With rapidly changing technological implementation of operating systems of businesses, the Ministry of foreign affairs (MOFA) of the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been undergoing digital transformation to its overall operations with the intent to innovate information and knowledge management (IKM) strategies since the mid-2000s. However, assessment as to the effectiveness of implemented IKM has been inadequately analyzed. This study aims to assess the concepts and limitations of the MOFA's current IKM strategies and the methods it employs to deliver its IKM framework, in light of strengthening the organizational ambidexterity and absorptive capacity, and also fostering organizational innovation through a qualitative study that involves interviews and analysis of reports from MOFA. The MOFA's IKM possesses dynamic capabilities to adapt to changing digital technologies. However, the institution's IKM is constrained by limitations associated with the utilization of the IKM system such as a structure that handles confidential documents and a lack of a collaborative system for IKM, and external limitations such as changes in the domestic political situation governing MOFA's priorities and the hierarchy of government organizations. Consequently, developing the organizational ambidexterity and absorptive capacity was not possible. To develop an IKM framework for organizational innovation, the MOFA must devise a way to minimize the impact of external changes by overcoming internal limitations. To that end, a detailed study on the development of a practically usable IKM system should include establishing a dialogue between job groups and enhancing employee competency in preparation for a changing environment.
In the Republic of Korea, which has adopted a strong president-centered system as a political system, comprehensive personnel verification of work ability, reputation, and misconduct for positions where the president has personnel rights is not only fundamental to the administration of the country, but is also very important for maintaining the democratic system. As the records containing the personnel verification process produced during this process also has a wide range of data on important people in the country, they themselves are very important national-level information, and there is a great possibility that they will be used as useful materials for studying current national management in future generations. Therefore, it is assumed that after the enactment of the "Act on the Management of Presidential Records" in 2007, Senior Secretary for Civil Affairs of the Office of the President, which were responsible for the personnel verification, designated a wide range of personnel verification records as presidential designated records and transferred them to the Presidential Archives. However, with the launch of the 20th government, the agency responsible for personnel verification changed from Senior Secretary for Civil Affairs of the Office of the President to the "Personnel Information Management Team" of the Ministry of Justice from June 2022, a major change occurred in the personnel verification process that had been maintained and the preservation of related records. This paper examined what personnel verification records are and how they have been preserved and managed, and proposed what issues have arisen at the record management level due to this change in the agency in charge of personnel verification, and how those issues should be resolved on a practical and institutional level.
Analysis of future business or investment opportunities, such as business feasibility analysis and company or technology valuation, necessitate objective estimation on the relevant market and expected sales. While there are various ways to classify the estimation methods of these new sales or market size, they can be broadly divided into top-down and bottom-up approaches by benchmark references. Both methods, however, require a lot of resources and time. Therefore, we propose a data-based intelligent demand forecasting system to support evaluation of new business. This study focuses on analogical forecasting, one of the traditional quantitative forecasting methods, to develop sales forecasting intelligence systems for new businesses. Instead of simply estimating sales for a few years, we hereby propose a method of estimating the sales of new businesses by using the initial sales and the sales growth rate of similar companies. To demonstrate the appropriateness of this method, it is examined whether the sales performance of recently established companies in the same industry category in Korea can be utilized as a reference variable for the analogical forecasting. In this study, we examined whether the phenomenon of "mean reversion" was observed in the sales of start-up companies in order to identify errors in estimating sales of new businesses based on industry sales growth rate and whether the differences in business environment resulting from the different timing of business launch affects growth rate. We also conducted analyses of variance (ANOVA) and latent growth model (LGM) to identify differences in sales growth rates by industry category. Based on the results, we proposed industry-specific range and linear forecasting models. This study analyzed the sales of only 150,000 start-up companies in Korea in the last 10 years, and identified that the average growth rate of start-ups in Korea is higher than the industry average in the first few years, but it shortly shows the phenomenon of mean-reversion. In