• Hwankyungkyoyuk
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.38-50
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• 2000

We are evidently Home Economicus, egoistic rational utility maximiger, and all the capitalism economic situation make us adapt to such life, and recognize that it is rational to act like that. This can be demonstrated in Prisoner′s Dilemma(PD) which always select the non-cooperative choice for free rider in rational selection process of public goods. This paper notice the "what is problem\ulcorner"The problem is not in free rider itself but in free rider egoism. The practical behavior of free rider egoism can be explained by way of Prisoner′s Dilemma. In PD situation, the prisoner makes a rational choice, non-cooperative alternative, but he doesn′arrive at preto-optimality. It is dilemma. Why can′t he arrive \ulcorner Because he is isolated from other prisoner. So we call it prisoner′s dilemma. The PD situation can be compared with our real economic life, which, we think, have kept by rational choice of the public goods. We actually have made our life as an individual one although we organized communities of capitalism. Of course, we know each others as members of same society, but each individual being can′t secure the belief, which has composed basis of community. So, it is very similar and common between PD situation and our real economic life in the production of public goods. We conclude that this non-cooperative process of PD situation can be utilized as instrument of EE. So this non-cooperative process can show us the effectiveness of EE as follows. \circled1 Game situation life PD can be used as good instrument for explaining the rational selection dilemma(error) to Homo-Economicus, the rational agent, with the optimal and rational language. \circled2 We can show that the selection result is dilemma, not arrive pareto - optimality. \circled3 The dilemma can be resolved with accomplishing the good communal life based on the belief, not on the isolation.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.20 no.12
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• pp.278-286
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• 2020

The prisoner's dilemma game which is a representative example of game theory is being studied with interest by many economists, social scientists, and computer scientists. In recent years, many researches on computational approaches that apply evolutionary computation techniques such as genetic algorithms and particle swarm optimization have been actively conducted to analyze prisoner dilemma games. In this study, we intend to evolve a strategy for a iterated prisoner dilemma game participating two or more players using three different binary particle swarm optimization techniques. As a result of experimenting by applying three kinds of binary particle swarm optimization to the iterated prisoner's dilemma game, it was confirmed that mutual cooperation can be established even among selfish participants to maximize their own gains. However, it was also confirmed that the more participants, the more difficult to establish a mutual cooperation relationship.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.42 no.4
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• pp.39-48
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• 2019

This paper considers the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in which there exists a dilemma that the best response is that both players are to confess, but doing not confess can give a higher gain to the both players in a social perspective. To resolve such a dilemma in the game, an incentive model to encourage to confess and a penalty model for being imposed when not confessing are introduced, respectively. Then, the conditions are characterized under which incentive or penalty involved in the game's payoffs can make the game rational without a dilemma on both the personal and social perspectives, by taking the payoff values as variables with the incentive and penalty factors. Furthermore, it turns out that the resulting values of incentive and penalty are inversely proportional to each other, and thus, obtaining one of these amounts can provide the other. Simple examples are shown to interpret the theoretical verifications of our models, and randomly generated data based simulation results investigate the tendency of incentive and penalty and the resulting game values for a variety of instances. These results can provide a framework on resolving the dilemma by artificially putting incentive or penalty, although it is careful to apply more generalized real world games.

• Journal of KIISE:Software and Applications
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.257-265
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• 2000

There is much selective confliction in nature where selfish and rational individuals exists. Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game deals with this problem, and has been used to study on the evolution of cooperation in social, economic and biological systems. So far, there has been much work about the relationship of the number of players and cooperation, strategy learning as a machine learning and the effect of payoff functions to cooperation. In this paper, We attempt to investigate the cooperative coalition size according to payoff functions, and observe the relationship of localization and the evolution of cooperation in NIPD (N-player IPD) game. Experimental results indicate that cooperative coalition size increases as the gradient of the payoff function for cooperation becomes steeper than that of defector's payoff function, or as the minimum coalition size gets smaller, Moreover, the smaller the neighborhood of interaction is, the higher the cooperative coalition emerges through the evolution of population.

• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.37
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• pp.270-306
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• 2007

This study examines the economies of promotion gifts in the newspaper industry. Because of the oligopolistic structure, the newspaper industry shows highly concentrated market. Under the certain circumstance, the dominant firms are struggling to become the market leader by providing unlawful promotion gifts and unbearable price discount which yields the prisoner's dilemma. Ultimately, in spite of the criticism about their unlawful behaviors, the dominant firms choose the fierce competition with high costs. On the other hand, the remaining fringe firms do not have many strategic choices due to the limited financial capacity. They cannot provide free gifts or any other incentives to the subscribers. Even worse, because advertisers and subscribers also prefer promotional gifts as a rational choice, the distorted mechanism has been sustained in the newspaper industry. Thus, governmental interventions hardly achieve the goal of controlling unfair trade. This study examines the structure, strategic behaviors of the players, and the unintended consequences leading to the dilemma on promotional sales in the newspaper industry.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.550-572
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• 2009

