• 한국경영과학회지
• /
• 제28권4호
• /
• pp.115-129
• /
• 2003

This paper suggests that the profit sharing contract can be Pareto optimal for both supplier and the purchaser. It is shown that Pareto optimal risk sharing contract can be obtained even though the decisions are made in a decentralized manner. The effect of risk attitude of the members of the supply chain is discussed. We examined various aspects of the risk sharing contract such as risk altitude, bargaining power, and cost of information system. The different risk attitude changes the optimal parameters and decision variables. Especially, we proved that, when both the supplier and the purchaser are risk averse, the purchaser orders less quantity than when the one is risk neutral and the other is risk averse. If the fixed cost for the information system is big enough to satisfy a certain condition, it is Pareto optimal not to share the profit and the purchaser takes all the risk even though he is risk averse.

• 한국산학기술학회논문지
• /
• 제3권4호
• /
• pp.325-332
• /
• 2002

본 논문은 최적리콜보험계약의 설계와 관련된 논문의 survey이다. 리콜보험 뿐만이 아니라 최적보험계약을 만들기 위해서는 보험계약의 조건들이 내생적이라는 가정하에서 연구모형을 구축하고 분석의 과정에서는 보험구매를 위한 의사결정 원칙으로 기대효용이론, 비기대효용이론, 및 상태귀속적인 (state-dependent) 효용함수를 사용하였다. 어떠한 이론을 사용하더라도 최적보험의 조건들은 존재한다. 다만 계약조건에 관련되어서는 보험의 비용, 자기부담금, 보상한도액 등이 차이가 날 수 있다. 보험의 비용은 지급보험금과 선형, 오목형, 볼록형의 관계가 성립할 수 있으나 잠식비용과 고정비용의 존재를 인정하여야 한다. 이를 바탕으로 최적보험을 위한 비용 설계가 이루어져야 한다. 또한 전부보험이냐 일부보험이냐를 결정하는 자기부담금의 존재는 일률자기부담금형태와 점감식자기부담금형태가 가능하다. 자기부담금 수준의 결정과 관련하여 담보되는 모든 위험에 동일한 수준을 적용시킬 것인가 혹은 차별화시킬 것인가는 보험의 종류에 따라 달라질 수밖에 없다. 보상한도와 관련되어서는 특히 리콜보험에 있어서는 기업의 파산위험성이 상당히 존재하고 있으므로 계약당사자의 파산선고를 포함한 이익이 충분히 고려되어야 한다. 또한 제약조건으로는 불완전시장에 대한 이해를 필요로 하며 담보할 수 없는 배경위험의 존재에 대한 배려가 있어야 한다.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
• /
• 제19권4호
• /
• pp.513-526
• /
• 2023

Supply chain coordination plays a critical role in improving the enterprise performance and the competitive advantage of fresh e-commerce. This study explores the coordination problem of a two-echelon fresh produce e-commerce supply chain comprising a fresh e-commerce enterprise and a fresh supplier in a novel framework. In this framework, the fresh e-commerce sells fresh produce and provides promotion effort; meanwhile, the fresh supplier deliveries fresh produce and provides freshness-keeping effort. Specifically, the optimal decisions under centralized and decentralized decision-making are compared, and it is found that centralized decision-making is more profitable. Based on this work, we created a cost-sharing and revenue-sharing combination contract. This study demonstrates that this contract effectively coordinates the supply chain and makes both parties achieve Pareto optimization when the parameters meet certain conditions. Finally, the feasibility and validity of the contract are presented through a numerical example.

