This study investigates whether and how a firm's cost of equity capital is influenced by the extent of a firm's real earnings management (REM). Using a large sample of Hong Kong and Chinese firms over the 9-year period 2009-2017, we find that our implied cost of equity estimates are positively associated with both the extent of REM and the extent of accrual-based earnings management (AEM), but the positive association is stronger for REM than for AEM. We also provide evidence suggesting that the effect of AEM and REM on the cost of equity is more pronounced for Hong Kong firms than Chinese firms, and within Chinese firms, it is less pronounced for the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Collectively, our results suggest that while both REM and AEM exacerbate the quality of earnings used by outside investors, REM does so to a greater extent than AEM, and thus the market demands a higher risk premium for REM activities than for AEM activities and that this cost of capital-increase effect is more prominent in a developed market like Hong Kong and mitigated by state ownership in China because of investors' expectations for a lower level of detriments to firm fundamentals by REM due to government's protection in a less developed market like China.
This study investigates whether the positive relation between the real earnings management (REM) and audit fees reported by Choi et al. (2016) differs before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), and varies cross-sectionally depending on the existence of internal control problems. Using a large sample of U.S. firms, we find that the positive relation between REM and audit fees is stronger than the same relation between AEM and audit fees in the post-SOX period, whereas the opposite is true in the pre-SOX period. We also find that the positive relation between REM and audit fees is intensified for firms with material internal control weaknesses.
This study investigates whether earnings management behavior of chaebol firms differ from that of non-chaebol firms. The ownership structure of chaebol firms is characterized by the dominance of one largest shareholder and his family members who typically participate in the management of the firm directly or indirectly and influence most of the important management decision. This study adopts the random effect model and the hausman and talyor model, using a panel of 5092 firm-year over a period from 1991 to 2010 to control for potential heterogeneity and endogeneity that may cause sever bias. This study finds that there is no difference in accrual based earnings management level between chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms. However, chaebol firms appeared to engage less real earnings management that is known to negatively affect future earnings and share prices. The results are consistent when controlling for potential heterogeneity and endogeneity in the hausman and taylor model. The results may be of interest to various stakeholders, policy makers, standard setters and academic researchers.
The purpose of this study is to analyse whether the waste disposal volume level in the construction waste disposal industry makes a different effect on earnings management behaviour by size of the licensed storage capacity and by location of the waste disposal site. The empirical results of this study are as follows. First, the waste disposal volume significantly influences earnings management behavior. When it comes to the size of licensed storage capacity in the small-sized capacity firms, the smaller waste disposal volume firms make more aggressive earnings management by using discretionary accruals. On the other hand, in the large-sized capacity firms, more waste disposal volume firms report higher earnings by adjusting more discretionary accruals. Second, the effects of waste disposal volume on the earnings management show different pattern depending on the location of waste disposal site. When the firms are located in the non-capital regions, the smaller waste disposal volume firms report higher earnings by adjusting discretionary accruals as well as by using real activities earnings management. However, the firms located in the capital regions show more aggressive earnings management when they have higher waste disposal volume level.
This study considers the relation between firms' earnings management and credit rating. Unlike preceding papers only focusing earnings management by accrual(thereafter, AM), this paper examines the effect of accrual earnings management(AMs) and real earning management(thereafter, RM) on credit rating. RMs have more negative effects on firms' forward cash flow generation abilities and long term operating performances than AMs. So, RMs are more negative signals for credit analysts than AMs. But credit analysts have much difficulty in seeing through RM, because if credit analysts want to find out RMs, they have to understand firms' internal operating activities, cost structures, receivables collection practices, and review whether profit distortions are due to abnormal change of them. Sample of this study consists of 2,150firm-year data listed companies from 2002 to 2010. Empirical evidence shows that AMs and RMs are negatively related to credit rating. This result implies that credit analysts see through AMs and RMs in interpreting financial informations, that is to say, they discount credit rating in considering level of earnings management that consist of real activity and accrual earning management. This paper also finds that RMs are more negatively related to credit ratings than AMs. This result suggests that credit analysts don't take RMs into account in credit rating process as much as AMs.
The characteristics of intermediate-level waste treatment services are likely to have a negative effect because they act as a factor in promoting incentives of earnings management in the relationship between financial characteristics and earnings management in companies which are possible for earnings management. The researchers conducting this study attempted to empirically verify relationships between financial characteristics and earnings management against domestic construction waste disposal companies in consideration of the characteristics of intermediate-level waste disposal businesses, and the results are as follows. As construction waste disposal businesses grew larger, and the trade receivables collection period lengthened, the intention to increase profits via real activities strengthened. As the ability to generate cash via sales activities weakened, and the difference between the EBITDA margin and the operating margin was lower than the difference in industrial average ratio, discretionary accruals and earnings management via real activities were greater. In particular, there were differences in the variables of intermediate treatment business characteristics which reveal moderating effects by financial characteristics. This study is meaningful in that the scope of relationships between financial characteristics and earnings management in accounting is expanded to cover the construction waste disposal industry.
AL-ABSY, Mujeeb Saif Mohsen;ISMAIL, Ku Nor Izah Ku;CHANDREN, Sitraselvi;AL-DUBAI, Shehabaddin Abdullah A.
