• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.375-388
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• 2012

PVSS stands for publicly verifiable secret sharing. In PVSS, a dealer shares a secret among multiple share holders. He encrypts the shares using the shareholders' encryption algorithms and publicly proves that the encrypted shares are valid. Most of the existing PVSS schemes do not employ an ElGamal encryption to encrypt the shares. Instead, they usually employ other encryption algorithms like a RSA encryption and Paillier encryption. Those encryption algorithms do not support the shareholders' encryption algorithms to employ the same decryption modulus. As a result, PVSS based on those encryption algorithms must employ additional range proofs to guarantee the validity of the shares obtained by the shareholders. Although the shareholders can employ ElGamal encryptions with the same decryption modulus in PVSS such that the range proof can be avoided, there are only two PVSS schemes based on ElGamal encryption. Moreover, the two schemes have their drawbacks. One of them employs a costly repeating-proof mechanism, which needs to repeat the dealer's proof at least scores of times to achieve satisfactory soundness. The other requires that the dealer must know the discrete logarithm of the secret to share and thus weakens the generality and it cannot be employed in many applications. A new PVSS scheme based on an ElGamal encryption is proposed in this paper. It employs the same decryption modulus for all the shareholders' ElGamal encryption algorithms, so it does not need any range proof. Moreover, it is a general PVSS technique without any special limitation. Finally, an encryption-improving technique is proposed to achieve very high efficiency in the new PVSS scheme. It only needs a number of exponentiations in large cyclic groups that are linear in the number of the shareholders, while all the existing PVSS schemes need at least a number of exponentiations in large cyclic groups that are linear in the square of the number of the shareholders.

• Journal of Ocean Engineering and Technology
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.161-167
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• 2022

Three-dimensional finite element analysis (3D-FEA) models have been used to evaluate the shock-resistance responses of various equipments, including armaments mounted on a warship caused by underwater explosion (UNDEX). This paper aims to check the possibility of using one-dimensional (1D) FEA models for the shock-resistance responses. A frigate was chosen for the evaluation of the shock-resistance responses by the UNDEX. The frigate was divided into the thirteen discrete segments along the length of the ship. The 1D Timoshenko beam elements were used to model the frigate. The explosive charge mass and the stand-off distance were determined based on the ship length and the keel shock factor (KSF), respectively. The UNDEX pressure fields were generated using the Geers-Hunter doubly asymptotic model. The pseudo-velocity shock response spectrum (PVSS) for the 1D-FEA model (1D-PVSS) was calculated using the acceleration history at a concerned equipment position where the digital recursive filtering algorithm was used. The 1D-PVSS was compared with the 3D-PVSS that was taken from a reference, and a relatively good agreement was found. In addition, the 1D-PVSS was compared with the design criteria specified by the German Federal Armed forces, which is called the BV043. The 1D-PVSS was proven to be relatively reasonable, reducing the computing cost dramatically.

• Proceedings of the Korea Institutes of Information Security and Cryptology Conference
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• 2003.12a
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• pp.518-522
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• 2003

We propose a new auction protocol scheme that uses the publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme. Unlike the existing scheme where a verifiable encryption scheme is employed when there is a dispute between a bidder and the auctioneer, the proposed scheme essentially removes the potential of a dispute. In addition, it has a robust registration phase and any entities participating in or observing the auction can verify the correctness of the auction process. The manager does not directly chooses the private key for the bidders, but only verifies the correctness between the private key and the public key, thereby improving the security, such as a bid submission of a malicious manager using the private key of a bidder.