• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.154-195
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• 2017

This paper is to analyse conflict between the US and China over the South China Sea and Korea's responses. To this end the paper is composed of 6 chapters titled instruction; the current status of South China Sea sovereignty disputes; changes in US and Chinese maritime security strategies and the strategic values of the South China Sea; key issues and future prospects for US-China conflicts in the South China Sea; South Korea's security and diplomatic responses; and conclusion. The recent East Asian maritime security issue has evolved into a global issue of supremacy between the US and China, beyond conflicts over territorial disputes and demarcation among the countries in the region. China is pursuing offensive ocean policy to expand economic growth. The core of the maritime order that the United States intends to pursue is the freedom of navigation in the oceans and the maintenance of maritime access. China is making artificial islands in the South China Sea, claiming the sovereignty of these islands, building strategic bases in East Asia, and securing routes. The United States has developed several "Freedom of Navigation Operations" to neutralize the declaration of the territorial sea surrounding Chinese artificial islands. We can not be free from marine conflicts in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Regarding the South China Sea dispute, it is expected that the strategic competition and conflict between the two countries will intensify due to China's failure to make concessions of core interests and adherence to the US compliance with international norms. In the midst of conflict over the South China Sea, we need a harmonious balance between our alliance security and economic diplomacy. We must continue our efforts to strengthen the ROK-US alliance but not to make China an enemy. Considering the significant impacts of the oceans on the survival and prosperity of the nation, we must continue to develop our interest in the oceans, appropriate investments and tactical strategies.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.131-143
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• 2016

On 12 July 2016, China's maritime claim to most of the South China Sea (SCS) based on the so-called nine-dash line was rejected by the Arbitral Tribunal, constituted under Annex VII to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concerning issues in the South China Sea including the legality of the so-called "nine-dashed line", the status of certain maritime features and their corresponding maritime entitlements, together with the lawfulness of certain actions by China which the Philppines, in a case brought in 2013, alleged were violations. As having the Tribunal determined that China's claim had no legal grounds in UNCLOS, thus undermining China's claims, and establishing that China has no exclusive legal rights to control the area roughly the size of India. There are some major implications from the Tribunal's ruling in the Arbitration award. These include implications on: how to delimit the maritime boundary in disputed waters, how to promote maritime confidence-building measures, how to safeguard maritime safety and security, and how to promote the rule of law in the SCS. Since its application of UNCLOS in East Asia, it has been obvious that the only way to resolve maritime disputes in the region is to build strong maritime cooperative partnerships under the auspices of the rule of law.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.273-310
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• 2020

This study aims at empirically analyzing the overall mechanism of the "Gray Zone Strategy", which has begun to be used as one of Chinese major maritime security strategies in maritime conflicts surrounding the South China Sea and East China Sea since early 2010, and comparing the resulting conflict patterns in those reg ions. To this end, I made the following two hypotheses about Chinese gray zone strategy. The hypotheses that I have argued in this study are the first, "The marine gray zone strategy used by China shows different structures of implementation in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, which are major conflict areas.", the second, "Therefore, the patterns of disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea also show a difference." In order to examine this, I will classify Chinese gray zone strategy mechanisms multi-dimensionally in large order, 1) conflict trends and frequency of strategy execution, 2) types and strengths of strategy, 3) actors of strategy execution, and 4) response methods of counterparts. So, I tried to collect data related to this based on quantitative modeling to test these. After that, about 10 years of data pertaining to this topic were processed, and a research model was designed with a new categorization and operational definition of gray zone strategies. Based on this, I was able to successfully test all the hypotheses by successfully comparing the comprehensive mechanisms of the gray zone strategy used by China and the conflict patterns between the South China Sea and the East China Sea. In the conclusion, the verified results were rementioned with emphasizing the need to overcome the security vulnerabilities in East Asia that could be caused by China's marine gray zone strategy. This study, which has never been attempted so far, is of great significance in that it clarified the intrinsic structure in which China's gray zone strategy was implemented using empirical case studies, and the correlation between this and maritime conflict patterns was investigated.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.39 no.2
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• pp.81-108
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• 2008

