• 이베로아메리카
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• 제14권1호
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• pp.57-80
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• 2012

This year(2012) marks the 30th anniversary of the Malvinas (Falkland) war. A series of talks between the British and Argentina took place over 30 years until 1982, but failed to reach a conclusion on sovereignty. Argentina claims that sovereignty of the islands was transferred to Argentina from Spain upon independence, a principle known as uti possidetis juris. But UK claims that the principle of uti possidetis juris is not accepted as a general principal of international law, and UN General Assembly resolutions calling for negotiations are flawed because they make no reference to the islanders' right to choose their own future. In this situation, a huge amount of petroleum and natural gas has discovered near the Malvinas islands. To explore such situation, this article looks into history and present condition on dispute of Malvinas sovereignty, and also analyses de-colonialism and resource nationalism related to dispute of Malvinas sovereignty.

• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.103-141
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• 2018

As the South China Sea maritime dispute illustrates, when considering the place where maritime claims occur, states do not have many choices to respond to maritime claims in which disputed areas are located far away from the land and are surrounded by the sea. As Mearsheimer (2014) points out, the sea stops power projection. Therefore, in order to adopt coercive as well as peaceful settlement policies to deal with maritime claims, states need to overcome obstacles (the sea) to project power. It means that if states want to conduct a specific foreign policy action, such as negotiating maritime borderlines or arguing sovereignty on islands, they need a tool (naval power) to coerce or to persuade the opponent. However, there are lack of research that studies maritime claims from the perspective of naval power. This research project fills this gap based on naval power. How do relative levels of naval power and (dis) parities of naval power influence the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims? Naval power is a constitutive element during maritime claims. If disputants over maritime claims have required naval power to project their capability, it means that they have the capability to apply various ways, such as aggressive options including MIDs, to accomplish their goals. So, I argue that when two claimants have enough naval power to project their capabilities, the likelihood of MIDs over maritime claims increases. Given that one or both states have a certain level of naval power, how does relative naval power between two claimants influence the management of maritime claims? Based on the power transition theory, I argue that when the disparities of relative naval power between claimants becomes distinctive, militarized conflicts surrounding maritime territory are less probable. Based on the ICOW project which codes maritime claims from 1900 to 2001, the empirical results of the Poisson models show if both claimants have projectable naval power, the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims increases. In addition, the result shows that when disputants maintain similar relative naval powers, they are more likely to initiate MIDs over maritime claims. To put it differently, if naval capabilities' gap between two claimants becomes larger, the probability of the occurrence of MIDs decreases.

• Strategy21
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• 통권38호
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• pp.287-320
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• 2015

On October 27, 2015, USS Lassen(DDG82), a 9,200 ton class Aegis destroyer of the United States Navy, began its operations within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, one of the seven artificial islands that China has built and claimed sovereignty over. The maneuver was joined by anti-submarine patrol airplanes such as P-8A and P-3. The White House press secretary mentioned that the President of the United States approved the operation. In response, China announced that it warned the US Navy ship about the 'illegal violation' by sending two destroyers(PLAN Lanzhou and Taizhou). This event represents a close call case where tension between the United States and China in the South China Sea might have been elevated to a conflict between the two navies. Moreover, considering that this happened only one month after Chinese president Xi's state visit to the United States, the event shows that the positions of the two countries have become starkly different to the extent that they are so hard to be reconciled. The United States' position is different from those of Vietnam and the Philippines. Countries like Vietnam and the Philippines have been directly involved in disputes with regard to sovereignty claims across the waters in the South China sea. As for the United States, being a third party in the disputes, it still cannot be a by-stander watching the whole waters in the region fall under the influence of China. Accordingly, the United States maintains that all countries bear the rights of innocent passage and military operations in the Exclusive Economic Zones(EEZ) as stipulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS). In contrast, China claims that, historically, the South China sea has been part of China's territorial waters, and that foreign countries are not allowed to conduct military operations within the waters. It strongly accuses that such military operations are illegal. Against this background, this paper tracks the different positions of the United States and China on the issues regarding the South China sea. It also carefully looks at the possibility that, in the process of dealing with the issues, the two countries may get into an armed conflict as the phrase 'Thucydides Trap' predicts.