addition, although the start-up founding juncture affects the sales growth rate, it is not high significantly and the sales growth rate can be different according to the industry classification. Utilizing both this phenomenon and the performance of start-up companies in relevant industries, we have proposed two models of new business sales based on the sales growth rate. The method proposed in this study makes it possible to objectively and quickly estimate the sales of new business by industry, and it is expected to provide reference information to judge whether sales estimated by other methods (top-down/bottom-up approach) pass the bounds from ordinary cases in relevant industry. In particular, the results of this study can be practically used as useful reference information for business feasibility analysis or technical valuation for entering new business. When using the existing top-down method, it can be used to set the range of market size or market share. As well, when using the bottom-up method, the estimation period may be set in accordance of the mean reverting period information for the growth rate. The two models proposed in this study will enable rapid and objective sales estimation of new businesses, and are expected to improve the efficiency of business feasibility analysis and technology valuation process by developing intelligent information system. In academic perspectives, it is a very important discovery that the phenomenon of 'mean reversion' is found among start-up companies out of general small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs) as well as stable companies such as listed companies. In particular, there exists the significance of this study in that over the large-scale data the mean reverting phenomenon of the start-up firms' sales growth rate is different from that of the listed companies, and that there is a difference in each industry. If a linear model, which is useful for estimating the sales of a specific company, is highly likely to be utilized in practical aspects, it can be explained that the range model, which can be used for the estimation method of the sales of the unspecified firms, is highly likely to be used in political aspects. It implies that when analyzing the business activities and performance of a specific industry group or enterprise group there is political usability in that the range model enables to provide references and compare them by data based start-up sales forecasting system.
Land was originally communized by a community in the primitive society of Korea, and in the age of the ancient society SAM KUK-SILLA, KOKURYOE and PAEK JE-it was distributed under the principle of land-nationalization. But by the occupation of the lands which were permitted to transmit from generation to generation as Royal Grant Lands and newly cleared lands, the private occupation had already begun to be formed. Thus the private ownership of land originated by chiefs of the tribes had a trend to be gradually pervaded to the communal members. After the, SILLA Kingdom unified SAM KUK in 668 A.D., JEONG JEON System and KWAN RYO JEON System, which were the distribution systems of farmlands originated from the TANG Dynasty in China, were enforced to established the basis of an absolute monarchy. Even in this age the forest area was jointly controlled and commonly used by village communities because of the abundance of area and stocked volume, and the private ownership of the forest land was prohibited by law under the influence of the TANG Dynasty system. Toward the end of the SILLA Dynasty, however, as its centralism become weak, the tendency of the private occupancy of farmland by influential persons was expanded, and at the same time the occupancy of the forest land by the aristocrats and Buddhist temples began to come out. In the ensuing KORYO Dynasty (519 to 1391 A.D.) JEON SI KWA System under the principle of land-nationalization was strengthened and the privilege of tax collection was transferred to the bureaucrats and the aristocrats as a means of material compensation for them. Taking this opportunity the influential persons began to expand their lands for the tax collection on a large scale. Therefore, about in the middle of 11th century the farmlands and the forest lands were annexed not only around the vicinity of the capital but also in the border area by influential persons. Toward the end of the KORYO Dynasty the royal families, the bureaucrats and the local lords all possessed manors and occupied the forest lands on a large scale as a part of their farmlands. In the KORYO Dynasty, where national economic foundation was based upon the lands, the disorder of the land system threatened the fall of the Dynasty and so the land reform carried out by General YI SEONG-GYE had led to the creation of ensuing YI Dynasty. All systems of the YI Dynasty were substantially adopted from those of the KORYO Dynasty and thereby KWA JEON System was enforced under the principle of land-nationalization, while the occupancy or the forest land was strictly prohibited, except the national or royal uses, by the forbidden item in KYEONG JE YUK JEON SOK JEON, one of codes provided by the successive kings in the YI Dynasty. Thus the basis of the forest land system through the YI Dynasty had been established, while the private forest area possessed by influential persons since the previous KORYO Dynasty was preserved continuously under the influence of their authorities. Therefore, this principle of the prohibition was nothing but a legal fiction for the security of sovereign