Since the declaration made by UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on EEZs, The open seas of Northeast Asia, considerd as a convention area, needed new agreements in conformity with the changes brought by the introduction of the Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) system. The Contracting Parties of these agreements set up their own EEZs, which extend certain ranges from their baselines, Fishing in the other party's EEZ is done based on mutual agreements, which take into account traditional fishing activity in the zones. Seperate fishries management systems, in accordance with the relevant legal status of the waters, are applied to individual overlapping areas: Middle Zone in the Bast Sea and the waters south of jeju Island, Interim Measure Zone in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea, and the Transitional Zone in the Yellow Sea. They decided to conclude fisheries agreements as the provisional agreement under Article 74(3) of the UN Convention before the delimitations of the EEZs to avoid the territorial disputes. China and Japan concluded the Fishries Agreement in the November 1997, allowing each coastal State 52 mile EEZ. it was followed by Korea and Japan in September 1998, reaching a final compromise. And also Korea and China came to a satisfactary settlement in November 1998. Fisheries agreements have been established between the three North-east Asian States, the agreement are all bilateral. That implies inefficient resource management on the overlapping waters of the three states, especially on the East China Sea. The Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement and the China-Japan Fishery Agreement worked as governing rules in the North-east Asian seas before the establishment of EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones). However the conclusion of the bilateral fishery agreements, Korea China and Japan have developed EEZs, and these three countries have competed for the exploitation of fisheries resources. Therefore, the issue of fisheries resource management was no longer a single countries' problem and emerged as a common issue facing these three countries. In recognition of the above-mentioned problem, it is needed for the construction of cooperative System fishery management in the North-east Asian seas. Therefore, cooperative measures should be establishied. The final goal of the construction of fisheries management cooperative system is to establish sustainable fisheries in the North-east Asian seas. However, there is a big difference in fisheries management tools, fishing gear, exploitation rate of species, etc. This implies that a careful approach should be taken in order to achieve the cooperative fisheries management among Korea, China and Japan. conclusionly, the Governments of Korea, China and Japan should complement three bilateral agreemens, and which they prepares to 'Fisheries Resource Restore Program' Between Korea, China and Japan in the adjacent waters south of Jeju Island.

• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.175-199
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• 2018

Recent marine territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have come to us as a great threat. China, which has recently established the China Coast Guard and has rapidly developed maritime security forces, is trying to overcome the various conflict countries with its power. Japan is also strengthening intensively its maritime security forces. Since Korea, China, and Japan are geographically neighboring and sharing maritime space in Northeast Asia, there is no conflict between maritime jurisdiction and territorial rights among the countries. The struggle for initiative in the ocean is fierce among the three coastal nations in Northeast Asia. therefore, Korea needs more thorough preparation and response to protect the marine sovereignty. As the superpowers of China and Japan are confronted and the United States is involved in the balance of power in strategic purposes, the East Asian sea area is a place where tension and conflict environment exist. China's illegal fishing boats are constantly invading our waters, and they even threaten the lives of our police officers. The issue of delimiting maritime boundaries between Korea and China has yet to be solved, and is underway in both countries, and there is a possibility that the exploration activities of the continental shelf resources may collide as the agreement on the continental shelf will expire between Korea and Japan. On the other hand, conflicts in the maritime jurisdictions of the three countries in Korea, China and Japan are leading to the enhancement of maritime security forces to secure deterrence rather than military confrontation. In the situation where the unresolved sovereignty and jurisdiction conflicts of Korea, China and Japan continue, and the competition for the strengthening of the maritime powers of China and Japan becomes fierce, there is a urgent need for stabilization and enhancement of the maritime forces in our country. It is necessary to establish a new long-term strategy for enhancing the maritime security force and to carry out it. It is expected that the Korean Coast Guard, which once said that it was a model for the establishment of China's Coast Guard as a powerful force for the enforcement of the maritime law, firmly establishes itself as a key force to protect our oceans with the Navy and keeps our maritime sovereignty firmly.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.52 no.1
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• pp.1-22
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• 2021

