The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration (수산경영론집)

The Korean Society of Fisheries Business Administration (한국수산경영학회)
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Game Theory and a Study on Fishery Co-operation System in the Seas Surrounding Korea

게임이론과 한반도를 둘러싼 수산자원의 협력적 관리체계에 관한 연구

  • Received : 2018.09.16
  • Accepted : 2018.09.28
  • Published : 2018.09.30
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Abstract

The main purpose of this study is to explain fishery relation in the seas surrounding Korea and how the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), within game theory is applied to the region and suggest possible co-operative approaches in the region. The seas surrounding Korea are very productive fishing grounds with abundant fisheries resources because of the favourable marine environment, including its geographical features and physical oceanography. Nevertheless, Fishery relations among the coastal states in the region have been historically characterized by conflict rather than co-operation. Based on the PD game where there is always an incentive to do better by not co-operating, in order to ensure a share of the short-run benefits, fishing countries in the region have so far pursued the non-co-operative strategy of 'don't fish responsibly' rather than the co-operative strategy of 'fish responsibly'. Considering rapidly deteriorating situations in terms of fishery resources, regional co-operation among coastal states is urgently required to eliminate overfishing and increase fish stocks to sustainable levels. The West Sea/East China Sea and the East Sea, semi-enclosed seas, have unitary ecosystems, and many migratory fish species are shared between coastal states. Therefore, one countries' efforts alone cannot effectively manage and conserve the fishery resources and close co-operation among coastal states is required. The 1982 UN Convention and other international instruments emphasize the role of RFOs in managing and conserving capture fisheries and encourage states to establish Regional Fishery organizations (RFOs) or strengthen existing RFOs to facilitate conservation and management for fish stocks. Therefore, an international regime is worthy of serious consideration in that it provides fundamental advantages for the conservation of fish stocks for the fishery characteristic of the region.

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