Seven diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) prospective payment system is going to expand to all hospitals including university hospitals this year. However there are few studies on the change of practice pattern under prospective payment system in the university hospital setting. So This study was intended to predict the practice pattern change after the introduction of 7 DRGs prospective payment system in a university hospital setting. To predict the change of practice pattern, this study used simulation technique. Five hundred and nineteen patients classified as 5 DRGs in a university hospital were selected for simulation. The change of practice pattern were predicted based on clinicians' opinion. We also predicted payment change by service items. Major findings of this study are as follows. First, the total medical payment was reduced by 14.4%. The drug payment change (8.8%) took most of total payment reduction. The followings are the change of treatment material cost (3.2%), the change of laboratory tests cost (1.8%), the change of room charge (0.5%), and other payment change (0.1%), respectively. Second, most of the reduction in total medical payment resulted from the decreased amount of medical services themselves. The transfer of medical services to outpatient setting took up only 4.9% of the total payment reduction. The change of unit price or composition took up 5.5% of the total payment reduction. In this study we found that it is possible to reduce the inpatient services through practice pattern change in university hospital setting. However, it needs to be careful to adjust DRG payment after the reduction of provided services, because most of reduction was not due to service transfer but to service volume reduction. It is desirable to utilize the saving from practice pattern change as incentive to improve quality of care.
This article describes the theoretical foundations of government policy for hospitals in terms of correcting market failure and enhancing equity. It then discusses the characteristics that desirable payment systems should have, and the effects of the DRG-based prospective payment system on hospital behavior, its financial performance, hospital industry, and health care expenditure. The rationales and impacts of other public policies for hospitals such as antitrust and fair trade regulation, dissemination of practice guidelines and hospital mortality information, regulation of hospital capital investment, and tax policy are also discussed.
Objectives : To evaluate the impacts of the DRG payment system on the behavior of medical insurance claimants. Specifically, we evaluated the case-mix index, the numbers of diagnosis and procedure codes utilized, and the corresponding rate of diagnosis codes before, during and after implementation of the DRG payment system. Methods : In order to evaluate the case-mix index, the number of diagnosis and procedure codes utilized, we used medical insurance claim data from all medical facilities that participated in the DRG-based Prospective Payment Demonstration Program. This medical insurance claim data consisted of both pre-demonstration program data (fee-for-service, from November, 1998 to January, 1999) and post-demonstration program data (DRG-based Prospective Payment, from February, 1999 to April, 1999). And in order to evaluate the corresponding rate of diagnosis codes utilized, we reviewed 820 medical records from 20 medical institutes that were selected by random sampling methods. Results : The case-mix index rate decreased after the DRG-based Prospective Payment Demonstration Program was introduced. The average numbers of different claim diagnosis codes used decreased (new DRGs from 2.22 to 1.24, and previous DRGs from 1.69 to 1.21), as did the average number of claim procedure codes used (new DRGs from 3.02 to 2.16, and previous DRGs from 2.97 to 2.43). With respect to the time of participation in the program, the change in number of claim procedure codes was significant, but the change in number of claim diagnosis codes was not. The corresponding rate of claim diagnosis codes increased (from 57.5% to 82.6%), as did the exclusion rate of claim diagnosis codes (from 16.5% to 25.1%). Conclusions : After the implementation of the DRG payment system, the corresponding rate of insurance claim codes and the corresponding exclusion rate of claim diagnosis codes both increased, because the inducement system for entering the codes for claim review was changed.
