• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.63-98
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• 2012

Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea's nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world. Specifically, major maritime security threats include North Korea's nuclear proliferation and missile launching problems as well as military provocations nearby the Northern Limit Line(NLL) as witnessed in the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyong incidents. The ROK Navy has been supplementing its firm military readiness posture in consideration of North Korea's threats on the NLL. It has performed superb roles in defending the nation and establishing the Navy advanced and best picked. It also has been conducive to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, secure the sea lanes of communications, and establish regional stability and world peace. In order to effectively cope with the strategic environment and future warfares, the ROK Navy needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, this manuscript contends that the ROK Navy should strive for the establishment of the following: (1) Construction of Jeju Naval Base; (2) Strategic Navy Equipped with War Deterrence Capabilities; (3) Korean-type of System of Systems; (4) Structure, Budget and Human Resources of the Naval Forces Similar to the Advanced Countries; and (5) Strategic Maritime Alliance and Alignment System as well as Domestic Governance Network for the Naval Families.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.29
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• pp.193-222
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• 2011

Our country successfully hosted the G20 summit in Seoul in November, 2010. Afterwards, however, the Yeonpyungdo shelling incident took place by the North, and the North Korean nuclear issue have strained interKorean relations. Our country is going to host the nuclear security summit, which is of great significance at this point of time. The nuclear security summit is to be attended by 47 countries. The participant countries of this summit is larger in number than those of the ASEM, APEC and the G20 summit that our country has ever hosted. That is a large-scale international conference that invites the UN, the IAEA and the EU, which are three major nuclear-related international organizations. A successful hosting of the nuclear security summit will serve as an opportunity to boost our country's national prestige, and is likely be beneficial to the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue. Like other international submits in foreign countries, however, violent anti-globalization demonstrations are expected to occur when the nuclear security summit is held in April next year. The purpose of this study was to make a case analysis of demonstrations during multilateral international conferences hosted by foreign countries over ten years between 1999 and 2009, to examine the controversial points over the demonstrations, and ultimately to seek ways of ensuring safety against possible assemblies and demonstrations during the forthcoming nuclear security summit, which is scheduled to be held in April next year. The findings of the study on feasible security measures are as follows: First, information and intelligence gathering should be reinforced, and the inspection should be stepped up. Second, pacification among domestic NGOs and the supplementation of the existing legal devices are required. Third, publicity should be strengthened. Fourth, riot police officers should be selected as early as possible to bolster their education and training, and more reinforced emergency measures should be taken. It's needed to seek assistance from the military as one of emergency measures, and national defense readiness should be bolstered across the nation in collaboration with the Ministry of National Defense when the summit is near at hand. Finally, CBR countermeasures should be taken in preparation for CBR terrorism.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.5-27
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to look at USN's efforts to rebuild its combat power in the face of a reemergence of great powers competition, and to propose some recommendations for the ROKN. In addition to the plan to augment its fleet towards a 355-ships capacity, the USN is pursuing to improve exponentially combat lethality(quality) of its existing fleet by means of innovative science and technology. In other words, the USN is putting its utmost efforts to improve readiness of current forces, to modernize maintenance facilities such as naval shipyards, and simultaneously to invest in innovative weapons system R&D for the future. After all, the USN seems to pursue innovations in advanced military Science & Technology as the best way to ensure continued supremacy in the coming strategic competition between great powers. However, it is to be seen whether the USN can smoothly continue these efforts to rebuild combat strength vis-a-vis its new competition peers, namely China and Russian navy, due to the stringent fiscal constraints, originating, among others, from the 2011 Budget Control Act effective yet. Then, it seems to be China's unilateral and assertive behaviors to expand its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea that drives the USN's rebuild-up efforts of the future. Now, some changes began to be perceived in the basic framework of the hitherto regional maritime security, in the name of declining sea control of the USN as well as withering maritime order based on international law and norms. However, the ROK-US alliance system is the most excellent security mechanism upon which the ROK, as a trading power, depends for its survival and prosperity. In addition, as denuclearization of North Korea seems to take significant time and efforts to accomplish in the years to come, nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence by the US is still noting but indispensible for the security of the ROK. In this connection, the naval cooperation between ROKN and USN should be seen and strengthened as the most important deterrents to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as to potential maritime provocation by neighboring countries. Based on these observations, this paper argues that the ROK Navy should try to expand its own deterrent capability by pursuing selective technological innovation in order to prevent this country's destiny from being dictated by other powers. In doing so, however, it may be too risky for the ROK to pursue the emerging, disruptive innovative technologies such as rail gun, hypersonic weapon... etc., due to enormous budget, time, and very thin chance of success. This paper recommends, therefore, to carefully select and extensively invest on the most cost-effective technological innovations, suitable in the operational environments of the ROK. In particular, this paper stresses the following six areas as most potential naval innovations for the ROK Navy: long range precision strike; air and missile defense at sea; ASW with various unmanned maritime system (UMS) such as USV, UUV based on advanced hydraulic acoustic sensor (Sonar) technology; network; digitalization for the use of AI and big data; and nuclear-powered attack submarines as a strategic deterrent.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.145-164
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• 2014

Nuclear fusion is one of the most promising options for generating large amounts of carbon-free energy in the future. Major countries such as China, EU, and Japan have established a national plan for DEMO construction and they are implementing it. Korea has started a nuclear fusion research and development by the KSTAR project started in 1995. There are matured needs for a full-scale research and development initiatives to ensure competition with the major countries for DEMO as well as achieve the final goal to commercialize fusion energy. In this paper, we apply the TRL and AHP methods in order to identify the key technologies to conduct DEMO R&D. We propose the priorities of future R&D on DEMO by deriving a core technology in the field. At first, we review the scientific theory of fusion and trend of progress of DEMO activities in major countries. For previous studies, we review TRL and AHP methods to examine the technology classification system of DEMO and identify key technologies. We apply TRL method to identify readiness level of DEMO technologies and AHP to compensate shortcoming of TRL. The key technologies of DEMO to be secured from a synthesis result of the TRL and AHP are burning plasma, plasma facing material, structural material, high frequency heating, neutral particle beam, safety, plasma diagnostic, and simulation technologies.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."