• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.174-180
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• 2020

With the removal of underwater obstacles in the Busan New Port, the water depth of the pier has been secured up to 17m, and the port authority is constantly responding to the trend of container vessels becoming larger. Also, in 2020, 24,000TEU class container ships are entering to the port, and it is planned to secure the depth in the port to 23 m later in line with this trend. Mega container ships must check in advance the factors to be considered depending on the situation at the time, and for this, it is judged that information sharing among stakeholders is necessary. In this paper, to understand the effect of the corresponding route because of the mega container ships, a transit safety evaluation was conducted based on statistical data on ship entry and departure and maneuver characteristics of corresponding ships. The result showed that the transit of the mega container ships has increased up to 8.4% comparing to the risk of 4,000TEU class container ships. Additionally, safety measures such as minimum safety depth and tug operation plans were presented by gathering opinions on operational characteristics from the perspective of pilotage for safe transit in the Busan New Port area. Through this, it is considered that it will be possible to contribute to the prevention of accidents when entering and leaving the Busan New Port.

• Journal of the korean academy of Pediatric Dentistry
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.678-683
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• 2003

Preschool children in Iksan city, 3-5 years old, were examined for their prevalence of severe early childhood caries. The case definition was 1 or more cavitated, filled, or missing (due to caries) smooth surfaces in primary maxillary anterior teeth. Feeding behavior and oral hygiene behavior were investigated by a questionnaire. The prevalence was 20.8% for 36-47 months, 23.6% for 48-59 months, and 30.8% for 60-71 months. Going to sleep with bottle beyond 1 year (P<0.05), immediate removal of bottle after child fell on sleep (P<0.01), beginning time of toothbrushing (P<0.01) had significant relationship with the prevalence of severe early childhood caries. Toothbrushing frequency of primary care provider and use of oral cleaning aids by primary care provider had a tendency to be related with the prevalence(P<0.10).

• Land and Housing Review
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.1-11
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• 2017

The government has been constructing and supplying public rental housing to ordinary people in order to stabilize housing since 1989. However, the public rental houses initially supplied to ordinary people are at high risk for safety accidents due to the deterioration of the facilities. Therefore, this study is aimed to propose a solution to solve the life safety hazards of the old rental housing complex as a follow-up study of Analysis of Accident Patterns and Hazard Factor for Life Safety in Rental Housing Complex. Types of life safety accidents that occur in public rental housing complexes are sliding, falling, crash, falling objects, breakage, fire accidents, traffic accidents and criminal accidents. The types of safety accidents that occur in rental housing complexes analyzed in this study are sliding, crashes, falling objects, and fire accidents. Although the incidence of safety accidents such as falling, breakage, traffic accidents and crime accidents in public rental housing complexes is low, these types are likely to cause safety accidents. The method of this study utilized interviews and seminar results, and it suggested ways to solve the life safety hazards in rental housing complexes. Interviews were conducted with residents and managers of rental housing complexes. Seminars were conducted twice with experts in construction, maintenance, asset management, housing welfare and safety. Through interviews and seminars, this study categorizes the life safety hazards that occur in rental housing complexes by types of accidents and suggests ways to resolve them as follows. (1) sliding ; use of flooring materials with high friction coefficient, installation of safety devices such as safety handles, implementation of maintenance, safety inspections and safety education, etc. (2) falling ; supplementation of safety facilities, Improvement of the design method of the falling parts, Safety education, etc. (3) crash ; increase the effective width of the elevator door, increase the effective width of the lamp, improve the lamp type (U type ${\rightarrow}$ I type), etc. (4) falling objects and breakage ; design of furniture considering the usability of residents, replacement of old facilities, enhancement of safety consciousness of residents, safety education, etc. (5) fire accidents ; installation of fire safety equipment, improvement by emergency evacuation, safety inspection and safety education, etc. (6) traffic accidents ; securing parking spaces, installing safety facilities, conducting safety education, etc. (7) criminal accidents; improvement of CCTV pixels, installation of street lights, removal of blind spots in the complex, securing of security, etc. The roles of suppliers, administrators and users of public rental housing proposed in this study are summarized as follows. Suppliers of rental housing should take into consideration the risk factors that may arise not only in the design and construction but also in the maintenance phase and should consider the possibility of easily repairing old facilities considering the life cycle of rental housing. Next, Administrators of rental housing should consider the safety of the users of the rental housing, conduct safety checks from time to time, and immediately remove any hazardous elements within the apartment complex. Finally, the users of the rental housing needs to form a sense of ownership of all the facilities in the rental housing complex, and efforts should be made not to cause safety accidents caused by the user's carelessness. The results of this study can provide the necessary information to enable residents of rental housing complexes to live a safe and comfortable residential life. It is also expected that this information will be used to reduce the incidence of safety accidents in rental housing complexes.

