• Title, Summary, Keyword: North Korea's nuclear test

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Efficacy of UN's Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear and North Korea's Regime Survival Strategy (유엔의 북핵 대북제재조치의 실효성과 북한의 체제생존전략)

  • KIM, JOO-SAM
    • Korea and Global Affairs
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    • v.2 no.1
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    • pp.69-92
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    • 2018
  • North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.

Nuclear-First Politics of Kim Jung Un Regime and South Korea's Deterrence Strategy (김정은 정권의 선핵(先核) 정치와 한국의 억제전략)

  • Kim, Tae Woo
    • Strategy21
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    • pp.5-46
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    • 2016
  • North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

North Korean Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and Reaction of Republic of Korea Navy (북한 SLBM 평가와 한국 해군의 대응방안)

  • Yoon, Sukjoon
    • Strategy21
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    • pp.47-81
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    • 2016
  • This paper has attempted to examine the political and operational contexts within which North Korea's latest acts of nuclear blackmail, its test-firing of an SLBM on April 23rd 2016 and its fourth nuclear test on January 6th 2016, should be understood. Analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinpo-class SSB is based on official South Korean, US and others sources, especially the ROK MND, as well as other resources from South Korea, US and others. Unfortunately, the results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough evidence available at present to either confirm or refute the existence of a functional North Korean SLBM and SSB. Nevertheless, the North Korean determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly. But even accepting North Korea's claims about its SLBMs at face value, which is undermined by news of apparently unsuccessful follow-up test-firings in November, and probably December 2015, there is little proof that North Korea has yet succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warhead, so the most extravagant fears are not yet justified. Taken together with North Korea's latest announcement of a supposed successful SLBM ejection-test, on March 23th 2016, the KN-11 SLBM claims should probably be seen as primarily about proving North Korea's status as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to bolster internal political support for Kim Jong-un's rule. In conclusion, this paper recommends formulating a preemptive anti-access strategy for the ROKN, proposes acquiring an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols, and urges extending the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-access strategy. Other deterrence options may be suggested, but it is surely significant that the ROKN has recently publically referred to the deployment of an ASW CV and SSNs for the first time.

North's Launching Their Missile and Nuclear Test (뉴스초점 - 북한의 미사일 발사 그리고 핵실험)

  • Choo, Seung-Hwan
    • Journal of the Korean Professional Engineers Association
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    • v.42 no.3
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    • pp.35-40
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    • 2009
  • After the yield of North Korea conducted underground the first nuclear test in 2006, which was less than a kiloton, it launched a vehicle on this April 9 again, which is believed to be a Taepo-dong 2 missile, defying international warnings that the move would violate U.N. resolutions, from Musudan-ni, North Korea. Its development and proliferation of ballistic missile and nuclear bomb technology pose a threat to the northeast Asian region and to international peace and security. In the other launching the missile, a newspaper reported that "While the launch was dubbed a failure by the U.S., it was an improvement over the North Koreans' July 2006 test of the Taepodong-2, said Green of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "It was definitely better than last time, but it's still not an operational system," Green said.

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UNSC Resolution against North Korea and ROKN's Reactions (유엔 안보리 대북제재 결의와 우리 해군의 대응)

  • Park, Chang Kwoun
    • Strategy21
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    • pp.82-113
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    • 2016
  • This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

The Media's Agenda Setting on the Nuclear Test of North Korea (북한 핵실험 이슈에 대한 언론의 의제구성)

  • Lee, Wan-Soo;Son, Young-Jun
    • Korean journal of communication and information
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    • v.56
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    • pp.175-193
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    • 2011
  • This study explored how South Korean newspapers covered North Korea's second nuclear test in May of 2009. Findings show that South Korean newspapers mostly reported North Korea's nuclear experiment in relatively negative tones. Their coverage mainly focused on the influences of nuclear threat from the North on the military, political and economic areas in South Korea. However, the media's agenda settings and frames were not similar in terms of each paper's political and ideological inclination. Whereas the progressive papers, such as the Hankyoreh and the Kyunghyang Shinmun, recognized that the current nuclear issue in Korean peninsula is getting worse because of South Korea's rigorous pressure on North Korea, the conservative papers, such as the Chosun Ilbo and the Donga Ilbo, see that the deadlock between North and South mainly comes from the system malfunction of North Korea. To prevent the current impasse, the left-side papers emphasized to develop the six-party talk in dealing with North Korean issue, while the right-wing papers paid attentions to the West's sanctions on North Korea and ensuring national security.

