• 제목/요약/키워드: Nuclear material accountancy

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Conceptual design of neutron measurement system for input accountancy in pyroprocessing

  • Lee, Chaehun;Seo, Hee;Menlove, Spencer H.;Menlove, Howard O.
    • Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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    • 제52권5호
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    • pp.1022-1028
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    • 2020
  • One of the possible options for spent-fuel management in Korea is pyroprocessing, which is a process for electrochemical recycling of spent nuclear fuel. Nuclear material accountancy is considered to be a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, for the purposes of which, the amount of nuclear material in the input and output materials should be measured as accurately as possible by means of chemical analysis and/or non-destructive assay. In the present study, a neutron measurement system based on the fast-neutron energy multiplication (FNEM) and passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) techniques was designed for nuclear material accountancy of a spent-fuel assembly (i.e., the input accountancy of a pyroprocessing facility). Various parameters including inter-detector distance, source-to-detector distance, neutron-reflector material, the structure of a cadmium sleeve around the close detectors, and an air cavity in the moderator were investigated by MCNP6 Monte Carlo simulations in order to maximize its performance. Then, the detector responses with the optimized geometry were estimated for the fresh-fuel assemblies with different 235U enrichments and a spent-fuel assembly. It was found that the measurement technique investigated here has the potential to measure changes in neutron multiplication and, in turn, amount of fissile material.

Evaluation of nuclear material accountability by the probability of detection for loss of Pu (LOPu) scenarios in pyroprocessing

  • Woo, Seung Min;Chirayath, Sunil S.
    • Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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    • 제51권1호
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    • pp.198-206
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    • 2019
  • A new methodology to analyze the nuclear material accountability for pyroprocessing system is developed. The $Pu-to-^{244}Cm$ ratio quantification is one of the methods for Pu accountancy in pyroprocessing. However, an uncertainty in the $Pu-to-^{244}Cm$ ratio due to the non-uniform composition in used fuel assemblies can affect the accountancy of Pu. A random variable, LOPu, is developed to analyze the probability of detection for Pu diversion of hypothetical scenarios at a pyroprocessing facility considering the uncertainty in $Pu-to-^{244}Cm$ ratio estimation. The analysis is carried out by the hypothesis testing and the event tree method. The probability of detection for diversion of 8 kg Pu is found to be less than 95% if a large size granule consisting of small size particles gets sampled for measurements. To increase the probability of detection more than 95%, first, a new Material Balance Area (MBA) structure consisting of more number of Key Measurement Points (KMPs) is designed. This multiple KMP-measurement for the MBA shows the probability of detection for 8 kg Pu diversion is greater than 96%. Increasing the granule sample number from one to ten also shows the probability of detection is greater than 95% in the most ranges for granule and powder sizes.

Investigations on the Pu-to-244Cm ratio method for Pu accountancy in pyroprocessing

  • Sunil S. Chirayath;Heukjin Boo;Seung Min Woo
    • Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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    • 제55권10호
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    • pp.3525-3534
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    • 2023
  • Non-uniformity of Pu and Cm composition in used nuclear fuel was analyzed to determine its effect on Pu accountancy in pyroprocessing, while employing the Pu-to-244Cm ratio method. Burnup simulation of a typical pressurized water reactor fuel assembly, required for the analysis, was carried out using MCNP code. Used fuel nuclide composition, as a function of nine axial and two radial meshes, were evaluated. The axial variation of neutron flux and self-shielding effects were found to affect the uniformity of Pu and Cm compositions and in turn the Pu-to-244Cm ratio. However, the results of the study showed that these non-uniformities do not affect the use of Pu-to-244Cm ratio method for Pu accountancy, if the measurement samples are drawn from the voloxidized powder at the feed step of pyroprocessing. 'Material Unaccounted For' and its uncertainty estimates are also presented for a pyrprocessing facility to verify safeguards monitoring requirements of the IAEA.

APPLICATION OF FUZZY SET THEORY IN SAFEGUARDS

  • Fattah, A.;Nishiwaki, Y.
    • 한국지능시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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    • 한국퍼지및지능시스템학회 1993년도 Fifth International Fuzzy Systems Association World Congress 93
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    • pp.1051-1054
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    • 1993
  • The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

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Estimation of Input Material Accounting Uncertainty With Double-Stage Homogenization in Pyroprocessing

  • Lee, Chaehun;Kim, Bong Young;Won, Byung-Hee;Seo, Hee;Park, Se-Hwan
    • 방사성폐기물학회지
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    • 제20권1호
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    • pp.23-32
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    • 2022
  • Pyroprocessing is a promising technology for managing spent nuclear fuel. The nuclear material accounting of feed material is a challenging issue in safeguarding pyroprocessing facilities. The input material in pyroprocessing is in a solid-state, unlike the solution state in an input accountability tank used in conventional wet-type reprocessing. To reduce the uncertainty of the input material accounting, a double-stage homogenization process is proposed in considering the process throughput, remote controllability, and remote maintenance of an engineering-scale pyroprocessing facility. This study tests two types of mixing equipment in the proposed double-stage homogenization process using surrogate materials. The expected heterogeneity and accounting uncertainty of Pu are calculated based on the surrogate test results. The heterogeneity of Pu was 0.584% obtained from Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) spent fuel of 59 WGd/tU when the relative standard deviation of the mass ratio, tested from the surrogate powder, is 1%. The uncertainty of the Pu accounting can be lower than 1% when the uncertainty of the spent fuel mass charged into the first mixers is 2%, and the uncertainty of the first sampling mass is 5%.

The National Inspection at KAERI

  • Kim, Hyun-Sook;Lee, Byung-Doo;Kim, In-Cheol;Kim, Hyun-Jo;Jung, Ju-Ang;Lee, Sung-Ho
    • 한국방사성폐기물학회:학술대회논문집
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    • 한국방사성폐기물학회 2016년도 춘계학술논문요약집
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    • pp.25-26
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    • 2016
  • In this paper, the major changes of the national inspection in respect of the KAERI nuclear facilities were summarized. The frequency of the national inspection was decreased since the amendment of the Notification of the NSSC on the national inspection. But the national inspection broadened its scope and its implementation procedures and criteria were not clear. So, it is necessary to establish and enhance the national inspection system including the implementing guides and criteria. In addition, the internal regulation of the nuclear material accountancy for the nuclear facilities should be approved from the NSSC and observed by the KAERI in accordance with the national law. As the Notification of the NSSC on the national inspection was amended in Sep. 2014, it need to be revised to reflect the detail accountancy procedures and the preparation of the national inspection. So, KAERI will revise it to meet the international and national requirements as well as to implement the safeguards effectively at facility level.

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U.S. FUEL CYCLE TECHNOLOGIES R&D PROGRAM FOR NEXT GENERATION NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT

  • Miller, M.C.;Vega, D.A.
    • Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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    • 제45권6호
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    • pp.803-810
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    • 2013
  • The U.S. Department of Energy's Fuel Cycle Technologies R&D program under the Office of Nuclear Energy is working to advance technologies to enhance both the existing and future fuel cycles. One thrust area is in developing enabling technologies for next generation nuclear materials management under the Materials Protection, Accounting and Control Technologies (MPACT) Campaign where advanced instrumentation, analysis and assessment methods, and security approaches are being developed under a framework of Safeguards and Security by Design. An overview of the MPACT campaign's activities and recent accomplishments is presented along with future plans.