• Journal of Korea Soil Environment Society
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.9-24
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• 1997

Surfactant-aided in situ soil flushing has been proposed as an alternative for the expensive and time consuming 'pump and treat' technology in remediation of contaminated soil and groundwater Injected surfactants can effectively solubilize contaminants sorbed to the soil matrix or nonaqueous phase liquids(NAPLs) in residual saturation. The contaminants solubilized in groundwater are recovered and treated further. The theoretical background of the technology and the results of the field operations, mostly in the US. were summarized. In addition, the factors crucial to the successful application of the technology were discussed. Cost analyses and technical limitations in current applications were also discussed. In conclusion, it is likely that in situ surfactant flushing become a viable option for soil remediation in limited cases. Currently, further advances with respect to operation cost and to treatment efficiency are required for more extensive application of the technology. However, the current trends in soil remediation, specially the growing emphasis on risk based corrective action and natural attenuation, will increase the competitiveness of the technology. For example, removal of easily washable contaminants by short term soil flushing followed by long term monitoring and natural attenuation can greatly reduce the operation cost and time.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Tuberculosis and Respiratory Diseases
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• v.47 no.3
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• pp.331-338
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• 1999

Background: Nearly 10% of cancer patients will develop a second primary cancer within ten years after surgical removal of the primary tumor. The detection of risk factors for developing multiple primary tumors would be important This study was conducted to evaluate the clinical characteristics and abnormal p53 expression of lung cancer associated with multiple primary cancer(MPC). Method: Clinical characteristics and abnormal p53 expression were compared between 20 cases of lung cancer(NSCLC ; 16 cases, SCLC ; 4 cases) associated with MPC and 26 cases of primary non-small cell lung cancer. Result: MPC associated with lung cancer was gastric cancer(8), lung cancer(2), esophageal cancer(2), colon cancer(2), laryngeal cancer(1), bladder cancer(1), small bowel cancer(l), adrenal cancer(1), hepatocellular carcinoma(1), and breast cancer (1) in order. The clinical stage of primary NSCLC was relatively advanced, but NSCLC associated with MPC was even distribution at each stage. The detected incidences of abnormal p53 expressions were 62.5% in NSCLC associated with MPC and 76.9% in primary NSCLC(p>0.05). Conclusion: There was no difference in abnormal p53 expression between non-small cell carcinoma associated with multiple primary cancer and primary non-small cell carcinoma.

• Radiation Oncology Journal
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.165-176
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• 2004

Purpose: Firstly, to analyze facto in terms of radiation treatment that might potentially cause subfrontal relapse in two patients who had been treated by craniospinal irradiation (CSI) for medulloblastoma, Secondly, to explore an effective salvage treatment for these relapses. Materials and Methods: Two patients who had high-risk disease (T3bMl, T3bM3) were treated with combined chemoradiotherapy CT-simulation based radiation-treatment planning (RTP) was peformed. One patient who experienced relapse at 16 months after CSI was treated with salvage surgery followed by a 30.6 Gy IMRT (intensity modulated radiotherapy). The other patient whose tumor relapsed at 12 months after CSI was treated by surgery alone for the recurrence. To investigate factors that might potentially cause subfrontal relapse, we evaluated thoroughly the charts and treatment planning process including portal films, and tried to find out a method to give help for placing blocks appropriately between subfrotal-cribrifrom plate region and both eyes. To salvage subfrontal relapse in a patient, re-irradiation was planned after subtotal tumor removal. We have decided to treat this patient with IMRT because of the proximity of critical normal tissues and large burden of re-irradiation. With seven beam directions, the prescribed mean dose to PTV was 30.6 Gy (1.8 Gy fraction) and the doses to the optic nerves and eyes were limited to 25 Gy and 10 Gy, respectively. Results: Review of radiotherapy Portals clearly indicated that the subfrontal-cribriform plate region was excluded from the therapy beam by eye blocks in both cases, resulting in cold spot within the target volume, When the whole brain was rendered in 3-D after organ drawing in each slice, it was easier to judge appropriateness of the blocks in port film. IMRT planning showed excellent dose distributions (Mean doses to PTV, right and left optic nerves, right and left eyes: 31.1 Gy, 14.7 Gy, 13.9 Gy, 6.9 Gy, and 5.5 Gy, respectively. Maximum dose to PTV: 36 Gy). The patient who received IMRT is still alive with no evidence of recurrence and any neurologic complications for 1 year. Conclusion: To prevent recurrence of medulloblastoma in subfrontal-cribriform plate region, we need to pay close attention to the placement of eye blocks during the treatment. Once subfrontal recurrence has happened, IMRT may be a good choice for re-irradiation as a salvage treatment to maximize the differences of dose distributions between the normal tissues and target volume.