• Journal of KIISE:Computer Systems and Theory
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• v.34 no.10
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• pp.502-510
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• 2007

Private Matching is a problem of computing the intersection of private datasets of two parties. One could envision the usage of private matching for Insurance fraud detection system, Do-not-fly list, medical databases, and many other applications. In 2004, Freedman et at. [1] introduced a probabilistic solution for this problem, and they extended it to malicious adversary model and multi-party computation. In this paper, we propose a new deterministic protocol for private matching with perfect correctness. We apply this technique to adversary models, achieving more reliable and higher speed computation.

• Proceedings of the Korean Information Science Society Conference
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• 2006.10a
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• pp.484-489
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• 2006

Private Matching은 각기 다른 두 참여자 (two-party)가 가진 데이터의 교집합 (intersection)을 구하는 문제이다. Private matching은 보험사기 방지시스템 (insurance fraud detection system), 의료정보 검색, 항공기 탐승 금지자 목록 (Do-not-fly list) 검색 등에 이용될 수 있으며 다자간의 계산 (multiparty computation)으로 확장하면 전자투표, 온라인 게임 등에도 이용될 수 있다. 2004년 Freedman 등은 이 문제를 확률적 (probabilistic)으로 해결하는 프로토콜 (protocol) [1]을 제안하고 악의적인 공격자 (malicious adversary) 모델과 다자간 계산으로 확장하였다. 이 논문에서는 기존의 프로토콜을 결정적 (deterministic) 방법으로 개선하여 Semi-Honest 모델에서 결과의 정확성을 보장하는 한편, 이를 악의적인 공격자 모델에 확장하여 신뢰도와 연산속도를 향상시키는 새로운 프로토콜을 제안한다.

• Journal of KIISE:Computer Systems and Theory
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• v.37 no.6
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• pp.348-353
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• 2010

A threshold decryption scheme is a multi-party public key cryptosystem that allows any sufficiently large subset of participants to decrypt a ciphertext, but disallows the decryption otherwise. When performing a threshold decryption, a third party is often involved to guarantee fairness among the participants. To maintain the security of the protocol as high as possible, it is desirable to lower the level of trust and the amount of information given to the third party. In this paper, we present a threshold decryption scheme which allows the anonymity of the participants as well as the fairness by employing a semi-trusted third party (STTP) which follows the protocol properly with the exception that it keeps a record of all its intermediate computations. Our solution preserves the security and fairness of the previous scheme and reveals no information about the identities of the participants and the plaintext even though an attacker is allowed to access the storage of the STTP.