powers. Consequently the private occupancy of the forest area was gradually enlarged and finally toward the end of YI Dynasty the privately possessed forest lands were to be officially authorized. The forest administration systems in the YI Dynasty are summarized as follows: a) KEUM SAN and BONG SAN. Under the principle of land-nationalization by a powerful centralism KWA JEON System was established at the beginning of the YI Dynasty and its government expropriated all the forests and prohibited strictly the private occupation. In order to maintain the dignity of the royal capital, the forests surounding capital areas were instituted as KEUM SAN (the reserved forests) and the well-stocked natural forest lands were chosen throughout the nation by the government as BONG SAN(national forests for timber production), where the government nominated SAN JIK(forest rangers) and gave them duties to protect and afforest the forests. This forest reservation system exacted statute labors from the people of mountainious districts and yet their commons of the forest were restricted rigidly. This consequently aroused their strong aversion against such forest reservation, therefore those forest lands were radically spoiled by them. To settle this difficult problem successive kings emphasized the preservation of the forests repeatedly, and in KYEONG KUK DAI JOEN, the written constitution of the YI Dynasty, a regulation for the forest preservation was provided but the desired results could not be obtained. Subsequently the split of bureaucrats with incessant feuds among politicians and scholars weakened the centralism and moreover, the foreign invasions since 1592 made the national land devasted and the rural communities impoverished. It happned that many wandering peasants from rural areas moved into the deep forest lands, where they cultivated burnt fields recklessly in the reserved forest resulting in the severe damage of the national forests. And it was inevitable for the government to increase the number of BONG SAN in order to solve the problem of the timber shortage. The increase of its number accelerated illegal and reckless cutting inevitably by the people living mountainuos districts and so the government issued excessive laws and ordinances to reserve the forests. In the middle of the 18th century the severe feuds among the politicians being brought under control, the excessive laws and ordinances were put in good order and the political situation became temporarily stabilized. But in spite of those endeavors evil habitudes of forest devastation, which had been inveterate since the KORYO Dynasty, continued to become greater in degree. After the conclusion of "the Treaty of KANG WHA with Japan" in 1876 western administration system began to be adopted, and thereafter through the promulgation of the Forest Law in 1908 the Imperial Forests were separated from the National Forests and the modern forest ownership system was fixed. b) KANG MU JANG. After the reorganization of the military system, attaching importance to the Royal Guard Corps, the founder of the YI Dynasty, TAI JO (1392 to 1398 A.D.) instituted the royal preserves-KANG MU JANG-to attain the purposes for military training and royal hunting, prohibiting strictly private hunting, felling and clearing by the rural inhabitants. Moreover, the tyrant, YEON SAN (1495 to 1506 A.D.), expanded widely the preserves at random and strengthened its prohibition, so KANG MU JANG had become the focus of the public antipathy. Since the invasion of Japanese in 1592, however, the innovation of military training methods had to be made because of the changes of arms and tactics, and the royal preserves were laid aside consequently and finally they had become the private forests of influential persons since 17th century. c) Forests for official use. All the forests for official use occupied by government officies since the KORYO Dynasty were expropriated by the YI Dynasty in 1392, and afterwards the forests were allotted on a fixed standard area to the government officies in need of firewoods, and as the forest resources became exhausted due to the depredated forest yield, each office gradually enlarged the allotted area. In the 17th century the national land had been almost devastated by the Japanese invasion and therefore each office was in the difficulty with severe deficit in revenue, thereafter waste lands and forest lands were allotted to government offices inorder to promote the land clearing and the increase in the collections of taxes. And an abuse of wide occupation of the forests by them was derived and there appeared a cause of disorder in the forest land system. So a provision prohibiting to allot the forests newly official use was enacted in 1672, nevertheless the government offices were trying to enlarge their occupied area by encroaching the boundary and this abuse continued up to the end of the YI Dynasty. d) Private forests. The government, at the bigninning of the YI Dynasty, expropriated the forests all over the country under the principle of prohibition of private occupancy of forest lands except for the national uses, while it could not expropriate completely all of the forest lands privately occupied and inherited successively by bureaucrats, and even local governors could not control them because of their strong influences. Accordingly the King, TAI JONG (1401 to 1418 A.D.), legislated the prohibition of private forest occupancy in his code, KYEONG JE YUK JEON (1413), and furthermore he repeatedly emphasized to observe the law. But The private occupancy of forest lands