• Title/Summary/Keyword: Power analysis attack

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New Type of Collision Attack on First-Order Masked AESs

  • Kim, Hee Seok;Hong, Seokhie
    • ETRI Journal
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    • v.38 no.2
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    • pp.387-396
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    • 2016
  • This paper introduces a new type of collision attack on first-order masked Advanced Encryption Standards. This attack is a known-plaintext attack, while the existing collision attacks are chosen-plaintext attacks. In addition, our method requires significantly fewer power measurements than any second-order differential power analysis or existing collision attacks.

New Type of Collision Attack on Power-Analysis Resistant AES (전력 분석에 안전한 AES에 대한 새로운 종류의 충돌쌍 공격)

  • Kim, HeeSeok;Park, Hark-Soo;Hong, Seokhie
    • KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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    • v.2 no.9
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    • pp.393-398
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    • 2013
  • This paper introduces a new collision attack on first-order masked AES. This attack is a known plaintext attack, while the existing collision attacks are a chosen plaintext attack. In addition, our method is more efficient than the second-order power analysis and requires about 1/27.5 power measurements by comparison with the last collision attack. Some experiment results of this paper support this fact. In this paper, we also introduce a simple countermeasure, which can protect against our attack.

Power-based Side-Channel Analysis Against AES Implementations: Evaluation and Comparison

  • Benhadjyoussef, Noura;Karmani, Mouna;Machhout, Mohsen
    • International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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    • v.21 no.4
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    • pp.264-271
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    • 2021
  • From an information security perspective, protecting sensitive data requires utilizing algorithms which resist theoretical attacks. However, treating an algorithm in a purely mathematical fashion or in other words abstracting away from its physical (hardware or software) implementation opens the door to various real-world security threats. In the modern age of electronics, cryptanalysis attempts to reveal secret information based on cryptosystem physical properties, rather than exploiting the theoretical weaknesses in the implemented cryptographic algorithm. The correlation power attack (CPA) is a Side-Channel Analysis attack used to reveal sensitive information based on the power leakages of a device. In this paper, we present a power Hacking technique to demonstrate how a power analysis can be exploited to reveal the secret information in AES crypto-core. In the proposed case study, we explain the main techniques that can break the security of the considered crypto-core by using CPA attack. Using two cryptographic devices, FPGA and 8051 microcontrollers, the experimental attack procedure shows that the AES hardware implementation has better resistance against power attack compared to the software one. On the other hand, we remark that the efficiency of CPA attack depends statistically on the implementation and the power model used for the power prediction.

A Pre-processing Technique for Performance Enhancement of the Differential Power Analysis Attack (차분 전력 분석 공격의 성능 향상을 위한 전처리 기법)

  • Lee, You-Seok;Lee, Yu-Ri;Lee, Young-Jun;Kim, Hyoung-Nam
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.20 no.4
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    • pp.109-115
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    • 2010
  • Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is well known as one of efficient physical side-channel attack methods using leakage power consumption traces. However, since the power traces usually include the components irrelevant to the encryption, the efficiency of the DPA attack may be degraded. To enhance the performance of DPA, we introduce a pre-processing technique which extracts the encryption-related parts from the measured power consumption signals. Experimental results show that the DPA attack with the use of the proposed pre-processing method detects correct cipher keys with much smaller number of signals compared to that of the conventional DPA attack.

On the Security of ID-Based Cryptosystem against Power Analysis Attacks (전력 분석 공격과 ID기반 암호 시스템의 안전성)

  • 양연형;박동진;이필중
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.14 no.4
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    • pp.135-140
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    • 2004
  • The ID-based cryptosystem and Power Analysis Attack are attracting many researchers and have been developed aggressively to date. Especially, DPA (Differential Power Analysis) attack has been considered to be the most powerful attack against low power devices, such as smart cards. However, these two leading topics are researched independently and have little hewn relations with each other. In this paper, we investigate the effect of power analysis attack against ID based cryptosystem. As a result, we insist that ID-based cryptosystem is secure against DPA and we only need to defend against SPA (Simple Power Analysis).

Random Point Blinding Methods for Koblitz Curve Cryptosystem

  • Baek, Yoo-Jin
    • ETRI Journal
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    • v.32 no.3
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    • pp.362-369
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    • 2010
  • While the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) is getting more popular in securing numerous systems, implementations without consideration for side-channel attacks are susceptible to critical information leakage. This paper proposes new power attack countermeasures for ECC over Koblitz curves. Based on some special properties of Koblitz curves, the proposed methods randomize the involved elliptic curve points in a highly regular manner so the resulting scalar multiplication algorithms can defeat the simple power analysis attack and the differential power analysis attack simultaneously. Compared with the previous countermeasures, the new methods are also noticeable in terms of computational cost.

