• 대한수학회보
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• 제49권6호
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• pp.1251-1254
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• 2012

Pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) is one of the most important concepts in game theory. Tae-Hwan Yoon and O-Hun Kwon gave a "sufficient condition" for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in matrix games [5]. They also claimed that the condition was necessary for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in undominated matrix games. In this short note, we show that these claims are not true by giving two examples.

• 대한수학회보
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• 제37권2호
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• pp.377-385
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• 2000

In this paper we find a sufficient condition to guarantee the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in matrix games. In the process of formulating our condition, the alternative theorem of Farkas is used. The formulated condition is necessary and sufficient to the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in undominated matrix games.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제61권2호
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• pp.187-193
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• 2012

Nash Equilibrium (NE) is as useful tool for investigating a participant's strategic generation quantity in a competitive electricity market. Cournot model may give a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy when transmission constraints are considered. A mixed strategy is difficult to compute, complicated to understand conceptually, and hard to implement in an electricity market practically. This paper presents that a mixed strategy does not appear in Stackelberg leader-follower model even under a transmission congestion. A solution method is proposed for the leader-follower model under a nondifferentiable space of a strategy variable. Based on the pure strategy NE with a transmission line congested, the merit of leader-follower model is shown from a social welfare point of view.

• 아태비즈니스연구
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• 제12권2호
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• pp.61-79
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• 2021

Purpose - The purpose of this study was to analyze the impact of a company's competitive strategy on corporate performance in the highly competitive Chinese automotive industry. Design/methodology/approach - This study collected 14 survey data from automotive companies in China which be listed more than one year. We chosen the exploratory study with deriving research assignments, and the final research results are presented as propositions to proceed with the study. Findings - First, in the Chinese automobile industry, a company's competition strategy has a positive impact on corporate performance. and also the Differentiation strategy and the Low-cost strategy both have a positive impact on corporate performance. In addition, a company pursuing the Differentiation strategy that it would achieve better corporate performance than a company pursuing the Low-cost strategy. Second, it has been shown that the hybrid strategy rather than the pure strategy in the Chinese automobile industry can achieve higher corporate performance. Research implications or Originality - First, the type of competitive strategy in Chinese automotive industry were identified through the original strategies presented by Porter and Murray, and the impact of the Low-cost and the Differentiation strategies on corporate performance was analyzed. Second, contributing to the study of pure and hybrid strategies that are still under discussion now. Third, it also suggested practical implications that companies in China's automotive industry should pursue cost or differentiation advantages to secure competitive advantage.

• Journal of Applied and Pure Mathematics
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• 제4권5_6호
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• pp.287-297
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• 2022

In this paper, we consider a risk-minimization hedging problem for a special European contingent claims. The existence and uniqueness of strategy are given constructively. Firstly, a non-standard European contingent is demonstrated as stochastic payment streams. Then the existence of the risk minimization strategy and also the uniqueness are proved under two kinds market information by using Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe decomposition and constructing a 0-achieving strategy risk-minimizing strategies in full information. And further, we have proven risk-minimizing strategies exists and is unique under restrict information by constructing a weakly mean-selffinancing strategy.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권11호
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• pp.668-674
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• 2003

The electric marketplace is in the midst of major changes designed to promote competition. No longer vertically integrated with guaranteed customers and suppliers, electric generators and distributors will have to compete to sell and buy electricity. Unit commitment (UC) in such a competitive environment is not the same as the traditional one anymore. The objective of UC is not to minimize production cost as before but to find the solution that produces a maximum profit for a generation firm. This paper presents a hi-level formulation that decomposes the UC game into a generation-decision game (first level game) and a state(on/off)-decision game (second level game). Derivation that the first-level game has a pure Cournot Nash equilibrium(NE) helps to solve the second-level game. In case of having a mixed NE in the second-level game, this paper chooses a pure strategy having maximum probability in the mixed strategy in order to obviate the probabilistic on/off state which may be infeasible. Simulation results shows that proposed method gives the adequate UC solutions corresponding to a NE.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제12권2호
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• pp.135-154
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• 2010

이 연구는 교체비용이 존재하는 상황에서 복점기업간 경쟁을 다룬다. 분석에서는 일시적 가격할인 현상이 순수전략균형(Pure Strategy Equilibrium)의 결과일 수 있음을 보인다. 이는 기존 대다수 연구들에서 일시적 가격할인 현상을 혼합전략균형(Mixed Strategy Equilibrium)의 결과로 해석해왔던 것과 구별된다. 본 연구에서 구해진 일시적 가격할인의 순수전략균형 하에서 기업들은 정규가격만을 제공하는 경우보다 높은 이윤을 얻게 되며, 이러한 현상은 일시적 가격할인이 충성가입자와 비충성 가입자간 가격차별의 역할을 수행하는 것에 기인한다. 한편 본 연구에서는 기업들이 정규가격과 할인가격을 적절히 조정함으로써 충성가입자들의 수를 통제할 수 있음을 가정하고 있다. 이를 통해 기업들은 정규가격 수준을 일정 수준 이상으로 유지함으로써 충성가입자들의 수를 지나치게 늘리지 않으려는 유인이 있음을 보인다.

• 드라이브 ㆍ 컨트롤
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• 제17권4호
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• pp.80-86
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• 2020

Autonomous driving is one of the most important new technologies of our time; it has benefits in terms of safety, the environment, and economic issues. Path following algorithms, such as automated lane keeping systems (ALKSs), are key level 3 or higher functions of autonomous driving. Pure-Pursuit and Stanley controllers are widely used because of their good path tracking performance and simplicity. However, with the Pure-Pursuit controller, corner cutting behavior occurs on curved roads, and the Stanley controller has a risk of divergence depending on the response of the steering system. In this study, we use the advantages of each controller to propose a hybrid control strategy that can be stably applied to complex driving environments. The weight of each controller is determined from the global and local curvature indexes calculated from HD map information and the current driving speed. Our experimental results demonstrate the ability of the hybrid controller, which had a cross-track error of under 0.1 m in a virtual environment that simulates K-City, with complex driving environments such as urban areas, community roads, and high-speed driving roads.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제55권11호
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• pp.492-497
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• 2006

Nash Equilibrium (NE) is essential to investigate a participant's bidding strategy in a competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the NE due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The competition among multi-participants is modeled by a two-level hierarchical optimization problem. A mathematical programming approach is widely used in finding this equilibrium. However, there are difficulties to solving a mixed strategy NE. This paper presents two propositions to add heuristics to the mathematical programming method. The propositions are based on empirical studies on mixed strategies in numerous sample systems. Based on the propositions a new formulation is provided with a set of linear and nonlinear equations, and an algorithm is suggested for using the prepositions and the newly-formulated equations.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제59권7호
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• pp.1226-1231
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• 2010

This paper looks at the influence of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the market value(Social Welfare; SW) in the competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the Nash Equilibrium (NE) due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The aim of this paper are to compute a mixed strategy NE and analyze SW in power transaction with FTRs. This paper introduces a formula and a technique for solving NE of multi-player game with FTRs. In addition, it analyzes the influence of holding of FTRs by generation company on SW and it proposes the SW at NE is influenced by Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) where holder of FTRs are located. The assertion is verified by calculating the mixed strategy utilizing the Cournot model widely used for studies on FTRs.