According to the increasing attention to safety and security in maritime shipping, there are diverse security systems in international logistics activities. Although prior studies on maritime transport and port security reviewed security policy and practices in order to provide useful insights for strategic agenda, a few focused on attitude to respond it. Moreover, there are no prior study on a comparative study between continents. To tackle this, this paper compared confrontation attitude to maritime transport and port security between South Korea and European Union. Results identified that maritime shipping security incorporates container cargo security management, logistics security management, logistics security certificate system, and environmental impacts management caused by maritime shipping. Further, the comparison between two countries suggests that South Korea need to take more positive attitude to respond, such as investment in equipment and technologies for maritime shipping security, construction of comprehensive management system, political supports for logistics security, and training and education for safety and security. The results provide useful insights for strategic review of security systems in South Korea, and to help strategic agenda for future improvement.
South Korean national security strategy should be developed to effectively handle and counter increasing maritime threats and challenges. There are three major maritime threats South Korea faces today; maritime disputes on the EEZ boundary and Dokdo islet issues, North Korean threats, and international maritime security. Maritime disputes in the region are getting intensified and turned into a military confrontation after 2010. Now regional countries confront each other with military and police forces and use economic leverage to coerce the others. They are very eager to create advantageous de facto situations to legitimize their territorial claims. North Korean threat is also increasing in the sea as we witnessed in the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyoung shelling in 2010. North Korea resorts to local provocations and nuclear threats to coerce South Korea in which it may enjoy asymmetric advantages. The NLL area of the west sea would be a main hot spot that North Korea may continue to make a local provocation. Also, South Korean national economy is heavily dependent upon foreign trade and national strategic resources such as oil are all imported. Without an assurance on the safety of sea routes, these economic activities cannot be maintained and expanded. This paper argues that South Korea should make national maritime strategy and enhance the strength of naval forces. As a middle power, its national security strategy needs to consider all the threats and challenges not only from North Korea but also to maritime security. This is not a matter of choice but a mandate for national survival and prosperity. This paper discusses the importance of maritime security, changing characteristics of maritime threats and challenges, regional maritime disputes and its threat to South Korea's security, and South Korea's future security strategy and ways to enhance the role of naval forces. Our national maritime strategy needs to show middle and long term policy directions on how we will protect our maritime interests. Especially, it is important to build proper naval might to carry out all the roles and missions required to the military.
BACKGROUND/OBJECTIVES: North Korean refugees (NKRs) in South Korea are a unique population as they must adapt in a new country with similar cultural traits but different social, political, and economic systems, but little research has been conducted on diet and nutrition in this population. This study examined food security, dietary behaviors, and nutrient intakes among adult NKRs living in South Korea and compared them to those of South Koreans. SUBJECTS/METHODS: The subjects were 139 adult NKRs (25 men, 114 women) living in the Seoul metropolitan area, and 417 age- and sex- matched South Korean controls (SKCs; 75 men, 342 women) selected from the Korea National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (KNHANES). Food security and dietary behaviors (meal skipping, eating-out, meals with family, nutrition education and counseling, and nutrition label knowledge and utilization) were obtained using self-administered questionnaires. Nutrient intakes were assessed by 24-hr recall. The statistical analysis was performed using IBM SPSS ver. 23.0. RESULTS: In South Korea, food security had improved over the previous 12 months, but remained significantly poorer for NKR women than SKC women. Meal skipping was three times more frequent than for SKCs and eating-out was rare. Average energy intake was 1,509 kcal for NKR men and 1,344 kcal for NKR women, which was lower than those of SKCs (2,412 kcal and 1,789 kcal, respectively). Significantly more NKRs (men 24.0%, women 21.9%) showed simultaneously deficient intake in energy, calcium, iron, vitamin A, and riboflavin than SKCs (men 2.7% (P = 0.003), women 7.0% (P < 0.001)). NKR women had a significantly higher index of nutrient quality (INQ) for some nutrients than SK women. CONCLUSIONS: This study reports significant differences in food security, dietary behaviors, and nutrient intakes between NKRs and SKCs. Generally, NKRs reported lower intakes despite improved food security, but relatively good INQs across nutrients. Further research is needed to understand processes of food choice and consumption among NKRs to provide appropriate support aimed at improving diets.
I study on the security organization for the chief of state in North and South Korea. The paper, purporting to analyze security system in comparative prospectives, comprise four chapters. Chapter I Which sets out purpose, scope and method, is followed by Chapter II , dealing largely with the power structure on The Socialist Constitution of Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the protection organization and security activities for the chief of state in North Korea. Chapter III concerns the security environment - terrorist groups, firearms, explosives, suspects, movements of hostile countries and orthers - and the protection organization on The Presidential Security Service for the president in South Korea, culminating in projection of certain problem area. It is followed by concluding observation made in Chapter IV. To be operated security systems effectively, these need to be regulated according to a protective scale, function, authority of a existing.
From Cold War, Nuclear weapons have emerged military power into a very dangerous and important way of each national security. Throughout the era, the U.S. had stationed nuclear weapons in South Korea. But President George Bush initially started the withdrawal of nuclear tactical weapons deployed abroad in 1991. After that, under the protection of the nuclear umbrella, South Korea guarantees that the United States would operate its nuclear weapons to protect South Korea if it would be needed and the economy of South Korea has rapidly developed as more strong countries in the world. However, South Korea has seen and been realized the present state from the recent war between Russia and Ukraine. The protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of North Korea is unlikely to be permanently guaranteed. At the same time, South Korea should consider the security environment changes of surrounding nations such as China as military power acceleration and Russia as re-formation ambition. Because of these reasons, South Korea independently wants to protect itself and have the own nuclear weapons as a way to counter security threats. A majority of South Koreans also definitely believe that North Korea will not denuclearize or give up because North Korea has been having nuclear weapons as the final survival strategy of Kim Jong Un's regime. However, South Korea considers and makes new nuclear strategy through the role and effect of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to overcome the paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy. Therefore, this research is to suggest the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea from new security threats of surrounding nations through dispute between India and Pakistan. The focus of this research is that what is the role and paradox of nuclear deterrence strategy in dispute between India and Pakistan and how to find the effective nuclear deterrence strategy of South Korea.