was not yet ceased up at the age of the King, SE JO (1455 to 1468 A.D.), so he prescribed the provision in KYEONG KUK DAI JEON (1474), an immutable law as a written constitution in the YI Dynasty: "Anyone who privately occupy the forest land shall be inflicted 80 floggings" and he prohibited the private possession of forest area even by princes and princesses. But, it seemed to be almost impossible for only one provsion in a code to obstruct the historical growing tendecy of private forest occupancy, for example, the King, SEONG JONG (1470 to 1494 A.D.), himself granted the forests to his royal families in defiance of the prohibition and thereafter such precedents were successively expanded, and besides, taking advantage of these facts, the influential persons openly acquired their private forest lands. After tyrannical rule of the King, YEON SAN (1945 to 1506 A.D.), the political disorder due to the splits to bureaucrats with successional feuds and the usurpations of thrones accelerated the private forest occupancy in all parts of the country, thus the forbidden clause on the private forest occupancy in the law had become merely a legal fiction since the establishment of the Dynasty. As above mentioned, after the invasion of Japanese in 1592, the courts of princes (KUNG BANGG) fell into the financial difficulties, and successive kings transferred the right of tax collection from fisherys and saltfarms to each KUNG BANG and at the same time they allotted the forest areas in attempt to promote the clearing. Availing themselves of this opportunity, royal families and bureaucrats intended to occupy the forests on large scale. Besides a privilege of free selection of grave yard, which had been conventionalized from the era of the KORYO Dynasty, created an abuse of occuping too wide area for grave yards in any forest at their random, so the King, TAI JONG, restricted the area of grave yard and homestead of each family. Under the policy of suppresion of Buddhism in the YI Dynasty a privilege of taxexemption for Buddhist temples was deprived and temple forests had to follow the same course as private forests did. In the middle of 18th century the King, YEONG JO (1725 to 1776 A.D.), took an impartial policy for political parties and promoted the spirit of observing laws by putting royal orders and regulations in good order excessively issued before, thus the confused political situation was saved, meanwhile the government officially permittd the private forest ownership which substantially had already been permitted tacitly and at the same time the private afforestation areas around the grave yards was authorized as private forests at least within YONG HO (a boundary of grave yard). Consequently by the enforcement of above mentioned policies the forbidden clause of private forest ownership which had been a basic principle of forest system in the YI Dynasty entireely remained as only a historical document. Under the rule of the King, SUN JO (1801 to 1834 A.D.), the political situation again got into confusion and as the result of the exploitation from farmers by bureaucrats, the extremely impoverished rural communities created successively wandering peasants who cleared burnt fields and deforested recklessly. In this way the devastation of forests come to the peak regardless of being private forests or national forests, moreover, the influential persons extorted private forests or reserved forests and their expansion of grave yards became also excessive. In 1894 a regulation was issued that the extorted private forests shall be returned to the initial propriators and besides taking wide area of the grave yards was prohibited. And after a reform of the administrative structure following western style, a modern forest possession system was prepared in 1908 by the forest law including a regulation of the return system of forest land ownership. At this point a forbidden clause of private occupancy of forest land got abolished which had been kept even in fictitious state since the foundation of the YI Dynasty. e) Common forests. As above mentioned, the forest system in the YI Dynasty was on the ground of public ownership principle but there was a high restriction to the forest profits of farmers according to the progressive private possession of forest area. And the farmers realized the necessity of possessing common forest. They organized village associations, SONGE or KEUM SONGE, to take the ownerless forests remained around the village as the common forest in opposition to influential persons and on the other hand, they prepared the self-punishment system for the common management of their forests. They made a contribution to the forest protection by preserving the common forests in the late YI Dynasty. It is generally known that the absolute monarchy expr opriates the widespread common forests all over the country in the process of chainging from thefeudal society to the capitalistic one. At this turning point in Korea, Japanese colonialists made public that the ratio of national and private forest lands was 8 to 2 in the late YI Dynasty, but this was merely a distorted statistics with the intention of rationalizing of their dispossession of forests from Korean owners, and they took advantage of dead forbidden clause on the private occupancy of forests for their colonization. They were pretending as if all forests had been in ownerless state, but, in truth, almost all the forest lands in the late YI Dynasty except national forests were in the state of private ownership or private occupancy regardless of their lawfulness.