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A study on measure of North Korea's nuclear terror threat; Focusing on the guarantee of 'anticipatory self-defense' (북한 핵테러 위협 대비방안 연구; '선제적 자위권' 보장을 중심으로)

  • Kim, Yeon Jun
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.16 no.3_2
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    • pp.13-23
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    • 2016
  • North Korea had recently conducted the fourth nuclear test and ICBM tests, dared nuclear provocation targeting the Korea and the international community. It is determined based on experiments of nuclear and missile in progress in North Korea that the technical level of nuclear force reached the completion stage of standardization, lightweight, and variation. It is expected to become reality that North Korea executes the nuclear provocation targeting the Korea and the international community in the near future. Nuclear bomb is an absolute weapon that the logic of counterattack after allowing the first strike of the other party cannot be applied due to its tremendous destructive power. Therefore, as the opponent to North Korea that it decided to hold the nuclear, the exercise of anticipatory self-defense in order to guarantee a minimum of right to life is not a choice, but the only essential correspondence concept. At the moment that the North Korean nuclear provocation is expected in the near future, it shall be provided with competence to strike the origin region of provocation by forming a national consensus of preemptive strike enforcement. Also, in preparation for the fifth nuclear test of North Korea, which is anticipated, the national competence must be mobilize to be able to ensure the 'Nuclear Option' from the international community.

An Empirical Study for Efficient Preparation for Enhancing North Korean Nuclear Threat: Focusing on non-military field (북핵 위협 고도화에 효율적 대비를 위한 실증적 연구: 비군사 분야를 중심으로)

  • Kim, Eung-Soo
    • Korean Security Journal
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    • no.53
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    • pp.255-279
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    • 2017
  • The development of North Korea's nuclear weapons has worsened to the sixth nuclear test in 2017, and despite the sanctions of the international community including our government, we have not been able to offer clear solutions and alternatives, and the current measures are not enough in case of North Korea is using nuclear weapons. This study suggests how we should be prepared against the use of nuclear weapons under the premise that North Korea will never give up development of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The first chapter outlines the current status of our preparedness if North Korea makes a nuclear attack. The second chapter analyzes and evaluates the power of nuclear weapons and North Korea's nuclear weapons threat. In the third chapter, we analyze North Korea nuclear attack and analyze the wartime emergency situation and civil defense posture. Finally, in order to implement the solutions presented in the text, we will identify priorities and summarize further developments.

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South Korea's strategy to cope with local provocations by nuclear armed North Korea (핵위협하 국지도발 대비 대응전략 발전방향)

  • Kim, Tae-Woo
    • Strategy21
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    • pp.57-84
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    • 2013
  • North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

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A Study on the Mission Effect of a Sea-based BMD system (해상기반 탄도미사일 방어체계의 임무효과에 관한 연구)

  • Lee, Kyoung Haing;Choi, Jeong Hwan
    • Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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    • v.10 no.1
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    • pp.118-126
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    • 2016
  • North Korea has continued developing ballistic missiles with various ranges. Even through the recent launch long-range missiles, it can be inferred that North Korea's Missile technology has reached a level where it can even threaten the US. moreover, through the three times nuclear tests, North Korea is known to have succeeded at gaining 10~20KT of explosive power as well as the minimization and lightening of nuclear warhead. Considering the short length of war zone in Korean peninsula and the possibility of nuclear equipment, if be the most severe threat across the whole peninsula. Since the midcourse phase flight takes the longest time, ROK should establish the ability to intercept at this middle phase. From this perspective, this paper describes mission effect of a sea-based BMD system through empirical threat and flight characteristic analysis using MIT model that was not suggested in original research.