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The Effect of Labor Union and its Power on Information Opacity: Evidence Based on Stock Price Crash Risk

  • Received : 2022.01.11
  • Accepted : 2022.02.14
  • Published : 2022.02.28

Abstract

This study investigates the effect of labor union and its power on information opacity. Given that the information opacity ultimately leads to the stock price crash, this study examines the relationship between labor unions and future stock price crash risk. Further, by assuming a strike by labor union as the actual power of the unionization in firms, whether labor union's power subrogated by the activity (i.e., a strike) makes a significant difference in the likelihood of future stock price crash between unionized firms is also examined. The work place survey data provided by Korea Labor Institute is used to test the hypotheses. The data is for the periods of 2004 - 2012 on firms listed on Korea Stock Exchange and KOSDAQ. The results show that while labor unionization has a positive impact on future stock price crash risk, on which labor union's power has a negative impact. This means that the existence of labor union itself might facilitate firm's information to be opaque by tolerating manager opportunism, while its power mitigates the managerial opportunism, which leads to lower future stock price crash risk. This study adds to the literature on the role of labor unions as nonfinancial stakeholders and its power in accounting environment, and also on the determinants of stock price crash. It is also valuable to examine the unions' role in terms of the economic consequences of both presence and power of the labor unions.

Keywords

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