The organization for managing records and archives did not emerge together with the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. Such management became active with the establishment of the Department of Documents (文書科) and its affiliated offices overseeing reading and safekeeping of official papers, after the formation of the Central Secretariat(中央秘書處) in 1926. Improving the work of the Secretariat's organization became the focus of critical discussions in the early 1930s. The main criticism was that the Secretariat had failed to be cognizant of its political role and degenerated into a mere "functional organization." The solution to this was the "politicization of the Secretariat's work." Moreover, influenced by the "Rectification Movement" in the 1940s, the party emphasized the responsibility of the Resources Department (材料科) that extended beyond managing documents to collecting, organizing and providing various kinds of important information data. In the mean time, maintaining security with regard to composing documents continued to be emphasized through such methods as using different names for figures and organizations or employing special inks for document production. In addition, communications between the central political organs and regional offices were emphasized through regular reports on work activities and situations of the local areas. The General Secretary not only composed the drafts of the major official documents but also handled the reading and examination of all documents, and thus played a central role in record processing. The records, called archives after undergoing document processing, were placed in safekeeping. This function was handled by the "Document Safekeeping Office(文件保管處)" of the Central Secretariat's Department of Documents. Although the Document Safekeeping Office, also called the "Central Repository(中央文庫)", could no longer accept, beginning in the early 1930s, additional archive transfers, the Resources Department continued to strengthen throughout the 1940s its role of safekeeping and providing documents and publication materials. In particular, collections of materials for research and study were carried out, and with the recovery of regions which had been under the Japanese rule, massive amounts of archive and document materials were collected. After being stipulated by rules in 1931, the archive classification and cataloguing methods became actively systematized, especially in the 1940s. Basically, "subject" classification methods and fundamental cataloguing techniques were adopted. The principle of assuming "importance" and "confidentiality" as the criteria of management emerged from a relatively early period, but the concept or process of evaluation that differentiated preservation and discarding of documents was not clear. While implementing a system of secure management and restricted access for confidential information, the critical view on providing use of archive materials was very strong, as can be seen in the slogan, "the unification of preservation and use." Even during the revolutionary movement and wars, the Chinese Communist Party continued their efforts to strengthen management and preservation of records & archives. The results were not always desirable nor were there any reasons for such experiences to lead to stable development. The historical conditions in which the Chinese Communist Party found itself probably made it inevitable. The most pronounced characteristics of this process can be found in the fact that they not only pursued efficiency of records & archives management at the functional level but, while strengthening their self-awareness of the political significance impacting the Chinese Communist Party's revolution movement, they also paid attention to the value possessed by archive materials as actual evidence for revolutionary policy research and as historical evidence of the Chinese Communist Party.
