• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.36
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• pp.3-26
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• 2007

This article attempts to describe and analyze discussions on the matter of ex tunc effect or a ex nunc effect of rescission under Korean law in comparison with those under the CISG). In addition, it tries to scrutinize the various rules on the right to damages as an effect of rescission in a comparative way. Furthermore, it compares the various rules of Korean law with the CISG as to the right to damages and evaluates them in light of the discipline of comparative law. It maintains that the liquidation theory in Korean law is more close to the CISG in that there is no ex tunc effect in rescission and in other aspects. It also argues that the construction of the effects of rescission in accordance with the liquidation theory is more plausible when one considers Korea is one of the contracting states of the CISG. In addition, the theoretical analysis and the comparative study with the CISG shows that the insistence of ex nunc effect and its interpretation on the scope of damages extends to damages for expectation interest. It is also submitted that the position under the CISG on the assumption of ex nnuc effect, is regretted in that the restitution in value of the goods in the event of impossibility of the physical restitution is not allowed in some cases which the damage claims can not be awarded for the seller due to the application of the CISG Art. 79.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.24
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• pp.25-49
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• 2004

English contract law has traditionally taken the view that it is not the duty of the parties to a contract to give information voluntarily to each other. In English law, one of the principal distinctions between insurance contract law and general contract law is the existence of the duty of disclosure in insurance law. This article is, therefore, designed to analyse the scope or extent of the duty of disclosure and the remedy for breach of the duty in English marine insurance law. The main purpose of this article is also to seek the alternative remedy for the breach. The results of analysis are as following : First, the scope of the duty of disclosure is closely related to the test of materiality and the concept of a hypothetical prudent insurer. The assured is required to disclose only material circumstances subject to MIA 1906, s. 18(1). The test of materiality, which had caused a great deal of debate in English courts over 30 years, was finally settled by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic and the House of Lords rejected the 'decisive influence' test and the 'increased risk' test, and the decision of the House of Lords is thought to accept the 'mere influence' test in subsequent case by the Court of Appeal. Secondly, an actual insurer is, in order to avoid contract, required to provide proof that he is induced to enter into the contract by reason of the non-disclosure of the assured. But this subjective test of actual inducement is somewhat meaningless in sense that English court takes the test of materiality as a starting point and assumes the presumption of inducement even in case of no clear proof on the inducement. Finally, MIA 1906, s. 18 provides expressly for the remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the duty of disclosure. This means rescission or retrospective avoidance of the entire contract, and the remedy is based upon a fairly crude 'all-or-nothing' approach. The remedy of rescission is too draconian from the point of view of the assured, because he can be deprived of all cover despite he is innocent perfectly. An inadvertent breach from an innocent mistake is as fatal as wilful concealment. What is, therefore, needed in English marine insurance law with respect to remedy for the breach is to introduce a more sophisticated or proportionate remedy ascertaining degrees of fault.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.175-185
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• 2013

The judgement which is subject of research has denied legal rescission of division of the inherited property by agreement based on (1) the fact that the division of inherited property terminated at the time of concluding mutual agreement in its nature while only the relationship of claim and obligation between the inheritor who has paid for such obligation and the inheritor who has acquired such obligation in the mutual agreement remains (2) and the fact that the legal stability is considerably hindered as the re-partition of inherited property having retroactive effect becomes unavoidable in case of approving the legal rescission of the division of the inherited property by agreement. But it is reasonable to also approve legal rescission on the division of the inherited property by agreement in case the division by agreement actually has the nature such as conditional donation between joint heirs (1) from the fact that the division of the inherited property by agreement gets the nature of disposal equivalent to exchange, transfer and abandonment of share between joint heirs in actuality, (2) and the fact that there are no other theories in approving the validity of mutually agreed rescission despite the fact that the re-partition of inherited property having retroactive effect is unavoidable even in case of the mutually agreed rescission of the division by agreement among all joint heirs. However, as the division of the inherited property by agreement is a contract that gets concluded only if all joint heirs participate, even the legal rescission for the reason of not fulfilling the obligations paid by one party of the heirs during the division by agreement must be considered as possible only by expression of intentions from all other joint heirs excluding this one party.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.14
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• pp.103-152
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• 2000

