• Iberoamérica
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.57-80
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• 2012

This year(2012) marks the 30th anniversary of the Malvinas (Falkland) war. A series of talks between the British and Argentina took place over 30 years until 1982, but failed to reach a conclusion on sovereignty. Argentina claims that sovereignty of the islands was transferred to Argentina from Spain upon independence, a principle known as uti possidetis juris. But UK claims that the principle of uti possidetis juris is not accepted as a general principal of international law, and UN General Assembly resolutions calling for negotiations are flawed because they make no reference to the islanders' right to choose their own future. In this situation, a huge amount of petroleum and natural gas has discovered near the Malvinas islands. To explore such situation, this article looks into history and present condition on dispute of Malvinas sovereignty, and also analyses de-colonialism and resource nationalism related to dispute of Malvinas sovereignty.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.103-141
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• 2018

As the South China Sea maritime dispute illustrates, when considering the place where maritime claims occur, states do not have many choices to respond to maritime claims in which disputed areas are located far away from the land and are surrounded by the sea. As Mearsheimer (2014) points out, the sea stops power projection. Therefore, in order to adopt coercive as well as peaceful settlement policies to deal with maritime claims, states need to overcome obstacles (the sea) to project power. It means that if states want to conduct a specific foreign policy action, such as negotiating maritime borderlines or arguing sovereignty on islands, they need a tool (naval power) to coerce or to persuade the opponent. However, there are lack of research that studies maritime claims from the perspective of naval power. This research project fills this gap based on naval power. How do relative levels of naval power and (dis) parities of naval power influence the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims? Naval power is a constitutive element during maritime claims. If disputants over maritime claims have required naval power to project their capability, it means that they have the capability to apply various ways, such as aggressive options including MIDs, to accomplish their goals. So, I argue that when two claimants have enough naval power to project their capabilities, the likelihood of MIDs over maritime claims increases. Given that one or both states have a certain level of naval power, how does relative naval power between two claimants influence the management of maritime claims? Based on the power transition theory, I argue that when the disparities of relative naval power between claimants becomes distinctive, militarized conflicts surrounding maritime territory are less probable. Based on the ICOW project which codes maritime claims from 1900 to 2001, the empirical results of the Poisson models show if both claimants have projectable naval power, the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims increases. In addition, the result shows that when disputants maintain similar relative naval powers, they are more likely to initiate MIDs over maritime claims. To put it differently, if naval capabilities' gap between two claimants becomes larger, the probability of the occurrence of MIDs decreases.

• Strategy21
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• s.38
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• pp.287-320
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• 2015

On October 27, 2015, USS Lassen(DDG82), a 9,200 ton class Aegis destroyer of the United States Navy, began its operations within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, one of the seven artificial islands that China has built and claimed sovereignty over. The maneuver was joined by anti-submarine patrol airplanes such as P-8A and P-3. The White House press secretary mentioned that the President of the United States approved the operation. In response, China announced that it warned the US Navy ship about the 'illegal violation' by sending two destroyers(PLAN Lanzhou and Taizhou). This event represents a close call case where tension between the United States and China in the South China Sea might have been elevated to a conflict between the two navies. Moreover, considering that this happened only one month after Chinese president Xi's state visit to the United States, the event shows that the positions of the two countries have become starkly different to the extent that they are so hard to be reconciled. The United States' position is different from those of Vietnam and the Philippines. Countries like Vietnam and the Philippines have been directly involved in disputes with regard to sovereignty claims across the waters in the South China sea. As for the United States, being a third party in the disputes, it still cannot be a by-stander watching the whole waters in the region fall under the influence of China. Accordingly, the United States maintains that all countries bear the rights of innocent passage and military operations in the Exclusive Economic Zones(EEZ) as stipulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS). In contrast, China claims that, historically, the South China sea has been part of China's territorial waters, and that foreign countries are not allowed to conduct military operations within the waters. It strongly accuses that such military operations are illegal. Against this background, this paper tracks the different positions of the United States and China on the issues regarding the South China sea. It also carefully looks at the possibility that, in the process of dealing with the issues, the two countries may get into an armed conflict as the phrase 'Thucydides Trap' predicts.