This study aims to face common threats from the depletion of fish resources, the decline of production and employment as well as the increase of life risk in East Sea Rim countries, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia due to the Chinese fishing fleets entering East Sea. The recent competition in fishing among fishing vessels and fleets of national origin operating in the East Sea has induced a significant change in the ecological landscape of the fishing fleets cluster while having influenced production and employment in the fishing industries of South Korea and Japan as well as life threat on the fishermen in North Korea. It seems that the population organizational ecological theory can be applied to this change. It can be seen as the isomorphism of the selection process over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to avoid the environment in which these North Korean fishing vessels are pushed against the Chinese fleet in the North Korean part of the East Sea. To resolve the fishery disputes or conflict in the common waters in East Sea, first of all, Chinese fishing fleets will be required to put international pressure so as to solve the unfairness of the illegal fishing and overfishing by the International Fishery Organization or the UN violations of the sanctions against North Korea selling fishing rights to China. Although it is not easy for South Korea to cooperate with North Korea in the short term, South Korea will be able to support the fishery infrastructure in North Korea in the mid- to the long-term to prevent the loss of innocent lives for their fishermen and to raise their incomes.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.28-53
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• 2018

The U.S. has recently developed Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and Distributed Lethality strategy based on a common perception that they are responding to China's threats. In the future, it is anticipated the following. Strengthen cooperation of the U.S.-India-Vietnam navy, Maximizing the combined combat power between the U.S. and regional navies, Improving its ability to restore damage control, Economic cooperation between the Pacific and Indian countries. The meanings given to the Korean navy are as follows. First, South Korea should pursue cooperation with the Indian Navy, which will grow into a regional balance on China's growth. The growth of the Indian navy is expected to increase cooperation with other Pacific countries. The government should seek ways to promote cooperation with india navy in various fields. Secondly, it is a joint drill between the U.S. Navy and the Korean Navy. Recently, the Korea-U.S. joint drill has not been conducted and many changes are expected to be made regarding the implementation of the joint drill in the future. Therefore, it is necessary to respond to possible changes in the naval relationship between Korea navy and the U.S. navy Also, due to distributed lethality strategy, preparations for operations and training with U.S.navy will be necessary. Lastly, it should contribute to cooperation among regional countries in preparation for maritime territorial disputes. The growth of the Chinese navy and the territorial disputes in the East and South China sea has raised the possibility of accidental military clashes at sea. Therefore, the government should make efforts to create multilateral security cooperation systems that can continue to promote the prevention of armed conflict.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.1-23
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• 1999

In the Northeast Asian region fisheries agreements of the past regarding high seas as an agreement area were transformed or new agreements were introduced in order to conform to the EEZ regime. However, the existing joint regulatory zone which “open” status is somewhat similar to the high sea not only disappear, but also two new systems were established. To begin with, parties of the agreement claimed their EEZs to be from the territorial sea baselines to the extent set forth, problem of the fishery access of the other party under the agreement is to be solved on the principle of reciprocity and on recognizing of the catch results achieved in the past. In regards to the overlapping zones like neutral zone of the East Sea of Korea(Sea of Japan) and neutral zone to the south of the Cheju Island, provisional measures zones in the Yellow Sea and in the East China Sea, and transitional zone of the Yellow Sea special fisheries management systems reflecting the legal character of the zone involved are applied. Moreover, as fisheries agreements defining open sea as an agreement zone are not able to conform to the EEZ regime, so new fisheries agreements must be taken out from old systems and conceptions, and must be understood and enforced from the new point view. Therefore, countermeasures needed to do so should be developed, and their basic structure is as follows. Firstly, the basic concept of the EEZ regime requires that the coastal states have sovereign rights on their sea zones' natural resources and bear responsibilities appropriate to their allowed jurisdiction. Each Northeast Asian state should adjust the structure of fishing industries and employ advanced fisheries management system, and should make efforts toward such issues of the state policy as increasing fishery resources and preserving ocean environment. Secondly, measures should be developed to solve the international fisheries disputes which are to occur under enforcement of the new fisheries agreements system. In regards to the acts of violation the fisheries laws in the foreign EEZ the principle of jail sentence prohibition is established by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and every fisheries agreement reflects this principle. Therefore, the present question is to consider concrete measures to enable the easy release of the seamen, who violated fisheries laws slightly and well-intently, through establishment and management of the guarantee fund needed to make collateral reasonable. Thirdly, Korean-Russian and Russian-Japanese fisheries relations were formed on the basis of the EEZ regime, since 1992 and 1977 respectively, and are expected to maintain mutually beneficial cooperative character. As for Korean-Chinese-Japanese fisheries relations, the operational problems of overlapping zones, and problem of the permits for EEZ mutual access should be solved on the basis of the principle of reciprocity and equity rather than unilaterally from any side.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.