• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.55-69
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• 2009

It is often to apply revenue sharing models in rental industries which consist of a retailer and a wholesaler. This research analyzed the influences to profit of the supply chain if we adopt the revenue sharing model when the demand is uncertain and price sensitive. We found the conditions of the revenue sharing model to maximize the profit of the supply chain, and identified incentive compatible conditions for revenue sharing. It is proved that vertical integration guarantees maximization of profit for the supply chain. Also we found that it is possible to derive Incentive compatible schemes by controlling ranges of revenue sharing ratios.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.95-103
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• 2024

Purpose: Focusing on the complex supply chain operations beyond the simple dyadic relationship, this study evaluates the performance of the revenue sharing contract in three stage supply chain system. Research design, data, and methodology: The optimization model is developed to describe the supply chain system where one manufacturer, one wholesaler, and one retailer exist and pursue the maximum level of their own profits. In the numerical examples of the proposed supply chain model, two types of the revenue sharing contract, pairwise and spanning methods, are tested and their performances are compared with the traditional system. Results: The numerical analysis reveals that both types of the revenue sharing contract outperform the traditional system. All supply chain members can achieve the improved profits only when they determine the proper combination of revenue share ratios and price discount rates. Conclusions: This study finds out that both pairwise and spanning revenue sharing contracts can make the positive outcome that is acceptable to all members in three stage supply chain system. When the proper contract content is agreed among the supply chain members, the revenue sharing contract has the potential to be the practically feasible collaboration program for the multiple stage supply chain system.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.213-220
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• 2009

A revenue sharing contract is one of the mechanisms that coordinate decision makers in a decentralized supply chain toward the consensual goal. The transfer prices between different echelons in the supply chain influence the total supply chain profits. The study aims to explore various transfer pricing heuristics on the supply chain coordination in terms of the supply chain profits and their interactions with the revenue sharing rate. A model is proposed for formulating the collaborative production and distribution planning in a decentralized supply chain with the revenue sharing mechanism. Experiment results indicate that the transfer price and the revenue sharing rate affect significantly the coordination. Among the studied pricing heuristics, the variable-cost pricing method led to the best SC profits. Raising the revenue sharing rate reduced the SC profits no matter what heuristics were employed. Furthermore, the experiments provide us clues for finding the optimal transfer price for the supply chain.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.14 no.9
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• pp.21-30
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• 2023

Purpose: Focusing on the role of the special contract to collaborate the supply chain operations, this study investigates how the revenue sharing contract affects the performance of Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI). Research design, data, and methodology: The optimization model is formulated to represent two stage supply chain system where the supplier and retailer manage the operations to maximize their own profits. Three supply chain models including the traditional system, VMI, and VMI with revenue sharing contract are compared in the numerical examples. Results: According to the numerical analysis, the entire supply chain system has greater profit under VMI than the traditional system, while VMI alone sacrifices the supplier's profit. With the proper sets of revenue share ratio and wholesale price discount rate, VMI with revenue sharing contract results in the increased profit for both supplier and retailer compared with VMI alone as well as the traditional system. Conclusions: The numerical examples imply that VMI, when it is combined with the revenue sharing contract, can be the effective collaboration program that satisfies every supply chain member. To make VMI with revenue sharing contract to be fair to all supply chain members, they need to agree on the appropriate contract content.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.20 no.6
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• pp.125-135
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• 2022

Purpose: The revenue sharing contract has been used in various industries and it is expected to coordinate the individual companies' operations in a way to improve the whole supply chain performance. This study evaluates the performance of the revenue sharing contract to find out whether this contract achieves its original goal, the supply chain coordination. Research design, data, and methodology: The profit optimization models are developed to represent two stage supply chain system with a supplier and a buyer. By using the numerical examples of the proposed mathematical models, this study examines whether this supply chain contract coordinates the supply chain system. Results: The numerical examples show that the revenue sharing contract does not make the same supply chain profit as the centralized system does. With the proper combination of the wholesale price discount rate and revenue share ratio, both manufacturer and retailer can obtain increased profits from the revenue sharing contract. Conclusions: The outcomes of the numerical analysis imply that the revenue sharing certainly improves the supply chain performance but it does not fully coordinate the supply chain system. By controlling the wholesale price and revenue share ratio, every supply chain member can be beneficiaries of this supply chain contract.

