overall profitability of supply chain. The experimental results with synthesis data and supply chain model which were made to mimic practical supply chain are illustrated and analyzed to show how the proposed approach can enhance the profitability of supply chain planning. Based on the result, it can be said that the proposed mechanism using bargainging solution mayguarantee the better profitability for the whole supply chin including both suppliers and buyer, even though quite small portion of buyer's profitability should be sacrified.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.15-24
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• 2019

Fair Allocation of profits or costs arising from joint participation by multiple individuals or entities with different purposes is essential for their continuing involvement and for their dissatisfaction reduction. In this research, fair allocation of the profits of forming a grand coalition in Three-Echelon Supply Chain (TESC) game that is composed of manufacturer, distributor and retailer, is studied. In particular, the solutions of the proportional method of profit, the proportional method of marginal profit, and Shapley value based on cooperative game theory are proved to be in the desirable characteristics of the core. The proportional method of profit and the proportional method of marginal profit are often used because of their ease of application. These methods distribute total profit in proportion to profits or marginal profits of each game participant. In addition, Shapley value can be defined as the average marginal profit when one game player is added at a time. Even though the calculation of the average of all possible marginal profits is not simple, Shapley value are often used as a useful method. Experiments have shown that the solution of the incremental method, which calculates the marginal cost of adding game players in the order of manufacturers, distributors and retailers, does not exist in the core.

• International Journal of Quality Innovation
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.53-76
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• 2009

As the flourish of today's supply chain, the traditional model of replenishment will cause accumulation of excessive inventory to the retailers and customers, or cause shortages and inability to meet the demands. To solve this problem, Theory of Constraints (TOC) proposed the replenishment model of demand-pull, combined with the establishment of factory-ware-house to achieve performance improvement. In the absence of empirical research, this study applied the Bean Game developed by Dr. Goldratt to design a supply chain system for different scenarios, in order to allow players and managers better understanding and supporting the TOC replenishment method through the operations of the game.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.162-168
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• 2010

Information is known to be a key element for the successful operation of a supply chain, which is required of the efficient ordering strategies and accurate predictions of demands. This study proposes a method to effectively utilize the meteorological forecast information in order to make decisions about ordering and prediction of demands by using the Taguchi experimental design. It is supposed that each echelon in a supply chain determines the order quantity with the prediction of precipitation in the next day based on probability forecast information. The precipitation event is predicted when the probability of the precipitation exceeds a chosen threshold. Accordingly, the choice of the threshold affect the performances of a supply chain. The Taguchi method is adopted to deduce a set of thresholds for echelons which is least sensitive to changes in environmental conditions, such as variability of demand distributions and production periods. A simulation of the beer distribution game was conducted to show that the set of thresholds found by the Taguchi method can reduce the cumulative chain cost, which consists of inventory and backlog costs.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.157-175
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• 2011

The purpose of this paper is to find out the effects of the gambler's fallacy bias on the supply chain. For this study, the simulation was based on a casual structure of the Beer Distribution Game from Sterman(2000)'s Business Dynamics and designed into 2 different models : the first model carries the exact same structure as the reference mentioned above and for the second model, the comparison model is used reflecting gambler's fallacy bias. Each model has 2 different demand patterns. The 4 cases of models was tested with 1,000 different random number seeds. The results for the simulation are following : In the aspect of the inventory and out of stock, the basic model resulted better than the comparison. However, in the bullwhip effect, the comparison model has less than the basic in terms of the level demand pattern. But there was no significant difference in the cycle demand.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.264-273
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• 2013

Credit option is a policy that has been studied by many researchers in the area of supply chain management. This policy has been applied in practice to improve the profits of supply chain members. Usually, a credit option policy is proposed by the seller, and often under a symmetric information environment where members have complete information on each others' operations. In this paper, we investigate two scenarios: firstly, the seller offers a credit option to the buyer, and secondly, the buyer attempts to stretch the length of the credit period offered by the seller. The proposed model in both scenarios will be investigated under an asymmetric information structure where some information are private and are only known to the individual who has knowledge of this information. The interactions between buyer and seller will be modeled by non-cooperative Stackelberg games where the buyer and seller take turn as leader and follower. Among some of the numerical results obtained, the seller and buyer's profits obtained from symmetric information games are larger than those obtained from an asymmetric information game in both scenarios. Furthermore, both buyer and seller's profit in the second scenario are better than in the first scenario.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.139-158
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• 2007

Information sharing is key to effective supply chain management. In reality, however, it is impossible to get perfect information. Accordingly, only uncertain information can be accessed in business environment, and thus it is important to deal with the uncertainties of information in managing supply chains. This study adopts meteorological forecast as a typical uncertain information. The meteorological events may affect the demands for various weather-sensitive goods, such as beer, ices, clothes, electricity etc. In this study, a beer distribution game is modified by introducing meterological forecast information provided in a probabilistic format. The behavior patterns of the modified beer supply chains are investigated. for two conditions using the weather forecast with or without an information sharing. A value score is introduced to generalize the well-known performance measures employed in the study of supply chains, i.e.. inventory, backlog, and deviation of orders. The simulation result showed that meterological forecast information used in an information sharing environment was more effective than without information sharing, which emphasizes the synergy of uncertain information added to the information sharing environment.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.385-395
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• 2016

Game theory is a powerful tool for analyzing the Supply chain (SC) with different conflicting elements. Among them, the Stackelberg game is the one in which a player as leader has more power than the other ones as followers. Since in many SC systems one element has, in essence, more power than the others; the Stackelberg game has found many applications in SC studies. In this paper, we apply the Stackelberg game-theoretic approach and the corresponding equilibrium point to formulate and analyze a two echelon VMI SC. Comprehensive computational results on an experimental case are conducted to numerically analyze the performance of VMI system against three groups of critical parameters. Moreover, a critical comparison demonstrates the poorer performance of decentralized VMI system than centralized one. This naturally necessitates designing proper contracts between VMI partners in order to more effectively implement the realistic decentralized system.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.129-158
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• 2015

It is necessary for retailers to determine the optimal ordering policy of products considering supply disruptions due to a natural disaster and a production process failure as quality and machine breakdowns. Under the situation, a dualsourcing supply chain (DSSC) is one of effective SC for retailers to order products reliably. This paper proposes the optimal ordering policy of a product in a DSSC with a retailer and two manufacturers. Two manufacturers may face supply disruptions due to a natural disater and a production process failure after they received the retailer's order of products. Here, two scenarios of demand information of products are assumed: (i) the demand distribution is known (ii) mean and variance of the demand are known. Under above situations, two types of DSSC are discussed. Under a decentralized DSSC (DSC), a retailer determines the optimal ordering policy to maximize his/her total expected profit. Under the integrated DSSC (ISC), the optimal ordering policy is determined to maximize the whole system's total expected profit. Numerical analysis investigates how demand information and supply disruptions affect the optimal decisions under DSC and ISC. Besides, profitability of supply chain coordination adjusting the wholesale price is evaluated to encourage the optimal decision under ISC.