• 수산경영론집
• /
• 제18권1호
• /
• pp.37-57
• /
• 1987

This article discussed the characteristics of several Pareto-optimal incentive contracts between owner and labor, more specifically, four situations: reporting output jointly observable by labor ana owner; reporting both output and effort; incorporating other endogenous elements (like capital) that affect the production process and Pareto-optimal fee schedules; and ascertaining the effects of private pre-decision information private- decision information, and per-contact informational asymmetries. Also presented were several extensions of the basic contractual model, and the different components of agency costs associated with labor-owner contractual relations. In a single-period model, the agency problem exists because the uncertainty prevents the owner from using the cash flow to determine unambiguously the labor's action. Holmstrom(1979) suggests that "when the same situation repeats itself over time, the effects of uncertainty tend to be reduced and dystunctional behavior is more accurately revealed, thus alleviating the problem of moral hazard. " Under these conditions, if the labor selects the first-best level of effect in each period, the cash flow will be independent and identically distributed over time. As the number of periods increases, the variance of the labows average output, if he selects the first-best level of effort in each period, gets smaller. Note that for this diversification effect to occur, it is necessary that the owner evaluate the labor's effort over the entire history of his employment, rather than evaluate each period's performance separately. Radner(1980) and Rubinstein and Yaari(1980) consider the extreme case in which there are an infinite number of observations. They show that the owner can eventually detect and systematic shirking on the part of the labor by comparing the labor's average output with what would be expected if the labor had been selecting the first-best level of effort in each period. In a dynamic model with incentive problems we have demonstrated that the labor's second-period compensation will depend on his first-period performance. This allows the owner to diversify away some of the uncertainty surrounding the labor's actions. In addition, this allows the owner to smooth the labor's income over time by spreading the risk of the first-period outcome over both periods. At least some unexplored avenves in this area invite future accounting research: situations where owner has different incompatible objectives and negotiates a contract with labor; circumstances in which owner deals with multiple objectives and negotiates contracts with several labors simultaneously; the value of costly accounting information systems and communication in establishing, Pareto-optimal incentive contracts, and the value and effects of inside information, Thorough theoretical or empirical research on each of these topics not only would increase our knowledge about the role and significance of accounting information but could also provide explanations of the inherent differences among various organizations and in their economic behavior. behavior.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
• /
• 제39권4호
• /
• pp.137-146
• /
• 2016

In recent years, business environment is faced with multi uncertainty that have not been suffered in the past. As supply chain is getting expanded and longer, the flow of information, material and production is also being complicated. It is well known that development service industry using application software has various uncertainty in random events such as supply and demand fluctuation of developer's capcity, project effective date after winning a contract, manpower cost (or revenue), subcontract cost (or purchase), and overrun due to developer's skill-level. This study intends to social contribution through attempts to optimize enterprise's goal by supply chain management platform to balance demand and supply and stochastic programming which is basically applied in order to solve uncertainty considering economical and operational risk at solution supplier. In Particular, this study emphasizes to determine allocation of internal and external manpower of developers using S&OP (Sales & Operations Planning) as monthly resource input has constraint on resource's capability that shared in industry or task. This study is to verify how Stochastic Programming such as Markowitz's MV (Mean Variance) model or 2-Stage Recourse Model is flexible and efficient than Deterministic Programming in software enterprise field by experiment with process and data from service industry which is manufacturing software and performing projects. In addition, this study is also to analysis how profit and labor input plan according to scope of uncertainty is changed based on Pareto Optimal, then lastly it is to enumerate limitation of the study extracted drawback which can be happened in real business environment and to contribute direction in future research considering another applicable methodology.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
• /
• 제12권20호
• /
• pp.123-138
• /
• 1989

The primary objective of the agency research in the game theory lives in the maintenance of Pareto is optimal condition for the optimal incentive contract. The basic concepts which are related to this objective are reviewed in connection with the general assumptions to model it, the moral hazard and adverse selection which arised from the information asymmetry, and finally the problem of risk distribution. The demand for auditing and the role of auditor have been addressed by ASOBAC. Issues which an auditor is explicitly introduced in a principal-agent framework have been addressed in this paper. These issues must be confronted to appropriately with the auditor, and to achieve an adequate understanding of optimal confronting arrangement with the auditor. The first step in introducing an auditor into this analysis is to examine the game-theoretic foundation of such a expended agency model. The Mathematical program formulated may not yield solution that are resonable. This arises because the program may call for the auditor and manager to play dominated Nash equilibra in some subgame. The nontrivial natures of the subgame implies that randomized strategies by the auditor and manager nay be of crucial importance. The possibilities for overcoming the randomized strategy problem were suggested; change the rule of the game and or impose covexity condition. The former seems unjustifiable in on auditing context, and the latter promising but difficult to achieve. The discussion ended with an extension of the revelation principle to the owner manager-auditor game, assuming strategies. An examination of the restriction and improvement direction of the basic concept of agency theory was addressed in the later part of this paper. Many important aspects of auditor incentives are inherently multiple-agent, multiple-period, multiple-objectine, phenomena and require further analyses and researches.