The recent global financial crisis has been the outcome of, among other things, the mismatch between institutions and the reality of the market in the current global financial system. The International financial institutions (IFIs) that were designed more than 60 years ago can no longer effectively meet the challenges posed by the current global economy. While the global financial market has become integrated like a single market, there is no international lender of last resort or global regulatory body. There also has been a rapid shift in the weight of economic power. The share of the Group of 7 (G7) countries in global gross domestic product (GDP) fell and the share of emerging market economies increased rapidly. Therefore, the tasks facing us today are: (i) to reform the IFIs -mandate, resources, management, and governance structure; (ii) to reform the system such as the international monetary system (IMS), and regulatory framework of the global financial system; and (iii) to reform global economic governance. The main focus of this paper will be the IMS reform and the role of the Group of Twenty (G20) summit meetings. The current IMS problems can be summarized as follows. First, the demand for foreign reserve accumulation has been increasing despite the movement from fixed exchange rate regimes to floating rate regimes some 40 years ago. Second, this increasing demand for foreign reserves has been concentrated in US dollar assets, especially public securities. Third, as the IMS relies too heavily on the supply of currency issued by a center country (the US), it gives an exorbitant privilege to this country, which can issue Treasury bills at the lowest possible interest rate in the international capital market. Fourth, as a related problem, the global financial system depends too heavily on the center country's ability to maintain the stability of the value of its currency and strength of its own financial system. Fifth, international capital flows have been distorted in the current IMS, from EMEs and developing countries where the productivity of capital investment is higher, to advanced economies, especially the US, where the return to capital investment is lower. Given these problems, there have been various proposals to reform the current IMS. They can be grouped into two: demand-side and supply-side reform. The key in the former is how to reduce the widespread strong demand for foreign reserve holdings among EMEs. There have been several proposals to reduce the self-insurance motivation. They include third-party insurance and the expansion of the opportunity to borrow from a global and regional reserve pool, or access to global lender of last resort (or something similar). However, the first option would be too costly. That leads us to the second option - building a stronger globalfinancial safety net. Discussions on supply-side reform of the IMS focus on how to diversify the supply of international reserve currency. The proposals include moving to a multiple currency system; increased allocation and wider use of special drawing rights (SDR); and creating a new global reserve currency. A key question is whether diversification should be encouraged among suitable existing currencies, or if it should be sought more with global reserve assets, acting as a complement or even substitute to existing ones. Each proposal has its pros and cons; they also face trade-offs between desirability and political feasibility. The transition would require close collaboration among the major players. This should include efforts at the least to strengthen policy coordination and collaboration among the major economies, and to reform the IMF to make it a more effective institution for bilateral and multilateral surveillance and as an international lender of last resort. The success on both fronts depends heavily on global economic governance reform and the role of the G20. The challenge is how to make the G20 effective. Without institutional innovations within the G20, there is a high risk that its summits will follow the path of previous summit meetings, such as G7/G8.
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.
It can be said that 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' in 2001 were not only the indiscriminate attacks on innocent people but also the whole - political, economical and military - attacks on human life. Also, 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' can be regarded as the significant events in the history of world, which were on the peak of the super-terrorism or new-terrorism that had emerged from the 1980s. However, if one would have analysed the developments of terrorism from the 1970s, they could have been foreknown without difficulty. The finding from this study can be summarized as the followings, First, in spite that the USA responsive system against terrorism had been assessed as perfect before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks', the fragilities were found in the aspects of the response on the new-terrorism or super-terrorism. The previous responsive system before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' had the following defects as the followings: (1) it was impossible to establish the integrated strategy, because the organizations related to the response against terrorism had not integrated; (2) there were some weakness to collect and diffuse the informations related to terrorism; (3) the security system for the domestic airline service in USA and the responsive system of air defense against terrors on aircraft were very fragile. For these reasons, USA government established the 'Department of Homeland Security' of which the President is the head so that the many organizations related to terrorism were integrated into a single management system. And, it legislated a new act to protect security from terrors, which legalized of the wiretapping in spite of the risk of encroachment upon personal rights, increased the jail terms upon terrorists, froze the bank related to terrorist organization, and could censor e-mails. Second, it seem that Korean responsive system against terrors more fragile than that of USA. One of the reasons is that people have some perception that Korea is a safe zone from terrors, because there were little attacks from international terrorists in Korea. This can be found from the fact that the legal arrangement against terrorism is only the President's instruction No. 47. Under this responsive system against terrorism dependent on only the President's instruction, it is expected that there would be a poor response against terrors due to the lack of unified and integrated responsive agency as like the case of USA before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks'. And, where there is no legal countermeasure, it is impossible to expect the binding force on the outside of administrative agencies and the performances to prevent and hinder the terrorist actions can not but be limited. That is to say, the current responsive system can not counteract effectively against the new-terrorism and super-terrorism. Third, although there were some changes in Korean government's policies against terrorism. there still are problems. One of the most important problems is that the new responsive system against terrorism in Korea, different from that of USA, is not a permanent agency but a meeting body that is organized by a commission. This commission is controled by the Prime Minister and the substantial tasks are under the National Intelligence Service. Under this configuration, there can be the lack of strong leadership and control. Additionally, because there is no statute to response against terrorism, it is impossible to prevent and counteract effectively against terrorism. The above summarized suggests that, because the contemporary super-terrorism or new-terrorism makes numerous casualties of unspecified persons and enormous nationwide damages, the thorough prevention against terrorism is the most important challenge, and that the full range of legal and institutional arrangements for the ex post counteraction should be established. In order to do so, it is necessary for the government to make legal and institutional arrangements such as the permanent agency for protection from terrorism in which the related departments cooperates with together and the development of efficient anti-terror programs, and to show its willingness and ability that it can counteract upon any type of domestic and foreign terrorism so that obtain the active supports and confidence from citizens.