English contract law has traditionally taken the view that it is not the duty of the parties to a contract to give information voluntarily to each other. In English law, one of the principal distinctions between insurance contract law and general contract law is the existence of the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance law. The doctrine gives rise to a variety of duties, some of which apply before formation of the contract while others apply post-formation. This article is, therefore, designed to analyse the overall structure and problems of the doctrine of utmost good faith in English marine insurance law. The results of analysis are as following : First, the requirement of utmost good faith in marine insurance law arises from the fact that many of the relevant circumstances are within the exclusive knowledge of the assured and it is impossible for the insurer to obtain the facts to make a appropriate calculation of the risk that he is asked to assume without this information. Secondly, the duty of utmost good faith provided in MIA 1906, s. 17 has the nature as a bilateral or reciprocal, overriding and absolute duty. Thirdly, the Court of Appeal in Skandia held that breach of the pre-formation duty of utmost good faith did not sound in damages since the duty did not arise out of an implied contractual term and the breach did not constitute a tort. Instead, the Court of Appeal held that the duty was an extra-contractual duty imposed by law in the form of a contingent condition precedent to the enforceability of the contract. Fourthly, the scope of the duty of utmost good faith is closely related to the test of materiality and the assured is required to disclose only material circumstances subject to MIA 1906, s. 18(1) and 20(1). The test of materiality, which had caused a great deal of debate in English courts over 30 years, was finally settled by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic and the House of Lords rejected the 'decisive influence' test and the 'increased risk' test, and the decision of the House of Lords is thought to accept the 'mere influence' test in subsequent case by the Court of Appeal. Fifthly, the insurer is, in order to avoid contract, required to provide proof that he is induced to enter into the contract by reason of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation of the assured. Sixthly, the duty of utmost good faith is, in principle, terminated before contract is concluded, but it is undoubtful that the provision under MIA 1906, s. 17 is wide enough to include the post-formation duty. The post-formation duty is, however, based upon the terms of marine insurance contract, and the duty lies entirely outside s. 17. Finally, MIA 1906, s. 17 provides expressly for the remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the duty. This means rescission or retrospective avoidance of the entire contract, and the remedy is based upon a fairly crude 'all-or-nothing' approach. What is needed in English marine insurance law is to introduce a more sophiscated or proportionate remedy.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.26 no.7
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• pp.93-108
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• 2022

Purpose - This paper examines the admissibility of restitution as the legal consequence where a contract is frustrated under the Law of Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 in comparison with Korean Civil Code (KCC). In order to provide practical guidelines and advice regarding choice of and application of law for contracting parties in international trade, the paper comparatively evaluates requirements and the scope of restitution under the Act 1943 and KCC. Design/methodology - This paper executes a comparative study to analyze whether the parties may claim restitution of money paid or non-money benefit obtained before or after the time of discharge under English law and KCC. To achieve the purpose, it focuses on the identifying characteristics of each statute, thereby providing guidelines to overcome difficulties in legal application and interpretation as to restitution as the consequence of frustration. Findings - Under English law, the benefit may be restituted according to Art 1943 or the common law rule, mistake of fact or law. Under the KCC, restitution is considered based on the principle of the obligation to recover the original obtained regardless of the time when the benefit is conferred. Whilst Act 1943 does not require careful analysis of the grounds of restitution, requirements to justify restitution according to the principle of unjust enrichment, mistake of fact or law, and the KCC should be met. Meanwhile, the KCC may provide more opportunities to award restitution because it does not require the burden of proof related to the defendant's good faith, unlike the principle of unjust enrichment. Originality/value - Where the contract is frustrated by the effect of COVID-19, one legal issue is a consequence of frustration. Therefore, this paper analyzes requirements and the scope of restitution under English law as compared with the KCC in a timely manner. It provides contracting parties with practical guidelines and advice to reduce unpredictability when they choose the governing law in a contract.