• Maritime Security
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.1-44
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• 2021

China's new Maritime Policy Law (MPL) purports to regulate the duties of China's maritime police agencies, including the China Coast Guard, and safeguard China's sovereignty, security, and rights and interest. The MPL has potentially far-reaching application, as China claims extensive maritime areas off its mainland and in the South China Sea. This expansive application of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction is problematic given that most of China's maritime claims are inconsistent with international law. To the extent that the MPL purports to assert jurisdiction over foreign flagged vessels in disputed areas or on the high seas, it contravenes international law. Numerous provisions of the MPL regarding the use of force are also inconsistent with international rules and standards governing the use of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction, as well as the UN Charter's prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. China could use the MPL as a subterfuge to advance its illegal territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas and interfere with coastal State resource rights in their respective exclusive economic zone.

• The Korean Journal of Ecology
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.245-251
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• 2001

Dokdo is a volcanic island, and its formative geological age took place at the end of the Pliocene Epoch. Dokdo is located at 131。 52′33" East longitude, and 37$^{\circ}$ 14′18" North latitude, and is consituted of 87 islands. The total area of Dokdo is 0.186 $\textrm{km}^2$ and the length of its coastline is 4 km. Ookdo is a treasury of fish resources where many varieties of fish including squid and Alaska pollack live in abundance of greatest importance. Dokdo is a forward fishery base. Ullung island is located at 37$^{\circ}$ 27′~37$^{\circ}$ 33′North latitude and 130$^{\circ}$ 47′~130$^{\circ}$ 56′East longitude. The area of Ullung is 72.92 $\textrm{km}^2$ and the length of its seashore is 44.21 $\textrm{km}^2$. The total marine product of Ullungdo(1995) is 9,066 tons (M/T). The largest is squid, 8,900 tons. For the sea area of the depths near the Ullungdo, coast, that of 50m or less is 2,477 ha, and that of 50- 100m is 1,471ha. This fact tells us that there is no extensive area of a very shallow sea, and that it is directly connected to the deep sea. Ullungdo is a treasury of marine bioresources with rich and varied fishes including squid and Alaska Pollack and many others. Presently there is a sovereignty dispute over Dokdo between Korea and Japan. Since A.D.512, Dokdo has been a part of territory of Korea. Dokdo is a part of Kyungsang-Bukdo, Ullung-gun, Ullung-up, Do-dong in the Korean administrative district division system. Japan strenuously claims sovereignty for significant economic reasons, including fishery rights, and has adhered to a contradictory position that "Dokdo is Japanese land" since Japan incorporated Dokdo into Japanese territory in 1905.ritory in 1905.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.148-177
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• 2014

The regional security and stability in Northeast Asia has become more complicated because of a sudden establishment of China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on 23 November 2013. One dimensional conflicts on the territorial sovereignty over the islands between the regional States has developed into the two dimensional conflicts like maritime delimitations among the States concerned since they have all ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which adopts the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone regime. Moreover, due to the notion of the outer limit of the continental shelf, the conflicts have developed into three dimensional ones in order to acquire more natural resources even in the seabed. To make matters worse, such three dimensional conflicts have expanded to the airspace as well. The paper will analyze what implications the sudden declaration of China's ADIZ have for the regional security in Northeast Asia from the perspectives of public international law. To this end, the paper 1) starts with the debates on the legal nature of the ADIZ, 2) identifies the Chinese government's political motives for the establishment of the ADIZ over the East China Sea, 3) assesses the responses of the regional States and the USA to the China's establishment of the ADIZ, and then 4) discuss what implications the overlapped ADIZ of the three key States in the region have for the regional security and stability.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.313-322
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• 2013

The concept of effective control is a crucial element for the acquisition as well as maintenance of territorial title. The general meaning of the concept has been described as 'an intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the exercise of jurisdiction and State functions, on a continuous and peaceful basis'. The concept has been developed through some significant international cases such as the Island of Palmas case (1928), Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (1933), Minquiers and Ecrehos case (1953), Burkina Faso/Mali case (1986) and Nicaragua/Colombia case (2012). In relation to Dokdo, the concept has an important bearing in regard to Korea's claims of territorial sovereignty over the island. This paper reviews the definition, components and ramifications of the effective control with regard to the acquisition and maintenance of territorial title through analyzing the relevant judgements of international courts and tribunals. Furthermore, it exams the legal ramifications of the current effective control on Dokdo and makes some suggestions for the strengthening of Korea's position on the island.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.409-431
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• 2012

