• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.213-233
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• 2021

Purpose - Our study examines the determinant factors of corporate financial fraud and whether the characteristics of outside directors tend to decrease the fraud in China. Design/methodology/approach - The data come from the enforcement actions of the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The multiple regression analysis were hired in order to analyze the data. Findings - Firms that have smaller size, higher debt ratio, or lower return of assets are associated with the incidence of fraud. However, the firms that have a high proportion of outside directors on the board or whose outside directors have a high compensation are less likely to engage in fraud. Our results show that outside directors monitor the actions of managers and thus help deter fraudulent acts. On the other hand, fraud is more associated with the local outside directors rather than outside directors who are from other locations. Since local outside directors tend to be more related with managers of firms, they can lose their independence. Research implications or Originality - Our findings have implications for the design of appropriate outside directors systems for China-listed firms. Moreover, our results imply that recruiting outside directors from other regions can improve the expertise and independence of outside directors in China. Our study contributes to provide more useful information about investors' investment decisions or management oversight and regulators' decisions on audit activities by disclosing information relating to the characteristics of outside directors.

• Korean Association of Arts Management
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• no.55
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• pp.115-154
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• 2020

This paper examines the professional qualifications of the directors of important public art museums in Korea in comparison to museums outside Korea through analysis of the directors' primary qualifications, including academic background, major, career experience, and study abroad experience, as well as secondary qualifications, including length of tenure, age, gender, and alma mater, which can indirectly the hiring process for directors. The museums examined in this study are separated into three geographical categories - 1. Seoul, 2. the Seoul Metropolitan Area, and 3. locations in Korea outside the Seoul Metropolitan Area - to analyze how the influence of primary and secondary qualifications differs across geographies. Additionally, this study looks at how the professional qualifications of directors in Korea compare to the qualifications of directors outside Korea to identify the idiosyncrasies of the Korean system. It finds that directors in Korea, in general, have a shorter length of tenure, are older, are more likely to be female, and are less likely to be foreign than the directors of overseas museums. Experience-wise, directors in Korea often have experience working as art experts, artists, and art professors, but their backgrounds differ depending on the region in which they are working. Although directors in Korea have, across the board, studied abroad and graduated from prestigious universities, there are noticeable differences across the three geographical locations looked at. Notably, in Korea, the proportion of directors who majored in practical skills is high, while in the case of directors overseas, the proportion of those who majored in art history is high. In addition, while a high percentage of directors are graduates of Hongik University regardless of their museum's location, graduates of Seoul University are mainly concentrated in the Seoul and Seoul Metropolitan Areas. Museums outside the Seoul Metropolitan Area, on the other hand, often hire directors who have graduated from a nearby university. These differences mark a contrast between Korean museums and museums overseas, which generally hire directors who have graduated from prestigious universities, regardless of geographical location.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.143-158
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• 2014

Country ownership and management of information security companies generally do not clearly separate from the Board of Directors to function smoothly controlling shareholders do not participate in management decision-making and internal control board does not perform the task correctly, they said the issue was raised. The purpose of this study is to improve corporate governance, information security companies of the outside director system was introduced as part of the transparency of accounting information to investigate whether the effectiveness of the overall business management is also part of the efficient management of operations and earnings being with respect to the empirical data would be analyzed using the. This means that with the specific purpose of the characteristics of a technology-intensive company focusing on information security proportion of outside directors and outside directors of the board of directors of the board of directors of the target attendance rate for identifying the relationship between earnings management purposes. The empirical results is the ratio of outside directors and the relationship between discretionary accruals as a temporary negative (-) boyimyeo significant relationship, so was adopted. is discretionary accruals and attendance of outside directors, as is the hypothesis that the regression coefficient negative (-) shows the relationship between the mind, so was adopted.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.173-188
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• 2016

The introduction and operation of compensation committee can affect managers' incentive-compensation system. In this context, The purpose of this paper examines whether managers' pay-performance sensitivity is affected by the quality of the compensation committee(compensation committee size, the proportion of outside directors on the compensation committee, the proportion of directors with 2 or more non additional board seats on the compensation committee) To test this hypothesis, we use a sample of 260 firm-year observations between 2001-2013. The results are as follows. Firstly, we find that no significant relevance between the compensation committee size and pay-performance sensitivity. But the proportion of outside directors on the compensation committee and the proportion of directors with 2 or more non additional board seats on the compensation committee is positively associated with both pay-earnings based performance sensitivity and pay-stock based performance sensitivity. Secondly, we find that the integration quality of the compensation committee is positively associated with both pay-earnings based performance sensitivity and pay-stock based performance sensitivity. Overall, our analysis suggests that compensation committee are important mechanism in the design of efficient incentive-compensation system.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.287-305
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• 2016

This study confirms that there is a correlation between managers' incentive-compensation system(introduction of the compensation committee) and corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure, proportion of outside directors, debt ratio, competitive strength), and analyzes whether firm value is affected by corporate governance mechanisms. The purpose of this paper are empirically tested using 318 firm-year data listed on the KRX from 2001 to 2010 and 2SLS(two-stage least square method) were used for the analysis of the hypotheses. The results of empirical tests are as follows. Firstly, there is no correlation between introduction of the compensation committee and corporate governance mechanisms. In addition, the results show that there is a causal relationship between some variables. Secondly, results from the analysis of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm value, only introduction of the compensation committee and foreign investors ownership were analyzed as a positive impact on the firm value. This result means that most domestic firm don't actively used for managers' incentive-compensation system as a useful control device for improving corporate governance.