• Bulletin of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.49 no.6
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• pp.1251-1254
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• 2012

Pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) is one of the most important concepts in game theory. Tae-Hwan Yoon and O-Hun Kwon gave a "sufficient condition" for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in matrix games [5]. They also claimed that the condition was necessary for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in undominated matrix games. In this short note, we show that these claims are not true by giving two examples.

• Bulletin of the Korean Mathematical Society
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.377-385
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• 2000

In this paper we find a sufficient condition to guarantee the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in matrix games. In the process of formulating our condition, the alternative theorem of Farkas is used. The formulated condition is necessary and sufficient to the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in undominated matrix games.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.61 no.2
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• pp.187-193
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• 2012

Nash Equilibrium (NE) is as useful tool for investigating a participant's strategic generation quantity in a competitive electricity market. Cournot model may give a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy when transmission constraints are considered. A mixed strategy is difficult to compute, complicated to understand conceptually, and hard to implement in an electricity market practically. This paper presents that a mixed strategy does not appear in Stackelberg leader-follower model even under a transmission congestion. A solution method is proposed for the leader-follower model under a nondifferentiable space of a strategy variable. Based on the pure strategy NE with a transmission line congested, the merit of leader-follower model is shown from a social welfare point of view.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.61-79
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• 2021

Purpose - The purpose of this study was to analyze the impact of a company's competitive strategy on corporate performance in the highly competitive Chinese automotive industry. Design/methodology/approach - This study collected 14 survey data from automotive companies in China which be listed more than one year. We chosen the exploratory study with deriving research assignments, and the final research results are presented as propositions to proceed with the study. Findings - First, in the Chinese automobile industry, a company's competition strategy has a positive impact on corporate performance. and also the Differentiation strategy and the Low-cost strategy both have a positive impact on corporate performance. In addition, a company pursuing the Differentiation strategy that it would achieve better corporate performance than a company pursuing the Low-cost strategy. Second, it has been shown that the hybrid strategy rather than the pure strategy in the Chinese automobile industry can achieve higher corporate performance. Research implications or Originality - First, the type of competitive strategy in Chinese automotive industry were identified through the original strategies presented by Porter and Murray, and the impact of the Low-cost and the Differentiation strategies on corporate performance was analyzed. Second, contributing to the study of pure and hybrid strategies that are still under discussion now. Third, it also suggested practical implications that companies in China's automotive industry should pursue cost or differentiation advantages to secure competitive advantage.

• Journal of Applied and Pure Mathematics
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• v.4 no.5_6
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• pp.287-297
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• 2022

In this paper, we consider a risk-minimization hedging problem for a special European contingent claims. The existence and uniqueness of strategy are given constructively. Firstly, a non-standard European contingent is demonstrated as stochastic payment streams. Then the existence of the risk minimization strategy and also the uniqueness are proved under two kinds market information by using Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe decomposition and constructing a 0-achieving strategy risk-minimizing strategies in full information. And further, we have proven risk-minimizing strategies exists and is unique under restrict information by constructing a weakly mean-selffinancing strategy.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.11
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• pp.668-674
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• 2003

The electric marketplace is in the midst of major changes designed to promote competition. No longer vertically integrated with guaranteed customers and suppliers, electric generators and distributors will have to compete to sell and buy electricity. Unit commitment (UC) in such a competitive environment is not the same as the traditional one anymore. The objective of UC is not to minimize production cost as before but to find the solution that produces a maximum profit for a generation firm. This paper presents a hi-level formulation that decomposes the UC game into a generation-decision game (first level game) and a state(on/off)-decision game (second level game). Derivation that the first-level game has a pure Cournot Nash equilibrium(NE) helps to solve the second-level game. In case of having a mixed NE in the second-level game, this paper chooses a pure strategy having maximum probability in the mixed strategy in order to obviate the probabilistic on/off state which may be infeasible. Simulation results shows that proposed method gives the adequate UC solutions corresponding to a NE.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.135-154
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• 2010

This paper considers a duopoly where switching costs exist. The analysis proves that temporal price reductions can be pure strategy equilibrium where firms earn more profit than in a regular price strategy. Greater profits result from price discrimination in temporal price reductions. The equilibrium is contrasted with previous studies, which explain temporal price reductions as a result of mixed strategy. In a given model with an assumption about forming switching cost, firms can control their range of loyal consumers by properly setting their regular and promotional prices. The model shows that temporal price reduction tends to raise the regular price and decrease the range of loyal consumers.

• Journal of Drive and Control
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.80-86
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• 2020

Autonomous driving is one of the most important new technologies of our time; it has benefits in terms of safety, the environment, and economic issues. Path following algorithms, such as automated lane keeping systems (ALKSs), are key level 3 or higher functions of autonomous driving. Pure-Pursuit and Stanley controllers are widely used because of their good path tracking performance and simplicity. However, with the Pure-Pursuit controller, corner cutting behavior occurs on curved roads, and the Stanley controller has a risk of divergence depending on the response of the steering system. In this study, we use the advantages of each controller to propose a hybrid control strategy that can be stably applied to complex driving environments. The weight of each controller is determined from the global and local curvature indexes calculated from HD map information and the current driving speed. Our experimental results demonstrate the ability of the hybrid controller, which had a cross-track error of under 0.1 m in a virtual environment that simulates K-City, with complex driving environments such as urban areas, community roads, and high-speed driving roads.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.11
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• pp.492-497
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• 2006

Nash Equilibrium (NE) is essential to investigate a participant's bidding strategy in a competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the NE due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The competition among multi-participants is modeled by a two-level hierarchical optimization problem. A mathematical programming approach is widely used in finding this equilibrium. However, there are difficulties to solving a mixed strategy NE. This paper presents two propositions to add heuristics to the mathematical programming method. The propositions are based on empirical studies on mixed strategies in numerous sample systems. Based on the propositions a new formulation is provided with a set of linear and nonlinear equations, and an algorithm is suggested for using the prepositions and the newly-formulated equations.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.7
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• pp.1226-1231
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• 2010

This paper looks at the influence of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the market value(Social Welfare; SW) in the competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the Nash Equilibrium (NE) due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The aim of this paper are to compute a mixed strategy NE and analyze SW in power transaction with FTRs. This paper introduces a formula and a technique for solving NE of multi-player game with FTRs. In addition, it analyzes the influence of holding of FTRs by generation company on SW and it proposes the SW at NE is influenced by Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) where holder of FTRs are located. The assertion is verified by calculating the mixed strategy utilizing the Cournot model widely used for studies on FTRs.