Yun Zhao;Ivan En-Howe Tan;Vikneswary D/O A Jahnasegar;Hui Min Chong;Yonghui Chen;Brian Kim Poh Goh;Marianne Kit Har Au;Ye Xin Koh
한국간담췌외과학회지
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제28권3호
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pp.291-301
/
2024
This systematic review and meta-analysis aimed to evaluate the impact of prospective payment systems (PPSs) on cholecystectomy. A comprehensive literature review was conducted, examining studies published until December 2023. The review process focused on identifying research across major databases that reported critical outcomes such as length of stay (LOS), mortality, complications, admissions, readmissions, and costs following PPS for cholecystectomy. The studies were specifically selected for their relevance to the impact of PPS or the transition from fee-for-service (FFS) to PPS. The study analyzed six papers, with three eligible for meta-analysis, to assess the impact of the shift from FFS to PPS in laparoscopic and open cholecystectomy procedures. Our findings indicated no significant changes in LOS and mortality rates following the transition from FFS to PPS. Complication rates varied and were influenced by the diagnosis-related group categorization and surgeon cost profiles under episode-based payment. There was a slight increase in admissions and readmissions, and mixed effects on hospital costs and financial margins, suggesting varied responses to PPS for cholecystectomy procedures. The impact of PPS on cholecystectomy is nuanced and varies across different aspects of healthcare delivery. Our findings indicate a need for adaptable, patient-centered PPS models that balance economic efficiency with high-quality patient care. The study emphasizes the importance of considering specific surgical procedures and patient demographics in healthcare payment reforms.
Objectives : To determine the impacts of Diagnosis-Related Groups/Prospective Payment System (DRG/PPS) on the quality of care in cases of Cesarean section and to describe the policy implications for the early stabilization of DRG/PPS in Korea. Methods : Data was collected from the medical records of 380 patients who had undergone Cesarean sections in 40 hospitals participating in the DRG/PPS Demonstration Program since 1999. Cesarean sections were peformed in 122 patients of the FFS(Fee-For-Service) group and 258 patients of the DRG/PPS group. Measurements of quality used included essential tests of pre- and post-operation, and the PPI(Physician Performance Index) score. The PPI was developed by two obstetricians. Results : Univariate analysis demonstrated significant differences in PPI scores according to the payment systems. With respect to the mean of PPI scores, a higher score was found in the DRG/PPS group than in the FFS group. However, the adjusted effect did not show significant differences between the FFS group and the DRG/PPS group. Conclusion : This study suggested that the problem of poor quality may not be related to the implementation of DRG/PPS in Cesarean section. However, this study did not consider the validity and reliability of the process measurement, and it did not exclude the possibility of data emission in medical records.
In the United States, the prospective payment system(PPS), under which diagnosis related groups (DRGs) are used to reimburse hospitals for the care of Medicare patients since 1983, Study results showed that the PPS is having a major impact on the quantity of services especially of hospital length of stay. The PPS has increased the likelihood that a patient will be discharged home in an unstable condition and the use of nursing homes or long term care facilities increased. Still, it is insufficient to conclude that the PPS has decreased the Medicare total expenditure, but relatively sufficient to conclude that the quality of care hasn't changed. The maintenance of the quality resulted from the systemic "check-and-balance" composed of three factors; (1) The doctors are reimbursed based on the fee-for-service system, (2) hospitals contact with doctors under the attending system, and (3) there are some public hospitals. In Korea, the reimbursement for hospitals and doctors are not divided, the hospitals have doctors as employees, and 90% of hospitals are private. These differences may weaken the "check-and-balance" existing in the U.S. system. And there are few long term care facilities and the diagnostic coding system using in pilot test are not suitable for Korean situation. In conclusion, for successful implementation of the DRG payment system in Korea, the government should establish the "check-and-balance" system in the health sector to make sure the quality of care before the implementation.
Objectives : This paper recommends a global budget based payment system for reimbursing oriental medical services in the national health insurance. Methods : We analyzed previous research outcomes related to oriental medical services and payment system We reviewed the experiences of other countries' global budget system in terms of their strength and weakness. In addition, we developed a reimbursement method for oriental medical services based on global budget. Results : Our reviews focused on global budget system of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Taiwan. The estimation of global budget in the national health insurance was described in two scenarios. First scenario was to allocate oriental medical services in scale after signing a contract for global budget. In this case, 4.16% of the national health insurance expenditure was allocated for the oriental medical services. Second scenario was to estimate the global budget in a historical context. As a result, the first scenario in total budget was higher than the second, and we proposed a retrospective adjustment method for the gap between the budget and the actual expenditure Conclusions : The payment system for oriental medical services is recommended to shift from fee-for-service to global budget.
