The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
/
제5권4호
/
pp.67-72
/
2018
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of quality of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) disclosure on stock price crash risk. The MD&A can be seen to reflect the management's intention on public announcement and reveals directly what the management says to communicate with outside investors. A firm's high-quality MD&A implies the management's commitment to communicating with the market, not allowing the managers to have incentives to hoard unfavorable news, which if revealed to the public, may lead to downward stock price corrections, damaging corporate values. The high-quality MD&A is, thus, likely to reduce the stock price crash risk. We use a logistic regression to test whether MD&A influences crash risk using listed companies in the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) stock market between 2010 and 2013. Findings of the empirical test show that the higher the quality of MD&A, the less likely crash risk appears, implying that the MD&A disclosed adequately can be one of the factors mitigating firm's stock price crash risk. This study has implications as it presents the MD&A disclosure as a factor influencing stock price crash risk and suggests voluntary disclosure as well as mandatory disclosure acts as a variable that explains the risk of stock price crash.
Purpose: This research aims to investigate the impact of corporate integrity on stock price crash risk. Research design, data, and methodology: Taking 1419 firms listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China as a sample, this paper empirically analyzed the relationship between corporate integrity and stock price crash risk. The main integrity data was hand-collected from Shenzhen Stock Exchange Website. Other financial data was collected from CSMAR Database. Results: Findings show that corporate integrity can significantly decrease stock price crash risk. After changing the selection of samples, model estimation methods and the proxy variable of stock price crash risk, the conclusion is still valid. Further research shows that the relationship between corporate integrity and stock price crash risk is only found in firms with weak internal control and firms in poor legal system areas. Conclusions: Results of the study suggest that corporate integrity has a significant influence on behaviors of managers. Business ethics reduces the likelihood of managers to overstate financial performance and hide bad news, which leads to the low likelihood of future stock price crashes. Meanwhile, corporate integrity can supplement internal control and legal system in decreasing stock price crash risks.
The purpose of this study is to examine how the characteristics of family firms affect stock price crash risk. Prior studies argued that the opacity of information due to agency problem causes a plunge in stock prices. The governance characteristics of family firms can increase information opacity which leads to crash risk. Therefore, this study verifies whether family firms have a high possibility of stock price crash risk. We use a logistic regression model to test the relationship between family firms and stock price crash risk using listed firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange during the fiscal years 2011 through 2017. The family firm is defined as the case where the controlling shareholder is the chief executive officer or the registered executive. If the controlling shareholder's share is less than 5%, it is not considered a family business. We found that family firms are more likely to experience a plunge in stock prices. This supports the hypothesis of this study that passive information disclosure behavior and information opacity of family firms increase stock price crash risk.
This study investigates the effect of labor union and its power on information opacity. Given that the information opacity ultimately leads to the stock price crash, this study examines the relationship between labor unions and future stock price crash risk. Further, by assuming a strike by labor union as the actual power of the unionization in firms, whether labor union's power subrogated by the activity (i.e., a strike) makes a significant difference in the likelihood of future stock price crash between unionized firms is also examined. The work place survey data provided by Korea Labor Institute is used to test the hypotheses. The data is for the periods of 2004 - 2012 on firms listed on Korea Stock Exchange and KOSDAQ. The results show that while labor unionization has a positive impact on future stock price crash risk, on which labor union's power has a negative impact. This means that the existence of labor union itself might facilitate firm's information to be opaque by tolerating manager opportunism, while its power mitigates the managerial opportunism, which leads to lower future stock price crash risk. This study adds to the literature on the role of labor unions as nonfinancial stakeholders and its power in accounting environment, and also on the determinants of stock price crash. It is also valuable to examine the unions' role in terms of the economic consequences of both presence and power of the labor unions.
Purpose: This study is to investigate the effect of managerial ownership level in distribution and service companies on the stock price crash. The managerial ownership level affects the firm's information disclosure policy. If managers conceal or withholds business-related unfavorable factors over a long period, the firm's stock price is likely to plummet. In a similar vein, management's equity affects information opacity, and information asymmetry affects stock price collapse. Research design, data, and methodology: A regression analysis is conducted using the data on companies listed on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) between 2012-2017 to examine the effect of the managerial ownership level on stock price crash risks. Results: Logistic and regression results indicate that the stock price crash risk was reduced as managerial ownership levels are increased. The managerial ownership level has a significant negative coefficient on stock price crash risk, negative conditional return skewness of firm-specific weekly return distribution, and asymmetric volatility between positive and negative price-to-earnings ratios. Conclusions: As the ownership and management align, the likeliness of withholding business-related information is reduced. This study's results imply that the stock price crash risk reduces as the managerial ownership level increases because shareholder and manager interests coincide, thereby reducing information asymmetry.
Purpose - This paper examines the effect of related party transactions on crash firm-specific stock price crash risk. Ownership of a typical Korean conglomerate is concentrated in a single family. In those entities, management and board positions are often filled by family members. Therefore, a dominant shareholder can benefit from related party transactions. In Korea, firms have to report related party transactions in financial statement footnotes. However, those are not disclosed in detail. The more related party transactions are the greater information risk. Thus, companies with related party transactions are likely to experience stock price crashes. Research design, data, and methodology - 2,598 firm-year observations are used for the main analysis. Those samples are from TS2000 database from 2009 to 2013, and the database covers KOSPI-listed firms in Korea. The proxy for related party transactions (RTP) is calculated by dividing total transactions to the related-party by total sales. A dummy variable is used as a dependent variable (CRASH) in the regression model. Logistic regression is used to explain the relationship between related party transactions and crash risk. Then, the sample was separated into two groups; tunneling firms and propping firms. The relation between related party transactions and crash risk variances with features of the transaction were investigated. Results - Using a sample of KOSPI-listed firms in TS2000 database for the period of 2009-2013, I find that stock price crash risk increases as the trade volume of related-party transactions increases. Specifically, I find that the coefficient of RPT is significantly positive, supporting the prediction. In addition, this relationship is strong and robust in tunneling firms. Conclusions - The results report that firms with related party transactions are more likely to experience stock price crashes. The results mean that related party transactions increase the possibility of future stock price crashes by enlarging information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In case of tunneling, it could be seen that related party transactions are positively associated with stock crash risk. The result implies that the characteristic of the transaction influences crash risk. This study is related to a literature that investigates the effect of related party transactions on the stock market.