• Proceedings of the Korea Technology Innovation Society Conference
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• 2000.05a
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• pp.483-492
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• 2000

In this paper, we explore the economic principle behind the revenue-sharing rule for interconnection charges. First, we assert that firms can collude by splitting tile revenues equally i.e., choosing the revenue-sharing ratio equal to l/2. Also, we characterize the optimal revenue-sharing ratio in a model of horizontal interconnection and discuss the relation between the optimal ratio and the optimal access price.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.37 no.1
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• pp.45-59
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• 2012

We analyze a transaction mechanism so-called the revenue sharing transaction model and its dynamics in a supply chain with two competing suppliers and a monopolistic retailer when the demand pattern is uncertain and the back-order is allowed in case. We assume that the products by the suppliers are substitutable each other with a certain degree even though their retail prices are different. It is proved that a supplier and the retailer in the supply chain have some room for enjoying the possibility of their increased profits comparing with the present ones by adopting the suggested revenue sharing scheme. Furthermore, such a transaction model is beneficial even to the customers by offering a lower retail price than before. On the contrary, we observe that another supplier which sticks to an existing transaction scheme is supposed to suffer some decrease in its profit as a result.

• Journal of Korean Society for Quality Management
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• v.46 no.4
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• pp.959-972
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• 2018

Purpose: This study developed a simulation model that incorporates the uncertainty of demand and yield to obtain optimized results for supply chain coordination within environmental constraints. The objective of this study is to examine whether yield management for perishable products can achieve the goal of supply chain coordination between a single buyer and a single supplier under a variety of environmental conditions. Methods: We investigated the efficiency of a revenue-sharing contract and a wholesale price contract by considering demand and yield uncertainty, profit maximizing ratio, and success ratio. The implications for environmental variation were derived through a comparative analysis between the wholesale price contract and the revenue-sharing contract. We performed Monte Carlo simulations to give us the results of an optimized supply chain within the environments defined by the experimental factors and parameters. Results: We found that a revised revenue-sharing contracting model was more efficient than the wholesale price contract model and allowed all members of the supply chain to achieve higher profits. First, as the demand variation (${\sigma}$) increased, the profit of the total supply chain increased. Second, as the revenue-sharing ratio (${\Phi}$) increased, the profits of the manufacturer gradually decreased, while the profits of the retailer gradually increased, and this change was linear. Third, as the quality of yield increased, the profits of suppliers appear to increased. At last, success rate was expressed as the profit increased in the revenue-sharing contract compared to the profit increase in the wholesale price contract. Conclusion: The managerial implications of the simulation findings are: (1) a strategic approach to demand and yield uncertainty helps in efficient resource utilization and improved supply chain performance, (2) a revenue-sharing contract amplifies the effect of yield uncertainty, and (3) revised revenue-sharing contracts fetch more profits for both buyers and suppliers in the supply chain.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.1-11
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• 2013

An interesting puzzle in business practices is that although many researchers emphasize the benefits of a revenue-sharing contract, a wholesale contract has remained to be the most common contractual form. By introducing the concept of unobservable efforts, we examine the contractual efficiency of a wholesale contract and a revenue-sharing contract. The multi-task agency model and experimental design approach are used to analyze the relationship between the contractual efficiency and parameters. A major finding of our study is that a wholesale contract coordinates unobservable efforts, while it fails to coordinate the order quantity decision. Because unobservable efforts have mixed effects on the contractual efficiency, the superiority of contract type depends on parameters. This finding implies that a wholesale contract can be a competitive contract, especially when unobservable efforts are heavily involved. Our conclusion is that the current popularity of a wholesale contract is manager's rational response to complex supply chain environments rather than irrational behaviors.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.224-233
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• 2013

In supply chain management, the supply contract can induce collaboration and coordination among the supply chain members in order to optimize supply chain performance. Numerous supply contracts have been examined; however, some difficulties related to the application of these contracts still occur. One of the solutions is to apply the composite supply contract which can assist in the supply chain coordination. This research examines the composite contract of the revenue sharing and quantity flexibility contracts in a two-stage supply chain, which comprises a retailer and a supplier. In this research, a mathematical model of the composite contract is developed; then, the applicability of the proposed composite contract is examined by investigating its capability in terms of supply chain coordination and profit allocation. In the numerical experiments, the composite revenue sharing-quantity flexibility contract showed that it is superior to both component contracts in terms of supply chain coordination and profit allocation among supply chain members.