• 해양안보
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• 제3권1호
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• pp.1-44
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• 2021

중국의 새로운 해양정책법(Maritime Policy Law: MPL)은 중국해안경비대 등의 중국 해양경찰 기관들의 임무를 규제하고, 중국의 주권, 안보, 권리, 이해관계를 보호한다고 주장한다. [하지만] 중국이 본토 주위 및 남중국해에서 넓은 해역에 대한 권리를 주장하고 있다는 점에서, MPL은 훨씬 광범위하게 적용될 수 있다. 중국이 제기하는 대부분의 해양 주장이 국제법에 부합하지 않는다는 점을 고려하면, 이렇게 해양법 집행 관할권을 광범위하게 적용하는 것은 문제의 소지가 많다. MPL이 분쟁해역 또는 공해에서 외국선적 선박에 대한 관할권을 주장한다면, 이는 국제법 위반이다. 무력 사용에 관한 MPL의 많은 규정 역시, 해양법 집행 관할권의 사용에 관한 국제 규칙 및 기준을 위반한 것이며, 모든 국가의 영토 온전성이나 정치적 독립성에 반하는 위협이나 무력사용을 금하는 유엔헌장에도 위배된다. 중국은 MPL을 남중국해와 동중국해에서 불법적인 영토 및 해양 주장을 제기하기 위한 구실로 사용할 수 있으며, 다른 연안국의 배타적경제수역 내 자원 권리 행사를 방해하기 위한 구실로도 사용할 수 있다.

• The Korean Journal of Ecology
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• 제24권4호
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• pp.245-251
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• 2001

Dokdo is a volcanic island, and its formative geological age took place at the end of the Pliocene Epoch. Dokdo is located at 131。 52′33" East longitude, and 37$^{\circ}$ 14′18" North latitude, and is consituted of 87 islands. The total area of Dokdo is 0.186 $\textrm{km}^2$ and the length of its coastline is 4 km. Ookdo is a treasury of fish resources where many varieties of fish including squid and Alaska pollack live in abundance of greatest importance. Dokdo is a forward fishery base. Ullung island is located at 37$^{\circ}$ 27′~37$^{\circ}$ 33′North latitude and 130$^{\circ}$ 47′~130$^{\circ}$ 56′East longitude. The area of Ullung is 72.92 $\textrm{km}^2$ and the length of its seashore is 44.21 $\textrm{km}^2$. The total marine product of Ullungdo(1995) is 9,066 tons (M/T). The largest is squid, 8,900 tons. For the sea area of the depths near the Ullungdo, coast, that of 50m or less is 2,477 ha, and that of 50- 100m is 1,471ha. This fact tells us that there is no extensive area of a very shallow sea, and that it is directly connected to the deep sea. Ullungdo is a treasury of marine bioresources with rich and varied fishes including squid and Alaska Pollack and many others. Presently there is a sovereignty dispute over Dokdo between Korea and Japan. Since A.D.512, Dokdo has been a part of territory of Korea. Dokdo is a part of Kyungsang-Bukdo, Ullung-gun, Ullung-up, Do-dong in the Korean administrative district division system. Japan strenuously claims sovereignty for significant economic reasons, including fishery rights, and has adhered to a contradictory position that "Dokdo is Japanese land" since Japan incorporated Dokdo into Japanese territory in 1905.ritory in 1905.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.148-177
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• 2014

The regional security and stability in Northeast Asia has become more complicated because of a sudden establishment of China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on 23 November 2013. One dimensional conflicts on the territorial sovereignty over the islands between the regional States has developed into the two dimensional conflicts like maritime delimitations among the States concerned since they have all ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which adopts the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone regime. Moreover, due to the notion of the outer limit of the continental shelf, the conflicts have developed into three dimensional ones in order to acquire more natural resources even in the seabed. To make matters worse, such three dimensional conflicts have expanded to the airspace as well. The paper will analyze what implications the sudden declaration of China's ADIZ have for the regional security in Northeast Asia from the perspectives of public international law. To this end, the paper 1) starts with the debates on the legal nature of the ADIZ, 2) identifies the Chinese government's political motives for the establishment of the ADIZ over the East China Sea, 3) assesses the responses of the regional States and the USA to the China's establishment of the ADIZ, and then 4) discuss what implications the overlapped ADIZ of the three key States in the region have for the regional security and stability.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• 제35권4호
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• pp.313-322
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• 2013

The concept of effective control is a crucial element for the acquisition as well as maintenance of territorial title. The general meaning of the concept has been described as 'an intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the exercise of jurisdiction and State functions, on a continuous and peaceful basis'. The concept has been developed through some significant international cases such as the Island of Palmas case (1928), Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (1933), Minquiers and Ecrehos case (1953), Burkina Faso/Mali case (1986) and Nicaragua/Colombia case (2012). In relation to Dokdo, the concept has an important bearing in regard to Korea's claims of territorial sovereignty over the island. This paper reviews the definition, components and ramifications of the effective control with regard to the acquisition and maintenance of territorial title through analyzing the relevant judgements of international courts and tribunals. Furthermore, it exams the legal ramifications of the current effective control on Dokdo and makes some suggestions for the strengthening of Korea's position on the island.