Analysis and Countermeasure on RSA Algorithm Having High Attack Complexity in Collision-Based Power Analysis Attack (충돌 전력 분석 공격에 높은 공격 복잡도를 갖는 RSA 알고리즘에 대한 취약점 분석 및 대응기법)

  • Kim, Suhri;Kim, Taewon;Jo, Sungmin;Kim, HeeSeok;Hong, Seokhie
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.26 no.2
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    • pp.335-344
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    • 2016
  • It is known that power analysis is one of the most powerful attack in side channel analysis. Among power analysis single trace attack is widely studied recently since it uses one power consumption trace to recover secret key of public cryptosystem. Recently Sim et al. proposed new exponentiation algorithm for RSA cryptosystem with higher attack complexity to prevent single trace attack. In this paper we analyze the vulnerability of exponentiation algorithm described by Sim et al. Sim et al. applied message blinding and random exponentiation splitting method on $2^t-ary$ for higher attack complexity. However we can reveal private key using information exposed during pre-computation generation. Also we describe modified algorithm that provides higher attack complexity on collision attack. Proposed algorithm minimized the reuse of value that are used during exponentiation to provide security under single collision attack.

A Simple Power Analysis Attack on ARIA Key Expansion Based on Hamming Weight Leakage (해밍 웨이트 누출 기반 ARIA 키 확장 SPA)

  • Park, Aesun;Han, Dong-Guk;Choi, Jun
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.25 no.6
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    • pp.1319-1326
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    • 2015
  • The symmetric key encryption algorithms, such as the AES or the ARIA, generate round keys by the key expansion mechanism. While the algorithm is executed, key expansion mechanism emits information about the secret key by the power consumption. The vulnerability exists that can reduce significantly the candidate of the secret key by the simple power analysis attack using a small number of the power traces. Therefore, we'll have to study about the attack and the countermeasure to prevent information leakage. While a simple power analysis attack on the AES key expansion has been studied since 2002, ARIA is insufficient. This paper presents a simple power analysis attack on 8-bit implementations of the ARIA-128 key expansion. The presented attack efficiently utilizes this information leakage to substantially reduce the key space that needs to be considered in a brute-force search for the secret key. We show that ARIA is vulnerable to a SPA attack based on hamming weight leakage.

Power Analysis Attack of Block Cipher AES Based on Convolutional Neural Network (블록 암호 AES에 대한 CNN 기반의 전력 분석 공격)

  • Kwon, Hong-Pil;Ha, Jae-Cheol
    • Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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    • v.21 no.5
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    • pp.14-21
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    • 2020
  • In order to provide confidential services between two communicating parties, block data encryption using a symmetric secret key is applied. A power analysis attack on a cryptosystem is a side channel-analysis method that can extract a secret key by measuring the power consumption traces of the crypto device. In this paper, we propose an attack model that can recover the secret key using a power analysis attack based on a deep learning convolutional neural network (CNN) algorithm. Considering that the CNN algorithm is suitable for image analysis, we particularly adopt the recurrence plot (RP) signal processing method, which transforms the one-dimensional power trace into two-dimensional data. As a result of executing the proposed CNN attack model on an XMEGA128 experimental board that implemented the AES-128 encryption algorithm, we recovered the secret key with 22.23% accuracy using raw power consumption traces, and obtained 97.93% accuracy using power traces on which we applied the RP processing method.

Implementation and Analysis of Power Analysis Attack Using Multi-Layer Perceptron Method (Multi-Layer Perceptron 기법을 이용한 전력 분석 공격 구현 및 분석)

  • Kwon, Hongpil;Bae, DaeHyeon;Ha, Jaecheol
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.29 no.5
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    • pp.997-1006
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    • 2019
  • To overcome the difficulties and inefficiencies of the existing power analysis attack, we try to extract the secret key embedded in a cryptographic device using attack model based on MLP(Multi-Layer Perceptron) method. The target of our proposed power analysis attack is the AES-128 encryption module implemented on an 8-bit processor XMEGA128. We use the divide-and-conquer method in bytes to recover the whole 16 bytes secret key. As a result, the MLP-based power analysis attack can extract the secret key with the accuracy of 89.51%. Additionally, this MLP model has the 94.51% accuracy when the pre-processing method on power traces is applied. Compared to the machine leaning-based model SVM(Support Vector Machine), we show that the MLP can be a outstanding method in power analysis attacks due to excellent ability for feature extraction.