According to viewpoints of researchers and stakeholders, various opinions can be suggested on self-governing police system. Therefore, success of Korean self-governing police system will be defending on how to balance among conflicting values such as Empowerment, Political neutrality, Financial issues, Comprehensive competence in maintaining public safety. Before the launching of self-governing police system nation-wide, the experience of Jeju provincial police will be valuable model case. In specific, enlargement of work scope of self-governing police in Jeju province which has been introduced since last year will be a useful reference. There is more pessimism about self-governing police of Jeju province so far. However, this perspective is mostly based on the issue regarding hardwares such as manpower, equipment, law and organization. Issues regarding softwares such as organizational culture, operation system and work process need more attention to evaluate self-governing police system properly. To mark the first year after enlargement of work scope of Jeju police, this study demonstrate the overall result and implications of self-governing police of Jeju province based on documents, statistics, reports and media reports. In result, several preconditions are needed to implement the self-governing police system nation-wide successfully. 1. Strengthen the link between local government and local police 2. Establish the foundation for collaboration of state and local police 3. Enhance the aspect of citizen autonomy in local level 4. Reinforcing the capability of handling situation of state and local police 5. Invigorating the inter-organizational working group to operate self-governing police system effectively. The self-governing police system is unclosed topic to discuss. After this study, in-depth studies should be followed with more resources. Particularly, additional perspective including redundancy and equity need to be considered regarding self-governing police. By getting with the changes of macroscopic trends - lowbirth and aging, the fourth industrial revolution and possible reunification of north and south Koreas - these studies should suggest the long-term blueprint of self-governing police system of Korea.
At the Intergovernmental Meeting held in 1972, the London Convention was adopted to prevent marine pollution from dumping of wastes and other matter. After that, at the special meeting held at the Headquarters of the International Maritime Organization in 1996, the London Convention was revised to consider advances in technology of treatment and disposal of wastes and to reflect changes in understanding of marine environment and then the London Protocol was concluded. The London Protocol states more concrete management system for ocean dumping than the London Convention and also provides that the Meeting of Contracting Parties shall establish those procedures and mechanisms necessary to assess and promote compliance with the Protocol. With the London Protocol in force since 24 March 2006, the Meeting of Contracting Parties adopted the 'Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms (CPM) pursuant to Article 11 of the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention 1972' and established the Compliance Group in 2007. According to the CPM, members of the Compliance Group shall be nominated by Contracting Parties, based on equitable and balanced geographic representation of the five Regional Groups of the United Nations, and elected by the Meeting of Contracting Parties. In 2009, the Republic of Korea nominated a member of the Compliance Group to be subsequently elected by the Meeting of Contracting Parties with the approval of other states in Asia Group. Through the United Nations Regional Group System based on geographical identity or political affinity, Contracting Parties to the London Protocol are expected to form a voting bloc or to exchange information in meetings on the London Protocol. In this sense, it is noteworthy that the London Protocol introduced marine environmental management system for comprehensive prohibition of ocean dumping with exception of the so-called 'reverse-list' which had been earlier adopted by the 'Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, 1992 (OSPAR)' whose contracting parties belonged to Western European and Other States Group. In recent years, the jurisdiction of London Protocol has been extended to protect and preserve the marine environment from all sources of pollution. This will make the United Nations Regional Group System play more important roles in the activities associated with the London Protocol. For this reason, this article has considered characteristics of the United Nations Regional Group System and has analyzed influences of this Regional Group System in meetings on the London Protocol. This could provide preliminary information for the Republic of Korea to give due consideration to the United Nations Regional Group System on the activities associated with the London Protocol.