Purpose - According to agency theory, managers have incentives to adjust firm revenues to meet earnings expectations or delay bad news disclosure because of performance-based compensation and their reputation in the market. When the bad news accumulates, stock prices fail to reflect all available information. Thus, market prices of stocks are higher than their intrinsic value. After all, bad news crosses the tipping point, it comes out all at once. That results in stock crashes. Auditors can decrease stock crash risk by reducing agency costs through their informational role. Especially, stock price crash risk is expected to be lower for firms adopting high-quality audits. We focus on distribution and service industry to examine the relation between audit quality and stock price crash risk. Industry specialization and auditor size are used as proxies for auditor quality. Research design, data and methodology - Our sample contains distribution and service industry firms listed in KOSPI and KOSDAQ during a period of 2004-2011. We use a logistic regression to test whether auditor quality influences crash risk. Auditor quality was measured by industry specialist auditor and Big4 / non-Big4 dichotomy. Following the approach in prior researches, we use firm-specific weekly returns to measure crash risk. Firms experiencing at least one stock price crash in a specific week during year are classified as the high risk group. Results - The result of analyzing 429 companies in distribution and service industry is summarized as follows: Above all, it is shown that higher audit quality has a significant negative(-) effect on the crash risk. Crash risk is alleviated for firms audited by industry specialist auditors and Big 4 audit firms. Therefore, our results show that hypotheses are supported. Conclusions - This study is very meaningful as the first study which investigated the effects of high audit quality on stock price crash risk. We provide evidence that high-quality auditors reduce stock price crash risk. Our finding implies that the risk of extreme losses can be reduced through screening of high-quality auditors. Therefore investors and regulators may utilize our findings in their investment and rule making decisions.
The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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제8권1호
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pp.623-635
/
2021
The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of information risk on the Cost of Equity (COE) and whether the risk of a stock price crash mediates the relation between information risk and COE. To test the dynamic nature of the proposed model, the two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimators are applied to all the non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) from 2007- 2018. The results of this study show that all three types of information risk, as well as the risk of the share price crash, increases the COE. The crash risk strengthens the impact of information risk on the COE. Moreover, these three information risks are correlated with each other and an increase in information quality reduces the effect of asymmetric information and improves the investor interpreting ability, while an increase in private information decreases the transparency. The finding is crucial for asset pricing, portfolio management, and information disclosure. This study contributes to the literature by providing novel findings on the impact of three different types of information risk, i.e. private information, quality of information, and transparency of information on the COE as well as whether crash risk mediates the relationship.
Purpose - This paper investigates whether managerial overconfidence is associated with firm-specific crash risk. Overconfidence leads managers to overestimate the returns of their investment projects, and misperceive negative net present value projects as value creating. They even use voluntary disclosures to convey their optimistic beliefs about the firms' long-term prospects to the stock market. Thus, the overconfidence bias can lead to managerial bad news hoarding behavior. When bad news accumulates and crosses some tipping point, it will come out all at once, resulting in a stock price crash. Research design, data and methodology - 7,385 firm-years used for the main analysis are from the KIS Value database between 2006 and 2013. This database covers KOSPI-listed and KOSDAQ-listed firms in Korea. The proxy for overconfidence is based on excess investment in assets. A residual from the regression of total asset growth on sales growth run by industry-year is used as an independent variable. If a firm has at least one crash week during a year, it is referred to as a high crash risk firm. The dependant variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is a high crash risk firm, and zero otherwise. After explaining the relationship between managerial overconfidence and crash risk, the total sample was divided into two sub-samples; chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms. The relation between how I overconfidence and crash risk varies with business group affiliation was investigated. Results - The results showed that managerial overconfidence is positively related to crash risk. Specifically, the coefficient of OVERC is significantly positive, supporting the prediction. The results are strong and robust in non-chaebol firms. Conclusions - The results show that firms with overconfident managers are likely to experience stock price crashes. This study is related to past literature that examines the impact of managerial overconfidence on the stock market. This study contributes to the literature by examining whether overconfidence can explain a firm's future crashes.
Purpose: This study aims to explore the relationship between stock liquidity and skewness risk-tail risk (stock price crash risk) in an emerging market, in which problems on liquidity are more severe than in developed markets. Research design, data, and methodology: Based on the Thai market stock exchange over the period of 2000 to 2019, our sample include 13,462 firm-period observations. We employ a panel regression models regarding to five liquidity measures. These five liquidity measures cover three dimensions of liquidity namely the volume-based, price-based, and transaction cost-based measures for the liquidity-tail risk relationship. Results: We find a positively significant relationship between stock liquidity and tail risk in all cases. The finding here shows that the higher the stock liquidity, the larger the tail risk is. Conclusion: As the prior studies show inconclusive effect of stock liquidity on stock price crash risk, we demonstrate that mixed results found in prior studies are probably driven from the type of liquidity measure. The stock liquidity-tail risk association is present in the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The results remain the same regardless of the definition of tail risk and liquidity factors. An endogeneity issue is addressed by employing the two-stage least squares regression.
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