This paper investigates the textile negotiations between Korea and the U.S. which Korea, as a weaker party in the bilateral trade negotiation, was recognized as making a good performance by Odell(1985). Using the documents of Korean governments at the time - Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry - telegrams and reports from various sources the paper picks a leveling factor during the negotiations. In the paper, we used a dynamic concept of power for describing the negotiating power, and showed Korea succeeded in making the negotiation symmetric using the Special Cooperative Relationship(SCR) as one of the most conspicuous leveling factors during the textile negotiations with the U.S. The paper contributes to finding the factors that can be used in the negotiations with power asymmetry as a leveling factor for weaker country. Also, based on the findings from the paper, future negotiators can get insights on which factors be used, and how to use those factors for leveling the negotiations with a stronger counterpart.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.105-121
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• 2019

This study applies diverse game theories to the US-China Trade War. The US-China Trade War can be analyzed as a game situation because the strategic decision-making process to maximize one's profit while considering the reaction of the other party is a game situation. However, related research suffered from some mistakes in applying the US-China Trade War as it is to classic game theory, because while the prisoners dilemma is based on the situation of No Communication, No Trust, No Cooperation, the US-China Trade War has a precondition different from that of prisoners dilemma, since it mutually communicates information and negotiation is repeated several times in a cooperative situation. The result of the trade negotiation will likely end as 'cooperate-cooperate'. Further, considering trade volume, trade interdependence, bargaining power based on economy, and the scale of damage caused by the Trade War, the US-China Trade War is progressing with the bargaining power of the US being higher than that of China. Since the current US-China Trade War is in an asymmetrical situation under the dominant bargaining power of the US, it is likely to reach 'US defect-China cooperative' in the long run.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.497-513
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• 2014

Rate-of-return regulation where a regulator compensates the utilities based upon the cost incurred the regulated companies have the incentive to over-report cost level. However, in case of cost-based competition where a regulator knows the cost of each plant involved and induce the competition among them, one can encounter prisoner's dilemma situation in the short run where the regulated firms under-report cost level. For instance, in case of cost-based pool, a generator may have a strategic behavior to keep its registered variable cost higher than the actual level to maintain its operation rate and generation amounts higher. Eventually, however, such behavior decrease the profitability of a generator and discourage new entry jeopardizing required level of capacity reserves. This is a typical Prisoner's Dilemma situation. The power market operating rule should be revised so that generators' registered variable cost reflect actual level of variable cost.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.49 no.3
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• pp.49-65
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• 2018

The main purpose of this study is to explain fishery relation in the seas surrounding Korea and how the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), within game theory is applied to the region and suggest possible co-operative approaches in the region. The seas surrounding Korea are very productive fishing grounds with abundant fisheries resources because of the favourable marine environment, including its geographical features and physical oceanography. Nevertheless, Fishery relations among the coastal states in the region have been historically characterized by conflict rather than co-operation. Based on the PD game where there is always an incentive to do better by not co-operating, in order to ensure a share of the short-run benefits, fishing countries in the region have so far pursued the non-co-operative strategy of 'don't fish responsibly' rather than the co-operative strategy of 'fish responsibly'. Considering rapidly deteriorating situations in terms of fishery resources, regional co-operation among coastal states is urgently required to eliminate overfishing and increase fish stocks to sustainable levels. The West Sea/East China Sea and the East Sea, semi-enclosed seas, have unitary ecosystems, and many migratory fish species are shared between coastal states. Therefore, one countries' efforts alone cannot effectively manage and conserve the fishery resources and close co-operation among coastal states is required. The 1982 UN Convention and other international instruments emphasize the role of RFOs in managing and conserving capture fisheries and encourage states to establish Regional Fishery organizations (RFOs) or strengthen existing RFOs to facilitate conservation and management for fish stocks. Therefore, an international regime is worthy of serious consideration in that it provides fundamental advantages for the conservation of fish stocks for the fishery characteristic of the region.

• Proceedings of the Korean Information Science Society Conference
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• 2002.04b
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• pp.310-312
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• 2002

반복적 죄수의 딜레마게임은 복잡한 사회현상들을 모델링 하기 위하여 주로 사용되는 방법이다. 본 논문에서는 집단을 협동으로 진화시키는데 있어서 전략적 연합을 이용하는 방법과 전략적 연합에 속해 있는 전략들이 연합의 의사를 결정할 때 어떠한 방법을 선택할 경우 더 빠르고 안정적으로 진화하는가에 대한 실험 결과를 제시한다. 의사결정방법으로는 신경망으로 결합에 주로 사용되는 투표방법 Borda 함수, Condorect 함수, 평균방법 그리고 최고이득 함수방법 등을 사용하였다. 실험결과 최고이득 함수 방법이 가장 좋은 결과를 보였으며 결합 방법에 따라 다소 상이한 결과를 나타내었다.