The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
/
v.7
no.8
/
pp.233-246
/
2020
This paper investigates the effect of the involvement of the board chairman in the audit committee (AC) on earnings management (EM). It examines Bursa Malaysia-listed companies with the lowest positive earnings for the years 2013 to 2015. The Modified Jones Model by Kasznik (1999) was used to determine discretionary accruals. An AC that includes its board chairman as an ordinary member is associated with greater discretionary accruals. However, a board chairman who is also the chairman of the AC does not seem to influence discretionary accruals. This paper supports the agency theory and policy-makers' efforts to prevent board chairmen from sitting on ACs. It is the first study that uses the agency theory to describe the association between the board chairman's involvement in the both AC and EM. This study alerts policy-makers, stakeholders and researchers to the influence of a board chairman serving on the AC in curbing EM. Furthermore, it provides empirical evidence that the majority of Malaysian companies whose board chairmen are involved in the AC appoint the chairman as an ordinary member of the AC. This indicates that executive directors may affect such actions. Hence, more policies are needed to improve AC independence.
KOSDAQ market reorganized their division system from two types to four types of division departments such as blue chip, venture, medium, and technology development departments in 2011. However, under the current new division system, financially unhealthy firms attempting to take advantage of the classifying opportunity of blue chip department are likely to engage in pernicious earnings management. The objective of this study is to investigate the earnings management behavior surrounding the time of KOSDAQ firms entering the blue chip department via new division system. More specifically, we test whether the firms classified blue chip department tend to engage in upward earnings management using accruals and real activities before and after they achieve blue chip status. In this study, we analyzed 111 firms classified blue chip department in 2011 according to new division system in KOSDAQ market. Major test results indicate that firms entering the blue chip department according to current KOSDAQ division system in general, tend to inflate reported earnings by means both of accruals and real activities right before the entering year. This result suggests that the firms classified blue chip department engage in opportunistic earnings management with a view to uplifting their market values. Our study is expected to provide clues useful for searching policy directions which intend to ameliorate adverse side effects of the current KOSDAQ division system. In sum, the regulatory authorities and enforcement bodies need to exercise caution in deliberating more stringent review procedures so that financially healthy and promising candidates are properly segregated from their poor and risky counterparts, thus enhancing the beneficial effects, while mitigating adverse side effects of the system.
Purpose: This study looks at the relevance between discretionary revenue and book-tax differences (hereafter BTDs). While the study of earnings management, which focused on discretionary accruals and real earnings management, has largely made, it has not yet been actively researched on discretionary revenues. Therefore, it was believed that discretionary revenue would expand the preceding study by looking at its relevance to BTD, known as financial reporting quality and measures of tax avoidance. In general, prior research suggested that earnings management make BTDs larger. Thus, the relationship between discretionary revenue and the amount of BTD is predicted positive. Research design, data and methodology: To this end, the method of discretionary revenues was used and BTDs measured in four ways. First, Earnings before income tax - estimated taxable income divided by total asset (BTD). Second is fractional rank variable of BTDs (FBTD). Third is Indicator variable equals 1 if the firm-year has a positive BTD, 0 otherwise (PBTD). Fourth is that Indicator variable equals 1 if the firm-year has a BTDs in top(bottom) quartile, 0 otherwise (LPBTD, LNBTD). 4,251 samples were analyzed in the Korean Security market (KOSPI) from 2003 to 2014. Results Empirical analysis shows that BTDs increases as discretionary revenue increases. These results were equally observed when BTDs was measured as a ranking variable or as a indicating variable. These results indicate that earnings management through the revenue of managers exacerbate the quality of financial reporting. Conclusions: In sum, discretionary revenues can be used as an indicator of making BTDs larger and meaningful as the first study of the Korean capital market where discretionary revenues affect accounting information quality. Investors need to increase interest in discretionary revenues because intervention in financial reporting through revenue accounts by managers can increase information asymmetry and agency costs. This means that studies on discretionary revenues that have been relatively small should be expanded. The results also provide important implications for the relevant authorities and investors. Despite these benefits, however, measurement error problems with estimates still appear as limited points, and prudent interpretations are required, and additional follow-up studies are needed in that variables that are not yet considered in this study may affect our findings.
We investigate whether the association between management overconfident tone and the level of audit effort measured by audit fees and hours differs depending on the level of earnings management. Prior studies suggest that firms led by overconfident managers are likely to initiate risky investments, report low quality financial statements, and have material weaknesses in internal control system. These characteristics, combined together, result in higher audit risk. At the same time, auditors assess audit risk based on the quality of financial reporting, measured by level of earnings management. As a result, the assess audit risk is likely to reflect the combined effect of management overconfidence and the level of earnings management. In this paper, we investigate whether auditors differentiate the effects of real earnings management (REM) and accrual-based earnings management (AEM) when they assess the audit risk related management overconfident. Using the CEO's letter published in 2018, we measure the CEO's tone representing the degree of overconfidence (i.e., activity). Based on this measure, we find that the positive association between managerial overconfident tone and audit effort is more pronounced as the level of REM is higher. However, we find that the baseline association does not vary depending on the level of AEM. These results suggest that auditors consider the managerial overconfident severer when such characteristic accompany the higher level of REM, which can be outcome of aggressive business decisions possibly leading to the higher audit risks. We further find that these results are stronger for Big 4 auditors and continuing auditors. This paper contributes to the literature and practice as follows. First, we provide contextual evidence on how auditors reflect managerial characteristics in the audit process by documenting that auditors actively increase their audit efforts only when overconfident managerial characteristics are highly likely to lead to audit risk. This result suggests that auditors conduct external auditing considering both the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process. Second, we suggest that auditors use information obtained from a wide range of sources to identify audit risks. Our results provide evidence of how the auditing standards, which do not provide detailed guidelines for audit risk assessment, are being applied in practice. Finally, our results also enhance the understanding of how audit fees are determined. Combined with the studies related to audit pricing, we provide the important reference for discussion between the auditor and the auditee about the audit fee that has created acute tension after the enforcement of the new External Audit Act.
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