• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.66
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• pp.219-240
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• 2015

Developing countries have faced serious difficulties in implementing customs procedures. For example, they have experienced heavy administrative constraints such as lack of qualified personnel and non-computerization. Some importers in developing countries have tried to undervalue or overvalue the imported goods and misclassify them with the target of lowering the incidence of customs duties. In order to address these problems many of developing countries often require the exporter to get a Clean Report of Findings(CRF) issued by a preshipment inspection entity. This study tries to reply to the following questions with which the exporters are faced in the process of issuance of CRF. First, what are the provisions and regulations that the exporters have to note in the event a CRF is issued by the inspection entity? Second, how do the exporters safeguard their own rights in case of price verification? Third, how to protect the confidential business information to be submitted by the exporters in order to get a CRF? Fourth, how can the exporters respond to the improper conducts that the inspection entities have done?

• Journal of the Korean Society of Industry Convergence
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• v.25 no.5
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• pp.811-816
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• 2022

Even though continuous management and supervision of reinforcement of policies to safeguard accidents at workplace and work sites were implemented. Accident prevention activities such as inspection and diagnosis are urgently required to induce a preliminary investigation to identify the risk factors for each type of work, before the work task to eliminate risks at the worksites. Since safety inspections at work sites were generally conducted through visual inspections, the results of safety inspections may vary depending on the findings and proficiency of the safety officers. The results of those inspections may have loopholes to prevent potential accidents at work. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to develop a risk identification checklist that can effectively perform safety inspections to prevent accidents at work sites. This study initially analyzed the previously developed accident checklist to identify current complications and issues in safety checklists. Based on the findings of major industrial accidents over the past three years, the relationship between accident, workplace, and work type were analyzed refereeing the safety inspection standards. A risk recognition-checklist was developed to provide basic data on identifying risk factors, and inspection guidance at work sites. To prepare for potential accidents by identifying and taking countermeasures to mitigate the high risk and serious accidents at sites by the guidelines of the checklist. The developed inspection checklist has been practically used by experts at work sites to perform safety inspections, and it has been verified its suitability, and feasibility, to prevent or mitigate workplace accidents, including securing the safety and health of field workers. The role of the developed safety checklist has been considered effective at worksites.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.39 no.1
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• pp.54-60
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• 2014

IAEA has employed various types of radiation detectors - HPGe, NaI, CZT - for accountancy of nuclear material. Among them, HPGe has been mainly used in verification activities required for high accuracy. Due to its essential cooling component(a liquid-nitrogen cooling or a mechanical cooling system), it is large and heavy and needs long cooling time before use. New hand-held portable HPGe has been developed to address such problems. This paper deals with results of performance evaluation test of the new hand-held portable HPGe prototype which was used during IAEA's inspection activities. Radioactive spectra obtained with the new portable HPGe showed different characteristics depending on types and enrichments of nuclear materials inspected. Also, Gamma-rays from daughter radioisotopes in the decay series of $^{235}U$ and $^{238}U$ and characteristic x-rays from uranium were able to be remarkably separated from other peaks in the spectra. A relative error of enrichment measured by the new portable HPGe was in the range of 9 to 27%. The enrichment measurement results didn't meet partially requirement of IAEA because of a small size of a radiation sensing material. This problem might be solved through a further study. This paper discusses how to determine enrichment of nuclear material as well as how to apply the new hand-held portable HPGe to safeguard inspection. There have been few papers to deal with IAEA inspection activity in Korea to verify accountancy of nuclear material in national nuclear facilities. This paper would contribute to analyzing results of safeguards inspection. Also, it is expected that things discussed about further improvement of a radiation detector would make contribution to development of a radiation detector in the related field.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.38 no.4
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• pp.353-358
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• 2006

Alpha track analysis for the determination of the trace amount of alpha emitting nuclides in a very small particle was performed as an efficient and powerful technique during safeguard inspection. Metal particles with well-defined spherical shape, size and isotopic compositions as a reference material were used to correlate the number of tracks or track diameter with an isotopic composition eventually to identify the uranium enrichment in the environmental swipe samples. Slopes in the number of tracks versus the exposure time curve provide a simple insight into the uranium enrichment of an unknown particle. Low enriched uranium metal particles result in slopes still steeper than the depleted or natural uranium metal particles. In addition, a linear relationship between track diameter and particle size Is thought to be a useful first stage analytical tool as an efficient and convenient inspection guide. The significance of the simple linear model was also judged using the usual statistical tests.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.39 no.3
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• pp.127-133
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• 2014

North Korea's uranium enrichment facility is a matter of international concern. It is of particular alarming to South Korea with regard to the security and safety of the country. This situation requires continuous monitoring of the DPRK and emergency preparedness on the part of the ROK. To assess the detectability of an undeclared uranium enrichment plant in North Korea, uranium concentrations in the air at both a short and a long distance from the enrichment facility were estimated. $UF_6$ source terms were determined by using existing information on North Korean facility and data from the operation experience of enrichment plants from other countries. Using the calculated source terms, two atmospheric dispersion models (Gaussian Plume Model and HYSPLIT models) and meteorological data were used to estimate the uranium particle concentrations from the Yongbyon enrichment facility. A maximum uranium concentration and its location are dependent upon the meteorological conditions and the height of the UF6 release point. This study showed that the maximum uranium concentration around the enrichment facility was about $1.0{\times}10^{-7}g{\cdot}m^{-3}$. The location of the maximum concentration was within about 0.4 km of the facility. It has been assumed that the uranium sample of about a few micrograms (${\mu}g$) could be obtained; and that few micrograms of uranium can be easily measured with current measurement instruments. On the contrary, a uranium concentration at a distance of more than 100 kilometers from the enrichment facility was estimated to be about $1.0{\times}10^{-13}{\sim}1.0{\times}10^{-15}g{\cdot}m^{-3}$, which is less than back-ground level. Therefore, based on the results of our paper, an air sample taken within the vicinity of the Yongbyon enrichment facility could be used to determine as to whether or not North Korea is carrying out an undeclared nuclear program. However, the air samples taken at a longer distance of a few hundred kilometers would prove difficult in detecting a clandestine nuclear activities.