This article deals with the nature of ISDS along with the admissibility thereof, for the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. ICSID as an organization of World Bank Group, has been established in 1966 and as of May in 2011, 157 nations ratified its convention. As for the Republic of Korea(ROK) it has been involved in the problematic situation with regard to ISDS of the KORUS FTA in negotiation with the United States. The ruling Grand National Party is pushing the FTA for ratification including ISDS. However, the opposition party, the Unified Democratic Party rejected the ISDS with a view to a toxin infringing on its judiciary sovereignty. The ROK has invested in the US 3.5 times more than the US did in Korea up to now. As a result, it seems that the ROK is more concerned about ISDS than the US is, considering that exhausting local remedy through the US local courts, applying even a municipal ordinance in their decisions which will be unsatisfactory toward the ROK side. The ROK is now struggling with the ISDS as a political issue between the ruling party and the opposition party mostly based on sovereignty with a reference on AUSFTA which excluded the ISDS. Australian model about ISDS has been impacted by the experience from the NAFTA which allowes direct claims against each other(the US against Canada and Canada against the US). It seems not to be much sympathy for developed countries because it has long been held to standards for pressing on developing countries. Australia is also struggling with ISDS from the political point of view likewise the ROK. And the ISDS is destined to the political situations established within the domestic countries among the political parties in relation with the acceptance or rejection of thereof.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.112-129
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• 2018

Produced by Chinese local television stations, Maritime Silk Road is a documentary which adopts ancient Maritime Silk Road as a historical nostalgia to interpret "the Belt and Road Initiative", a contemporary Chinese economic, political, and cultural strategy put forward by Chinese government mainly aiming at the countries of Southeast Asia. The main body of this article has three parts and the first part analyses how the documentary adopts computer-generated imagery (CGI) to create a historical nostalgia about ancient Maritime Silk Road in the period of Imperial China. At the same time, this part also presents a sense of diasporic nostalgia of the overseas Chinese. This historical and diasporic nostalgia is related to Chinese President Xi Jinping's political discourse: "Chinese dream" that propagandises to build a strong China put forward by Xi in 2013. The second part analyses how this historical and diasporic nostalgia legitimates Xi's "Chinese dream" and how it responds to recent territorial dispute when China continuously claims its territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. In this light, the documentary repeatedly mentions two political rhetoric: "coexistence" (gongcun) and "mutual benefit"(huli gongying) as a practical strategy to deal with the dispute between China and some countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the third section, the concept of "community of common destiny" (mingyun gongtongti) is adopted by the documentary to depict a convenient and effective organization of China and ASEAN, which is framed as an ultimate goal that Chinese government is depicted as the potential leader of this nostalgic community. At the same time, by providing different and even opposite viewpoints, this article discusses three controversial political rhetoric to present how historical and diasporic nostalgia is politicalized and served for Chinese diplomacy and national interest. Overall, this article argues that the documentary creates a glorious ancient Maritime Silk Road, as a sense of nostalgia, to expand China's economic and political influence, to respond to the controversial issues, and to reassert China's leadership as the centre of Asia.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.133-141
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• 2013

After Presidential Declaration of Korea's Rights in the Surrounding Seas(Lee, Seung-Man Line), Japanese government objected to the Korean government's Declaration of the Peace Line. Japan didn't agree with Korean's ownership of Dokdo and has tried to develop the Dokdo issue into an international dispute and solved it by resorting the International Court of Justice(ICJ) since 1954. As mentioned before, ICJ doesn'thave the right of compulsory jurisdiction of ownership of Dokdo between Korea and Japan. Therefore, we don'thave to agree with Japan's suggestion of bringing a case to ICJ to solve the Dokdo issue. It is not the best way to maintain the international peace judging by ICJ as well. When Japan try to institute case unilaterally, We should remember that it is possible to give the expanding jurisdiction to the ICJ. It is the best way that solving the dispute of Dokdo is to establish the sovereignty over Dokdo while strengthen the control the Dokdo effectively. In conclusion, no matter how Japan claims ownership of Dokdo, it cannot be subject to negotiation.