"History is a mirror" means that we should be prepared for the threats of enemies through learning from repeating history. Currently South Korea is facing various provocations, including North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile s. For the protection of the life and property of its people, South Korea should regard North Korea as a main enemy and be fully prepared for the threats. The Korean War was a war between well-prepared North Korea and ill-prepa red South Korea. After Liberation, North Korean army incorporated the Chinese Communist army, placed battle equi pment with the support of the Soviet army, and finished corps-level training while South Korea at that time did not finish battalion-level training. In wartime and peacetime, an army should improve military security by concealing its own information and find its enemy's information. North Korea carefully prepared for the war, collecting information about the organization, deployment and operation of the South Korean army. South Korean army failed to cope with it and had hard times in its early battles. In this paper, I will emphasize the importance of military security, focusing on the Battle of Gaeseong, the early part of the Korean War.
This article refers to the Space security legislation in South Korea and Poland. Both states have already prepared some legislation on Security in Space- the question is the following- if there is still a need of progress and if those presented legislation are sufficient for the practical purposes of the peaceful uses of Outer Space. South Korea is a much more experienced state in using space than Poland; the same seems with the legislation. Poland as less experienced state in this matter has lots of ambitions to create the efficient legislation on Space security, so it must follow the good examples of states and institution in this matter. One of them is Korea. On the other state, Poland as a Member of EU must implement the European law in space security (in particular SSA), which seems to be priceless and efficient for the international cooperation in Space.
Private security industry in South Korea has rapidly been growing in recent years. However, such a rapid growth is being criticized for its focus on external results, which has produced a number of problems. The continued growth of private security industry can be only based upon substantive and qualitative development. In this aspect, it is necessary to consider the global trends of the private security industry, particularly the recent trends of the U. S. security industry which has led the global security industry. This is because the recent trends of the U. S. private security industry would guide the future direction of the private security industry in South Korea. The U. S. private security industry has been replacing the role of law enforcement agencies including the police, from crime prevention to investigation and disaster management, not to mention asset protection and loss prevention. The recent trends of the U. S. security industry appears to be summarized by such characteristics as variety, specialty, and integration, which might account for the structural problem of the private security industry in South Korea. In short, the substantive and qualitative development of the private security industry in South Korea should be accomplished by strengthening its specialty and integration, and also widening its variety.
BACKGROUND/OBJECTIVES: Food shortage situation in North Korea has gained much interest, however food insecurity caused by the food shortage in North Korean households has not been much investigated. This study examined food security experiences and food consumption pattern of displaced North Korean households currently living in South Korea. SUBJECTS/METHODS: Food security experience among 51 North Korean households living in South Korea was examined using the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) in three time points: immediately before childbirth, immediately before leaving North Korea, and immediately before entering South Korea. Meal/snack consumption frequencies and food diversity were also examined. RESULTS: Food security situation was the worst at the time of immediately before leaving North Korea with the average HFIAS score of 10.05. The households that were food insecure, they tended to be "severely" insecure. Although majority of the subjects reported having three or more meals a day, food diversity in their diet was very low with the average food diversity score of 2.17 immediately before childbirth and 1.74 immediately before leaving North Korea. Their diet appeared to heavily rely on grain and vegetable. CONCLUSIONS: This study is one of few that specifically examined food security of North Korean households with a pre-developed scale, and that demonstrated food security situation at different time points in quantified terms. Replicating this study with different groups of North Korean households for different time points would allow more complete understanding of impacts of food shortage. Food diversity score could provide a good way to examine changes of food consumption occurring to North Koreans in the process of adaptation. More attention to the changes occurring during adaption to South Korea should be given to understand the process and impact and to prepare public nutrition policy for the re-unified Korea.
Today, the police alone can not prevent a crime. And the police is limited to meet for people's the increased needs on public safety. So the police and the community needs the cooperation of a variety of resources. Police in cooperation with community resources to respond to the crime's most professional and the private sector is a private security. However, the role of private security for cooperation policing is insufficient in South Korea. So for this study to build a cooperative policing in South Korea as private security for the following four kinds of directions are presented. First, as a private security of the United States and Japan, specializes in diversified business sectors. Simple human-oriented private security of the building security get out. Instead, take the high-tech crime prevention or industry complex security should be changed to a professional organization. Second, the interaction between police and private security should be increased. Police and private security through regular meetings between the need for mutual interests and build consensus is needed. The role of private security companies to be represented on the Security Association of South Korea's active role in the matter. Third, efforts to improve the image of private security activities and the publiciy activity of private security is needed. Some of the private security in an effort to escape a negative image to the people and actively promote a positive image is necessary. Finally, for South Korea to the level the cooperation between the police and private security are required to develop system models. Front-line policing priority in the field and the mutual understanding between the police and private security in an effort to have a positive perception is needed. Equal partners, especially the police and private security to private security companies to have recognized experts in their own recruitment and training should be improved by strengthening the expertise.
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