• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2005.05a
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• pp.295-296
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• 2005

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.52 no.5
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• pp.1022-1028
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• 2020

One of the possible options for spent-fuel management in Korea is pyroprocessing, which is a process for electrochemical recycling of spent nuclear fuel. Nuclear material accountancy is considered to be a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, for the purposes of which, the amount of nuclear material in the input and output materials should be measured as accurately as possible by means of chemical analysis and/or non-destructive assay. In the present study, a neutron measurement system based on the fast-neutron energy multiplication (FNEM) and passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) techniques was designed for nuclear material accountancy of a spent-fuel assembly (i.e., the input accountancy of a pyroprocessing facility). Various parameters including inter-detector distance, source-to-detector distance, neutron-reflector material, the structure of a cadmium sleeve around the close detectors, and an air cavity in the moderator were investigated by MCNP6 Monte Carlo simulations in order to maximize its performance. Then, the detector responses with the optimized geometry were estimated for the fresh-fuel assemblies with different ²³⁵U enrichments and a spent-fuel assembly. It was found that the measurement technique investigated here has the potential to measure changes in neutron multiplication and, in turn, amount of fissile material.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.56 no.9
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• pp.3969-3980
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• 2024

Over the years, numerous evaluations of material attractiveness have been performed for conventional light water reactors to better understand the nature of the spent fuel material and its desirability for misuse at different points in the nuclear fuel cycle. However, availability of such assessments for newer, Generation IV reactors such as Molten Salt Reactors is rather limited. In the present study we address the gap in knowledge of material attractiveness for molten salt reactor systems and describe the nature of irradiated fuel salts which the nuclear safeguards community might be faced with in the near future as more and more such reactors enter commission and operation. Within the scope of the paper, we use a large database of simulated irradiated fuel salt isotopics (and other derived quantities such as gamma activity, decay heat, and neutron emission rates) developed specifically for a molten salt reactor concept in order to shed some light on possible weapons usability of uranium and plutonium present in the irradiated fuel salts. This has been achieved by proposing a new attractiveness metric that is better suited for quantifying attractiveness of irradiated salts from a model molten salt concept. The said metric has been computed using a database that has been created by simulating the irradiation of molten fuel salt in a concept core over a wide range of operational parameters (burnup, initial enrichment, and cooling time) using the Monte-Carlo particle transport code, Serpent. With the help of this attractiveness metric, the findings from this study have shown that in relative terms, molten salt spent fuel is more attractive than spent fuel produced by a conventional light water reactor. The findings also underscore the need for strengthened safeguards measures for such spent fuel. These results are expected to be useful in the future for regulatory authorities as well as for nuclear safeguards inspectors for designing a functional safeguards verification routine for irradiated fuel of such unique nature.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.10b
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• pp.490-492
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• 2005

Unattended continuous containment/surveillance systems for safeguards of nuclear facility result in large amounts of image and radiation data, which require much time and effort to inspect. Therefore, it is necessary to develop system that automatically pinpoints and diagnoses the anomalies from data. In this regards, this paper presents the nuclear material containment/surveillance system that integrates visual image and radiation data.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.50 no.7
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• pp.1120-1130
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• 2018

An analysis of a pyroprocessing safeguards methodology employing the Pu-to-$^{244}Cm$ ratio is presented. The analysis includes characterization of representative used nuclear fuel assemblies with respect to computed nuclide composition. The nuclide composition data computationally generated is appropriately reformatted to correspond with the material conditions after each step in the head-end stage of pyroprocessing. Uncertainty in the Pu-to-$^{244}Cm$ ratio is evaluated using the Geary-Hinkley transformation method. This is because the Pu-to-$^{244}Cm$ ratio is a Cauchy distribution since it is the ratio of two normally distributed random variables. The calculated uncertainty of the Pu-to-$^{244}Cm$ ratio is propagated through the mass flow stream in the pyroprocessing steps. Finally, the probability of Type-I error for the plutonium Material Unaccounted For (MUF) is evaluated by the hypothesis testing method as a function of the sizes of powder particles and granules, which are dominant parameters to determine the sample size. The results show the probability of Type-I error is occasionally greater than 5%. However, increasing granule sample sizes could surmount the weakness of material accounting because of the non-uniformity of nuclide composition.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.1-14
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• 1992

As North Korea signed 'the Korea Peninsula Non-Nuclearization Joint Declaration' at the end of last year as well as full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA in Jan.30 1992, her nuclear activity was incorporated into the international monitoring system and opportunities were arranged to .obstruct her nuclear weapon development and nuclear material diversion, which have been international issues up to recent years. However, achieving goals of the Joint Declaration and safeguards agreement should presuppose North Korea's sincerity toward the abandonment of nuclear weapon development. In this study, first of all, her nuclear policy, current situation of nuclear development and the capability of nuclear development are analyzed. Also, based on the analysis. attempts have been made to find methods of effective performance of the South-North Korea mutual nuclear inspection and the suggested methods are as follows; 1) Analysis of the limits of IAEA inspection and suggestion of its supplementary strategies 2) Securing and training professional inspectors for the South-North mutual inspection 3) Establishment of the verification technology to detect nuclear material diversion.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.45 no.6
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• pp.803-810
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• 2013

The U.S. Department of Energy's Fuel Cycle Technologies R&D program under the Office of Nuclear Energy is working to advance technologies to enhance both the existing and future fuel cycles. One thrust area is in developing enabling technologies for next generation nuclear materials management under the Materials Protection, Accounting and Control Technologies (MPACT) Campaign where advanced instrumentation, analysis and assessment methods, and security approaches are being developed under a framework of Safeguards and Security by Design. An overview of the MPACT campaign's activities and recent accomplishments is presented along with future plans.

• Journal of Radiation Industry
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.79-87
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• 2024

In a previous study, the suitability for use of inspection equipment was evaluated at temperatures outside the quality assurance range. The quality assurance operating temperature of the safeguards equipment is 0~+40℃, and previous studies have confirmed the performance of the safeguards equipment for temperatures ranging from -40~+70℃. The scintillator-based verification equipment showed a shift in the centroid channel and a change in the count rate in all temperature ranges, and the semiconductor-based safeguards equipment generated Leakage Current and equipment failure. In this study, a retrofit was performed applying a vacuum housing to the safeguards equipment (Inspector-2000-based inspection equipment), and performance evaluation was performed at a low temperature and snowy site, and it was confirmed that the same performance was observed as the measurement results at room temperature.

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 1999.05a
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• pp.453-453
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• 1999