• 통상정보연구
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• 제14권4호
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• pp.409-431
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• 2012

본 연구는 미국과의 FTA에서 이의 비준과 관련하여 찬반 양쪽으로 첨예한 의견이 대립되는 ISDS에 관한 연구를 통하여 우리나라가 취할 수 있는 입장에 대하여 분석하였다. 이를 위하여 특별히 ICSID에 서명은 하였으나 인준을 하지 않은 국가 중, 캐나다와 호주의 사례를 중심으로 분석하였다. NAFTA에 의하여 미국과 멕시코를 포함하는 자유무역협정을 체결하고 있음에도 ICSID 협정을 인준하지 않고 있으며, 호주 또한 ICSID 협정을 거부하고 있다. 이러한 두 국가가 ICSID를 거부하고 있는 사유를 우리나라 역시 ICSID를 거부하여야 하는 문제점으로 제시하고 있는 실정임으로 양국의 입장을 분석하고 우리나라의 실정에 적용해 봄은 학술적으로 의미가 있다고 할 수 있을 것이다. 이에 본 연구는 캐나다와 호주의 ICSID 비인준 입장을 분석하고 이와 ICSID를 바탕으로 한미 FTA에서의 ISDS 문제를 논의하며, 국가간 분쟁과 ISDS의 의미를 재고하여 결론을 제시하도록 한다.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• 제17권1호
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• pp.112-129
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• 2018

Produced by Chinese local television stations, Maritime Silk Road is a documentary which adopts ancient Maritime Silk Road as a historical nostalgia to interpret "the Belt and Road Initiative", a contemporary Chinese economic, political, and cultural strategy put forward by Chinese government mainly aiming at the countries of Southeast Asia. The main body of this article has three parts and the first part analyses how the documentary adopts computer-generated imagery (CGI) to create a historical nostalgia about ancient Maritime Silk Road in the period of Imperial China. At the same time, this part also presents a sense of diasporic nostalgia of the overseas Chinese. This historical and diasporic nostalgia is related to Chinese President Xi Jinping's political discourse: "Chinese dream" that propagandises to build a strong China put forward by Xi in 2013. The second part analyses how this historical and diasporic nostalgia legitimates Xi's "Chinese dream" and how it responds to recent territorial dispute when China continuously claims its territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. In this light, the documentary repeatedly mentions two political rhetoric: "coexistence" (gongcun) and "mutual benefit"(huli gongying) as a practical strategy to deal with the dispute between China and some countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the third section, the concept of "community of common destiny" (mingyun gongtongti) is adopted by the documentary to depict a convenient and effective organization of China and ASEAN, which is framed as an ultimate goal that Chinese government is depicted as the potential leader of this nostalgic community. At the same time, by providing different and even opposite viewpoints, this article discusses three controversial political rhetoric to present how historical and diasporic nostalgia is politicalized and served for Chinese diplomacy and national interest. Overall, this article argues that the documentary creates a glorious ancient Maritime Silk Road, as a sense of nostalgia, to expand China's economic and political influence, to respond to the controversial issues, and to reassert China's leadership as the centre of Asia.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제13권2호
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• pp.133-141
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• 2013

1952년1월 18일 이승만 대통령의 인접해양의 주권선언이후(평화선언) 일본은 독도에 관한 대한민국의 영유권을 인정하지 않고 이를 한 일간의 영유권에 관한 법적분쟁으로 보고 국제사법재판소에 부탁하여 해결하자고 1954년부터 틈틈이 주장하고 있다. 국제사법재판소는 한 일간의 독도의 영유권 귀속문제에 대해 당연한 관할권을 갖는 것이 아니며 또 대한민국정부는 독도문제해결을 위해 국제사법재판소에 제소하자고 하는 일본의 제의에 합의할 필요가 없다. 특히 대한민국정부는 독도영유권 문제에 대해 일본과의 사전 합의한바 없어 국제사법재판소의 관할권은 인정되지 않는다. 그러나 일본이 일방적으로 국제사법재판소에 제소할 경우 대한민국은 명시적 및 묵시적 동의 등의 국제사법재판소에 확대관할권을 부여하는 결과가 없도록 유념해야 할 것이다. 독도영유권 분쟁의 해결방법으로서 가장 훌륭한 방안은 대한 민국의 주권을 실력으로 행사하면서 독도에 대해 실효적 지배를 보다 강화해 나가는 것이다.