Background: Engaging and Involving stakeholders who have different interests in changing health care policies are difficult task. As the literature on the governance in Korean health care field is rare, this study aims to provide empirical evidence of 'governing health policy'-the ways health care policy is made, implemented, and evaluated from a political perspective. Methods: The authors of this study conducted interviews with elites in policy and clinical areas, which was considered to be the most effective approach to gather in-depth information about the background of changing payment policy as well as the barriers or contributors for making the policy sustainable. A total of 14 experts (3 government officials, 2 representatives from medical profession, 3 professors form academic field, and 6 healthcare providers from New DRG pilot program hospitals) participated in 2 hour long interviews. Results: There was a perception gap of the feasibility and substantiality of new payment system among elites. The score was higher in government officers than those in scholars or clinical experts. Next, the interviewees indicated that Korean New DRG might not sustain without significant efforts to improving democratic aspects of the governance. It is also notable that all interviewees except healthcare providers provided negative expectation of the contribution of new payment system to increase administration efficiency. For clinical efficiency, every stakeholders perceived there was no increased efficiency after introduction of New DRG payment. Like general perception, there was a wide gap between the perception of stakeholders in quality change after implementing the new payment system. Finally, interview participants negatively assumed about the likelihood of New DRG to remain a case of successful reforms. Conclusion: This study implied the importance of social consensus and the governance of health policy.
This study explored the impact on the DRG(Diagnosis-Related Groups)-based prospective payment system(PPS) operated by voluntarily participation providers. We analyzed whether the provides in the DRG-based PPS and in traditional fee-for-service(FFS) systems showed different the degree of variation in length of stay(LOS), and the providers' behaviors depending on the differences according to the varied participation periods. The study sample included all data 2,061 institutions participated in DRG-PPS in 2007 and all cases 473 FFS institutions which reported fee-for-service claims were reviewed same diagnosized diseases at least 10cases claims during three months We compared the differences of the LOS among health care institutions according to their type, region, and size. For DRGs showing significant differences in LOS, multiple regression analyses were performed to find out factors associated with LOS and interaction effect participation and hospital types or participation periods. The result provide the evidence that the DRG payment system operated by volunteering health care institutions had impact on resources use, which can reduce the institutions' the length of stay. While some DRGs had no correlation between participation periods and LOS, other DRGs, DRG participation period reversely linear relationship with LOS. That is to say, the longer participation year, the less reducing the LOS. These results support the future expansion of the DRG-based PPS plan to all health care services in Korea.
Purpose: The purpose of this study was to classify the elderly in long-term care facilities using the Resource Utilization Group(RUG-III) and to examine the feasibility of a payment method based on the RUG-III classification system in Korea. Method: This study measured resident characteristics using a Resident Assessment Instrument-Minimum Data Set(RAI-MDS) and staff time. Data was collected from 530 elderly residents over sixty, residing in long-term care facilities. Resource use for individual patients was measured by a wage-weighted sum of staff time and the total time spent with the patient by nurses, aides, and physiotherapists. Result: The subjects were classified into 4 groups out of 7 major groups. The group of Clinically Complex was the largest (46.3%), and then Reduced Physical Function(27.2%), Behavior Problems (17.0%), and Impaired Cognition (9.4%) followed. Homogeneity of the RUG-III groups was examined by total coefficient of variation of resource use. The results showed homogeneity of resource use within RUG-III groups. Also, the difference in resource use among RUG major groups was statistically significant (p<0.001), and it also showed a hierarchy pattern as resource use increases in the same RUG group with an increase of severity levels(ADL). Conclusion: The results of this study showed that the RUG-Ill classification system differentiates resources provided to elderly in long-term care facilities in Korea.
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